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THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION ! 
A STUDY IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POWER 
NEIL GORDON MACDONALD RJSNWICK 
This study focuses on the question of how far multinational corporations 
l i e beyond the regulatory control of nation-states. I n what sense 
are these corporations autonomous organisations whose rules and 
practice exist independent of State control? This i s a p o l i t i c a l 
rather than economic question, for conceptB such as power, control 
or independence are fundamentally p o l i t i c a l i n nature^ The th e s i s 
analyses four leading interpretations of tne multinationals and 
th e i r r e l a t i o n s with States, the actual c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of both 
'actors' and the role of o i l multinationals i n the international 
o i j industry i n r e l a t i o n to 'host' and 'home' governments. 
Much of the debate over multinationals centres upon t h e i r unique 
character. Organised on the b a s i s of productive ca p i t a l i n a 
number of countries, that i s , subsidiaries linked to ce n t r a l i s e d 
managerial, technical and f i n a n c i a l resources, i t i s argued that 
these companies exercise global f l e x i b i l i t y with which the Stiles 
- t i e d to t h e i r borders- cannot compete. 'Global Reach' i s therefore 
claimed to allow multinationals to ignore national regulations and 
int e r e s t s . 
This a n a l y s i s , however, suggests that tha multinational-State 
relationship takes place within the framework of national regu-
l a t i o n s and international supervisory bodies that e f f e c t i v e l y form 
the 'rules' for the multinationals and the boundaries for bargaining 1. 
The multinational forms an important and int e g r a l part of the 
prevailing system that i s largely r e f l e c t i v e of St a t e - i n t e r e s t s , 
rather than a major challenge to the authority of the States. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study i s concerned w i t h the question of how f a r m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
c o r p o r a t i o n s l i e beyond the r e g u l a t o r y c o n t r o l of n a t i o n - s t a t e s . I n 
t h a t sense are the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s autonomous i n s t i t u t i o n s whose r u l e s 
and p r a c t i c e e x i s t independent o f State c o n t r o l ? I t must be stressed 
t h a t t h i s i s a p o l i t i c a l and not an economic question f o r concepts 
such as c o n t r o l , power, or independence are fundamentally p o l i t i c a l 
i n nature. 
This area of study i s c l e a r l y important when regarded i n the context 
o f the c o n t i n u i n g debate w i t h i n the f i e l d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s 
as t o the proper emphasis t o be attached t o non-state o r g a n i s a t i o n s , 
and f o r the e v a l u a t i o n of the c o n t r i b u t i o n made t o the f i e l d by 
th e o r i e s such as t h a t which argues f o r a ' t r a n s a c t i o n a l ' approach t o 
the study o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . ^ ~ 
M u l t i n a t i o n a l s are, however, c o n t r o v e r s i a l s u b j e c t s i n t h e i r own 
r i g h t , arousing widespread i n t e r e s t as w e l l as strong passions. 
C r i t i c a l arguments are wide-ranging. Some claim t h a t these corporations 
c o n s i s t e n t l y abuse t h e i r pov/er by i n t e r v e n i n g i n the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l 
a f f a i r s o f States i n order t o p r o t e c t t h e i r p o s i t i o n against i n t e r n a l 
p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n . For supporting evidence such claimants p o i n t t o 
newspaper headlines of c o r r u p t i o n i n v o l v i n g m u l t i n a t i o n a l s and events 
such as the overthrow of the Chilean government w i t h the a i d o f 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . More c r i t i c a l s t i l l are arguments t h a t i d e n t i f y the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s as the main forces behind ' i m p e r i a l i s t ' f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s 
o f developed home States. The expansion of America's r o l e i n world 
a f f a i r s f o l l o w i n g the Second World War a t the same time as American 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s experienced t h e i r most r a p i d growth i s used t o support 
t h i s argument. A more c r i t i c a l argument s t i l l i s t h a t which believes 
the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t o represent new organisations t h a t dominate and 
e x p l o i t a l l States and which are e v o l v i n g i n t o i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t w i l l 
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supercede the States. 
A l t e r n a t i v e arguments t h a t f o l l o w more moderate perspectives o f the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s f a l l i n t o two d i s t i n c t p o s i t i o n s . The f i r s t argues 
t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are l a r g e l y c o n t r o l l e d by home State r e g u l a t i o n s , 
but t h a t there i s no c o r r e l a t i o n between government and c o r p o r a t i o n . 
The second i s t h a t which agrees t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are moving 
beyond State r e s t r i c t i o n s but argues t h a t t h i s development w i l l overcome 
3 
the ' d i v i s i v e n e s s * o f economic na t i o n a l i s m . 
Controversy over m u l t i n a t i o n a l s stems l a r g e l y from the d i s t i n c t i v e 
character o f these f i r m s . I t i s , perhaps, understandable why so much 
of the l i t e r a t u r e about the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s emphasises the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f economic f a c t o r s , f o r these corporations have experienced a 
meteoric r i s e i n t h e i r economic p o s i t i o n d u r i n g the post-war years. 
By 1971 the t o t a l 'book value' o f these co r p o r a t i o n s was ^165 b i l l i o n , 
adding some $$00 b i l l i o n t o the value of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy 
(almost one f i f t h of the world's GNP). The top t e n m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
alone accounted f o r fP> b i l l i o n , more t h a t the GNP of e i g h t y States. 
The consequence o f t h i s r a p i d economic development was, i n the view of 
one observer, t o leave the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s " v i s i b l e i n the 1950's and 
conspicuous by the end o f the 1960's."^ 
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I n i t i a l r e a c t i o n s t o the emergence of these corporations among 
statesmen were g e n e r a l l y favourable, although cautious, based upon 
t h e i r pragmatic a p p r a i s a l s of t h e i r c o u n t r i e s needs. To the Western 
European and Developing States a l i k e the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s provided new 
sources o f c a p i t a l and offex-ed employment, e x p e r t i s e , and economic 
growth. Yet, by the mid-1960's governments had openly begun "counting 
the costs''^ of m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s . The de s i r e f o r a r e -
a s s e r t i o n of n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s , the b e l i e f t h a t these c o r p o r a t i o n s 
might not a f t e r a l l prove able t o f u l f i l the a s p i r a t i o n s o f n a t i o n a l 
s o c i e t i e s , and concern over mounting n a t i o n a l dependence upon m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s , has novi l e d t o i n c r e a s i n g scepticism, s u s p i c i o n and h o s t i l i t y 
towards these f i r m s . Such r e a c t i o n s are not prevalent i n a l l c o u n t r i e s , 
nor w i t h uniform i n t e n s i t y i n those where they do e x i s t . 
The r e a c t i o n t o the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o the f a c t 
t h a t the overwhelming m a j o r i t y of these corporations are of American 
o r i g i n w i t h t h e i r parent companies located i n the United States, I n 
1950 the t o t a l 'book value' of American m u l t i n a t i o n a l s was f>\7, b i l l i o n 
and by I960 was $33 b i l l i o n and. i n the same decade the number of 
American m u l t i n a t i o n a l s u b s i d i a r i e s more than t r i p l e d from 7,000 t o 
23,000. By 1974 the 'book value' of these f i r m s had r i s e n t o $100 
7 
b i l l i o n . In the same pe r i o d America e s t a b l i s h e d i t s e l f as the 
'leader o f the Free World', a posture t h a t d i d not preclude i n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of States i n 'defence' of 'freedom' i n the 
face of the perceived t h r e a t from communism. Concern t h e r e f o r e , grew 
i n many States t h a t the str o n g economic p o s i t i o n of American m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s i n these c o u n t r i e s could be used by America f o r p o l i t i c a l 
ends. 
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The m u l t i n a t i o n a l , however, i s not only of American o r i g i n , a 
'merger-movement' - l a r g e l y sponsored by governments - i n Western 
Europe i n the 1960's has provided a basis f o r a 'European r i p o s t e ' 
and more r e c e n t l y s t i l l are signs t h a t Japanese corpor a t i o n s are 
adopting the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . The m u l t i n a t i o n a l phenomenon 
i s thus a progeny of the developed world w i t h a l l the home States 
Q 
being h e a v i l y i n d u s t r i a l i s e d . A t t e n t i o n has i n c r e a s i n g l y been 
paid t o t h i s p o i n t and t o the r o l e of m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i n the r e l a t i o n -
s h i p between developed and under-developed areas o f the w orld.^ 
The c r u c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
i t as worthy of so much a t t e n t i o n and study i s i t s possession of 
unique f e a t u r e s when compared t o previous i n t e r n a t i o n a l , entrepre-
n e u r i a l a c t i v i t i e s . I n a world b u i l t upon trade and investment, the 
presence o f n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a r r i e r s erected on the basis 
of n a t i o n a l economic i n t e r e s t provides f a c t o r s of u n c e r t a i n t l y f o r 
f i r m s engaged i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s . To l i m i t the p o s s i b l e 
d i s i - u p t i o n t o world-wide investments from t h e s e , b a r r i e r s and reduce 
the r i s k f a c t o r involved, corporations have adopted s t r a t e g i e s o f 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n t o increase t h e i r f l e x i b i l i t y and most 
i m p o r t a n t l y , t o reach beyond n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l b a i ' r i e r s by e s t a b l i -
shing s u b s i d i a r i e s t h a t operate w i t h i n States. The l i n k i n g of these 
s u b s i d i a r i e s t o a g l o b a l c o r p o r a t i v e perspective and o r g a n i s a t i o n , 
guided by parent companies overseas, does engender n a t i o n a l concern 
about outside manipulation of domestic c o n d i t i o n s by f o r c e s over which 
government i s unable t o exercise d i r e c t c o n t r o l . I t i s upon t h i s 
p o ssible compromising of n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y t h a t much of the debate 
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concerning m u l t i n a t i o n a l corporations centres. 
The a n a l y s i s o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the n a t i o n -
s t a t e involves questions of power and c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t . The 
concept o f power i s open t o a n a l y t i c a l debate on the grounds o f i t s 
conceptual and e m p i r i c a l ambiguities, but f o r the purpose of t h i s 
study power w i l l be used t o mean both the capacity and the process 
o f i n f l u e n c i n g the behaviour of others t o a c t or r e f r a i n from a c t i n g 
so t h a t the i n t e r e s t s o f the i n f l u e n c e r are f o l l o w e d . This i s not a 
t h e o r e t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n , r a t h e r i t f o l l o w s a common sense n o t i o n of 
power as i t r e l a t e s t o an assessment of performance. There are 
formidable conceptual and a n a l y t i c problems i n r e f i n i n g power 
so t h a t i t has an adequate t h e o r e t i c a l f u n c t i o n i n explanatory 
argument. Power i n the context o f t h i s study i s a r e l a t i o n a l concept -
there i s no evidence t h a t supports the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
i s able t o exercise absolute c o n t r o l overthe a c t i v i t i e s o f these 
co r p o r a t i o n s . The d i s t r i b u t i o n of power i s c l o s e l y bound up w i t h the 
c o n f l i c t s i n v o l v e d stemming from r e s p e c t i v e r a t i o n a l e s of State and 
co r p o r a t i o n . Power r e l a t e s t o the notions of c o n t r o l and dependency. 
No State i n contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y can be said t o be 
independent i n the absolute sense o f the term, the era of nuclear 
weaponry, the 'penetrated State' and 'economic interdependency', 
precludes such a s s e r t i o n s . The i n a b i l i t y o f n a t i o n a l governments t o 
s a t i s f y the economic a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e i r peoples creates pressures 
t h a t push governments i n t o r e l a t i o n s h i p s determined by economic i n t e r -
dependency. Such r e l a t i o n s h i p s pose p o l i t i c a l dilemmas f o r governments. 
C l e a r l y the r a t i o n a l e o f the State i s i t s ' n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t ' as 
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perceived by government. 'National i n t e r e s t ' i s however, open t o 
a v a r i e t y o f meanings and i s o f t e n used as a vague ' c a t c h - a l l ' . ^ 
One way o f av o i d i n g t h i s problematic term i s t o s u b s t i t u t e ' o b j e c t i v e s ' 
f o r ' i n t e r e s t s ' . O n e o f the 'core* n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s i s undoubtedly 
t h a t of maint a i n i n g the economic welfare o f the p o p u l a t i o n and i n 
seeking t o f u l f i l ' t h i s o b j e c t i v e governments look t o outside o r g a n i -
s a t i o n s such as the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t o supply goods or services t h a t 
they themselves cannot. This economic need, however, produces a p o l i t i c a l 
backlash i n t h a t interdependence has consequences f o r the 'core' 
n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e of maint a i n i n g a monopoly of a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the 
State i n the hands of government. Against the background o f such 
o b j e c t i v e s i t i s c l e a r why m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t h a t s t r a d d l e a number of 
States and are subje c t t o competing n a t i o n a l pressures are open t o 
suspic i o n and d i s t r u s t . The l i s t o f n a t i o n a l complaints against the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i s lengthy. 
Governments argue t h a t t h e i r attempts a t n a t i o n a l investment and 
resource planning are rendered meaningless by the decisions made by 
these f i r m s , o f t e n thousands of miles away, according t o t h e i r g l o b a l 
s t r a t e g i e s i r r e s p e c t i v e of n a t i o n a l goals. The same argument i s 
expressed i n r e l a t i o n t o pay, p r i c e s , employment o r budgetary planning. 
The d e c i s i o n of the Form Motor Company's s u b s i d i a r y i n B r i t a i n t o award 
i t s workforce a pay increase t h a t exceeded government pay g u i d e l i n e s 
i n the l a t e 1970's, may w e l l have been a c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r i n the 
eventual f a i l u r e o f the government t o achieve r e - e l e c t i o n i n 1979-
Trade unions i n B r i t a i n and America complain w i t h f r u s t r a t i o n t h a t 
jobs are l o s t by m u l t i n a t i o n a l decisions t o i n v e s t i n low-cost c o u n t r i e s 
-6-
as 'export-platforms', and more are then l o s t when the products 
are. marketed i n the developed States u n d e r c u t t i n g d o m e s t i c a l l y -
12 
produced equivalents. On the other hand, or g a n i s a t i o n s i n host 
States make claims against the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s of e x p l o i t a t i o n o f 
the indigenous workforce through the payment o f low wages. I n 
t h i s respect, the claims made i n recent years against m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
o p e r a t i n g i n South A f r i c a are some of the most s e n s i t i v e . 
I t i s , however, misleading t o ignore the d i s t i n t i o n s t h a t e x i s t 
between States. This study makes the d i s t i n c t i o n between the developed 
States and the developing States and a l s o between home and host States.. 
D i s t i n c t i o n s of s i z e , n a t i o n a l , economic, p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y 
resources or s t a t u s , i n general usage do not determine the degree o f 
i n f l u e n c e exerted by government upon a m u l t i n a t i o n a l i n d i r e c t 
p r o p o r t i o n , I n f l u e n c e i s determined by a number of a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s 
t h a t d i f f e r from country t o country. The e x t e n t t o which a government 
des i r e s what the m u l t i n a t i o n a l has t o o f f e r , the p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l 
development of the country and the awareness o f the experiences of 
o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i n t h e i r d ealings w i t h m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , p e r s o n a l i t i e s 
such as charismatic leaders, the domestic p o l i t i c a l complexion o f 
p a r t i e s and ' p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e ' , the p o l i t i c a l w i l l of the government 
t o f u l l y pursue i t s goals and the nature of the r e g i o n a l and g l o b a l 
pressures involved, together c o n t r i b u t e t o complex i n t e r a c t i o n s t h a t 
enable a government t o exercise power over m u l t i n a t i o n a l corporations. 
Perhaps the lowest common denominator i n a discussion o f the r a t i o n a l e 
o f the State i s t h a t i t seeks simply t o maximise i t s gains and minimise 
i t s losses. 
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I f the r a t i o n a l e of the State (here i d e n t i f i e d w i t h government) i s 
the f u l f i l m e n t of o b j e c t i v e s conceived of i n pu r e l y n a t i o n a l terms, 
the r a i s o n d'etre of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n i s fundamentally 
t h a t of p r o f i t maximisation. The s t r a t e g y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i v e r s i f i -
c a t i o n employed by these f i r m s i s be l i e v e d t o provide an a b i l i t y t o 
d i r e c t c a p i t a l and other resources t o those areas i n which p r o f i t 
can best be achieved. Such f l u i d i t y o f operations i m p l i e s t h a t the 
corporations are i n a p o s i t i o n t o avoid governments t h a t i ntroduce 
new c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are regarded by the f i r m s as adversely a f f e c t i n g 
t h e i r p r o f i t margins, or those c o u n t r i e s where changes i n p o l i t i c a l 
c o n d i t i o n s t h r e a t e n t o endanger the p o s i t i o n o f the f i r m . At the 
he a r t o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l concept l i e s a d e s i r e f o r market s t a b i l i t y 
and the r e d u c t i o n of r i s k s t o investment. By becoming h e a v i l y 
i n v o l v e d i n a l l 'stages' of production the i n f l u e n c e t h a t the corpo-
r a t i o n i s capable of e x e r t i n g i s increased, costs are reduced and 
s t a b i l i t y i s increased. Although debate continues over the exact 
nature o f m u l t i n a t i o n a l expansion, over the question whether i t i s 
defensive i n nature aimed a t p r o t e c t i n g e s t a b l i s h e d markets, or 
aggressive aimed a t c a p t u r i n g new markets, the e f f e c t o f the s t r a t e g y 
has been t o enable c o r p o r a t i o n s t o g e n e r a l l y b e n e f i t from comparative 
advantages t o be found among c o u n t r i e s . Manufacturers e s p e c i a l l y 
have grasped t h i s f e a t u r e o f m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s m . The B'ord Motor Company 
i n Europe, f o r example, i s organised i n such a way t h a t v e h i c l e 
components are produced i n d i f f e r e n t p a r t s o f Europe before being 
assembled i n s t r a t e g i c a l l y s i t e d f a c t o r i e s and then marketed throughout 
the Western European r e g i o n . 
The concomitant f e a t u r e s of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y ; world-wide 
s t r u c t u r e s , planning and resource movement place a p r i o r i t y upon most 
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m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , although c e r t a i n l y not a l l , t o hold the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
r i n g between na t i o n a l l y - b a s e d s u b s i d i a r i e s or a f f i l i a t e s . Returning 
t o the c e n t r a l question of t h i s study, tension and doubt concerning 
the m u l t i n a t i o n a l f e a t u r e s of s u b s i d i a r i e s remain among n a t i o n a l 
p o l i t i c i a n s . I n e f f e c t , the worries expressed by government o f f i c i a l s 
about the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s can be regarded as the age-old q u e s t i o n of 
l o y a l t y . .Do the s u b s i d i a r i e s owe u l t i m a t e l o y a l t y t o the requirements 
of the governments i n which they operate or t o the parent company? 
This i s a s t a r k choice t h a t many company executives might claim does 
not e x i s t since the unique nature of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l allows i t t o 
serve both. At a time when n a t i o n a l governments have harnessed the 
f o r c e s of the State i n t o an u n p a r a l l e l e d degree of c e n t r a l i s e d planning 
and management, the idea t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s u b s i d i a r y serves two 
masters creates obvious concern and r a i s e s questions ac t o the corn-
pa t a b i l i t y o f n a t i o n a l and c o r p o r a t i v e i n t e r e s t s . 
Before d i s c u s s i n g the qu e s t i o n of c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f i n t e r e s t , mention 
must f i r s t be made of the d i v e r s i t y i n the d i f f e r e n t types o f m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l t o be found. I n the thousands of such c o r p o r a t i o n s , the 
spectrum of s i z e ranges from those household names t h a t operate i n 
excess of e i g h t y c o u n t r i e s , such as the Royal Dutch-Shell Group of 
Companies, t o those who operate i n only two. The operations o f these 
e n t e r p r i s e s are e q u a l l y broad i n nature, there are the long - e s t a b l i s h e d 
companies t h a t deal i n o i l , copper, t i n , bauxite and other minerals, 
others deal i n diamonds and precious metals, others i n primary produce 
such as f r u i t , and s t i l l others i n the manufacturing of motor ve h i c l e s 
or computers. The s t r u c t u r e s and f l e x i b i l i t y o f these f i r m s vary 
according t o the nature of t h e i r business. Petroleum companies or 
9 
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copper producers are t i e d t o where nature has decreed t h a t these 
mineral deposits are t o be found. Manufacturers, on the other 
hand, are less t i e d t o one area since f a c t o r i e s can g e n e r a l l y be 
est a b l i s h e d anywhere and i n a r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t time. I n theory a t 
l e a s t , the l a t t e r companies have a g r e a t e r propensity t o be ' f o o t -
loose gia.nts' than the former. However, the p o i n t must be made t h a t 
once lar g e - s c a l e investment has been undertaken by a company i t i s 
h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t i t w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e d i r e c t i t s operations 
unless i t i s f e l t a b s o l u t e l y necessary f o r s u r v i v a l . A t t i t u d e s of 
governments towards these corporations vary according t o t h e i r 
operations, although there w i l l be those t h a t are h o s t i l e t o a l l 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s j u s t as there are those t h a t are f r i e n d l y . E x t r a c t i v e 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are perhaps the most 'conspicuous' of m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
and as such have received a great d e a l o f a t t e n t i o n from governments 
as the case study considered l a t e r r e v e a l s . Yet the very f a c t t h a t 
these corp o r a t i o n s were t i e d t o p a r t i c u l a r c o u n t r i e s f o r t h e i r s u p p l i e s 
u l t i m a t e l y strengthened the b a r g a i n i n g - p o s i t i o n o f the governments 
towards them. The p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t manufacturing f i r m s might 'go 
elsewhere' may have engendered a more low-key approach by host govern-
ments towards t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . The EEC's d e s i r e t o s t i m u l a t e cross-
border e n t e r p r i s e s , tempered by f e a r s of abuses by such f i r m s has 
r e s u l t e d not i n s t r i d e n t anti-monopoly l e g i s l a t i o n but r a t h e r a code 
of behaviour t o which m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i n p a r t i c u l a r are expected t o 
adhere. D i f f e r e n c e s apart, however, i t would appear t h a t the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s share a de s i r e f o r p r o f i t a b i l i t y and f o r the 
e l i m i n a t i o n o f r i s k and i t s replacement by a " s u r p r i s e - f r e e world". 
Despite the s i z e , scope, and unique s t r a t e g y o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l , i t 
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i s d i f f i c u l t t o avoid the evidence t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l does 
e x i s t i n a world organised by and f o r the n a t i o n - s t a t e s . The 
laws t h a t govern the t r a n s a c t i o n s between c o u n t r i e s , and the norms 
of behaviour involved, are those e s t a b l i s h e d by the States themselves. 
The question r a i s e d by the growth of m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i s t o what e x t e n t 
these corporations are e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e i r own • r u l e s * f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r a n s a c t i o n s and d i s r e g a r d i n g the framework e s t a b l i s h e d by n a t i o n a l 
governments? The massive increase i n n a t i o n a l planning i n the post-
war years would seem t o suggest t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are very much 
l i m i t e d i n t h e i r choice of a c t i o n s . As the understanding o f the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l form of business has grown w i t h i n governments, t a x a t i o n 
laws, labour laws, competition, trade and investment r e s t r i c t i o n s 
have been a s t u t e l y imposed upon these f i r m s c r e a t i n g a widespread 
network o f n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s on these c o r p o r a t i o n s . These c o n t r o l s 
have been r e i n f o r c e d by important r e l a t e d developments. Governments 
have g e n e r a l l y been i n c r e a s i n g l y w i l l i n g t o intervene i n t h e i r 
s o c i e t i e s . Pressure has been s u c c e s s f u l l y exerted upon the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s t o in v o l v e newly-established government-backed companies i n 
t h e i r operations through j o i n t ventures, consortiums, or by means o f 
shared ownership agreements. N a t i o n a l pressures are enhanced by the 
emergence of m u l t i l a t e r a l cooperation between s i m i l a r l y placed 
governments. Regional groupings, producer ' c a r t e l s ' , consumer groupings, 
have a l l provided i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums i n which n a t i o n a l pressures 
upon m u l t i n a t i o n a l s can be coordinated and mutual assistance sought 
and provided. The United Nations, s t i m u l a t e d by the concern of member 
cou n t r i e s about the r o l e of these c o r p o r a t i o n s , has published a code of 
conduct t o govern the behaviour of these f i r m s . The m u l t i n a t i o n a l s can, 
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as an i n d i v i d u a l person may do, simply ignore the law. Unlike a 
case of i n d i v i d u a l d i s r e g a r d f o r law, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n 
i s not governed by one law or r e i n f o r c e d by a s i n g l e a u t h o r i t y . 
As has been noted above there i s a t l e a s t a p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r 
c o n f l i c t based upon the r e s p e c t i v e r a t i o n a l e o f the State and of the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l . The question, however, must be asked i n t h i s study 
how f a r t h i s p o t e n t i a l f o r c o n f l i c t i s a c t u a l l y r e a l i s e d ? 
Although the m u l t i n a t i o n a l phenomenon might have been s t u d i e d here 
i n the context of t h e o r i e s of i n t e g r a t i o n , cybernetics, or t r a n s -
n a t i o n a l i s m , f o u r arguments i n p a r t i c u l a r appear t o o f f e r hypotheses -
i n answer t o the questions posed i n t h i s study. These arguments are 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d as the Neo-Imperialist, Neo-Mercantllist, Sovereignty-at-
IS 
Bay, and Global Reach i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . ^ This study seeks t o r e l a t e 
these arguments t o the a v a i l a b l e evidence and evaluate the s t r e n g t h 
o f t h e i r explanations. 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as a whole argue t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are 
l a r g e l y beyond the c o n t r o l of the n a t i o n - s t a t e s . The n e o - i m p e r i a l i s t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s i t s e l f d i v i d e d between those who argue t h a t the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l represents an economic o r g a n i s a t i o n o p e r a t i n g on a 
p u r e l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l of c a p i t a l t h a t ignores p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s 
and views these c o r p o r a t i o n s as the l a t e s t stage of e x p l o i t a t i v e and 
preying c a p i t a l i s m , and those t h a t argue t h a t they represent the agents 
o f the c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s t o e x p l o i t other economic t e r r i t o r i e s . The 
former view t h e r e f o r e conceives of these forms as being independent of 
a l l c o u n t r i e s , w h i l s t the l a t t e r r e t a i n s the view t h a t , as the main 
economic con c e n t r a t i o n i n the home State, the m u l t i n a t i o n a l r e q u i r e s 
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the home government t o pursue ' i m p e r i a l i s t ' p o l i c i e s on t h e i r behalf. 
The n e o - m e r c a n t i l i s t s also argue t h a t there i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
home governments and m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , but views t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i n 
terms of n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l , r a t h e r than purely economic, power. The 
co r p o r a t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e not completely independent from the i n f l u e n c e 
o f the home States' i n t e r e s t s , although t h i s view also believes t h a t 
the home country becomes dependent upon these f i r m s which allows the 
l a t t e r i n c r e a s i n g autonomy. For the 'sovereignty* and g l o b a l reach 
arguments the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s seen as g r a d u a l l y escaping the p o l i t i c a l 
framework of n a t i o n - s t a t e s and becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y autonomous. 
However, as the discussion e a r l i e r h i g h l i g h t s , the a b i l i t y o f govern-
ments t o intervene and re g u l a t e these f i r m s suggests t h a t a r e a l i s t i c 
conclusion must lean towards the view which regards the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
as being t i e d i n t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment o f n a t i o n - s t a t e s . 
These i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s s t r e s s the degree of autonomy t h a t they do 
l a r g e l y because o f t h e i r a n a l y s i s o f power and i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n between 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l and n a t i o n - s t a t e . Without exception the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
conceive of power as capa c i t y t o i n f l u e n c e through t h e i r economic 
p o s i t i o n . Even the n e o - m e r c a n t i l i s t s argue t h a t n a t i o n a l power r e s t s 
h e a v i l y upon economic capacity. The emphasis upon the economic indices 
o f turnover, p r o f i t , o r the number of co u n t r i e s of operation o f these 
corp o r a t i o n s , by these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and the attempt t o use these i n 
a d i r e c t comparison w i t h c o u n t r i e s leads i n consequence t o the a s s e r t i o n 
t h a t power i s asymmetrically d i s t r i b u t e d i n favour o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l . 
Power and i n f l u e n c e , however, are concerned not only w i t h measurable 
c a p a b i l i t i e s but w i t h u n q u a n t i f i a b l e i n t a n g i b l e s such as p e r s o n a l i t i e s 
or p o l i t i c a l w i l l as noted e a r l i e r . Moreover, the successive rounds of 
bargai n i n g between m u l t i n a t i o n a l s and governments le a d i n g t o s i g n i f i c a n t 
advantages accruing t o the l a t t e r , e s p e c i a l l y i n the o i l i n d u s t r y , 
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i n d i c a t e the r e c i p r o c a l nature of power i n these r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
The assumption of asymmetrical power i s c l o s e l y entwined w i t h a 
r e l a t e d b e l i e f t h a t there i s an inherent and i r r e c o n c i l a b l e c o n f l i c t 
o f i n t e r e s t s between the State and the m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n . 
To the n e o - i m p e r i a l i s t s the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s form mechanisms f o r the 
accumulation of c a p i t a l and as such propogate the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
d i v i s i o n o f labour between the c a p i t a l i s t ownership and the workers, 
whether t h i s i s regarded i n terms of people or of States. Furthermore, 
the debate w i t h i n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n between the i n t e r n a t i o n a l and 
n a t i o n a l l e v e l s o f a n a l y s i s i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o a t h e o r e t i c a l 
debate concerning a c o n f l i c t between an emergent i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy 
and the e s t a b l i s h e d n a t i o n a l economic u n i t s . The n e o - m e r c a n t i l i s t s 
argue t h a t c o n f l i c t i s present between m u l t i n a t i o n a l and host govern-
ment sincethere i s argued t o be a harmony of i n t e r e s t between e n t e r p r i s e 
and home government. As the main instrument f o r the enhancement of 
n a t i o n a l power and i n f l u e n c e , the m u l t i n a t i o n a l thereby represents 
the l e a d i n g contemporary focus f o r the c o n f l i c t between those countries 
t h a t dominate and those t h a t are dominated. As i n the previous 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , the sovereignty-at-bay view i s o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
as an economic u n i t . This view argues t h a t these corp o r a t i o n s , by 
a c t i n g as the means by which n a t i o n a l economies are drawn i n t o a s i n g l e 
world economy, places them t e m p o r a r i l y i n c o n f l i c t w i t h governments. 
Once a world economy i s achieved the disharmony of n a t i o n a l economic 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t w i l l be removed. This same development i s i d e n t i f i e d 
by the g l o b a l re^ch argument but i s regarded w i t h pessimism. The 
philosophy and o r g a n i s a t i o n of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l , summed up as "one 
woiiiism","^ i s believed t o be i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h the immobile, 
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t e r r i t o r i a l l y - b o u n d n a t i o n - s t a t e . However, the three aspects of 
these arguments concerning c o n f l i c t ; t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s 
breaking down n a t i o n a l borders; t h a t c o n f l i c t i s i n e v i t a b l e ; and 
t h a t c o n f l i c t i s i r r e c o n c i l a b l e ; are not supported by evidence. 
The preceeding d i s c u s s i o n of power and autonomy has suggested 
t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s remain very much a pa r t of the n a t i o n -
s t a t e framework. I t cannot simply be assumed t h a t because m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
operate i n a number o f cou n t r i e s t h a t i t i n e v i t a b l y f o l l o w s t h a t they 
are i n c o n f l i c t w i t h these c o u n t r i e s . Tensions and c o n f l i c t s of 
i n t e r e s t do e x i s t , but the l a r g e number o f mutually accepted agreements 
t h a t r e s u l t from bargaining such as those i n the o i l i n d u s t r y , do not-
support the view t h a t c o n f l i c t s are e i t h e r i n e v i t a b l e or i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . 
I n order t o a i d e v a l u a t i o n of these arguments surrounding the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h the n a t i o n - s t a t e s , a case study of the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o i l i n d u s t r y i s included i n t h i s work. The o i l m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s o f f e r advantages t o studente-of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l phenomenon. 
In f o r m a t i o n and s t a t i s t i c a l evidence i s more r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e f o r 
these e n t e r p r i s e s than f o r others, mainly as a r e s u l t of the increased 
research f o l l o w i n g the o i l c r i s i s of 1973-7^. As the e a r l i e s t and 
l a r g e s t o f m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , the ' o i l majors' form an obvious grouping 
d e a l i n g i n a commodity t h a t f e a t u r e s l a r g e i n n a t i o n a l d e l i b e r a t i o n s . 
This i s not a comparative study, but by examining the character of 
these corporations and the issues i n v o l v e d i t may prove t o enhance 
understanding o f the problems and arguments a t the centre of the 
debate on these f i r m s . The i n c l u s i o n of a case study i s , t h e r e f o r e , 
i n p a r t an attempt t o ask whether the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s looked a t i n 
chapter two stand up t o e m p i r i c a l enquiry. This i s not an exercise 
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i n ' s c i e n t i f i c t e s t i n g * f o r such l i e s beyond the terms o f reference 
f o r t h i s study. Indeed these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s do not lend themselves 
t o such t e s t i n g being l a r g e l y h i s t o r i c a l exercises of a loose and 
generalised nature w i t h only the n e o ~ i m p e r i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
p resenting i t s e l f as a general t h e o r e t i c a l study. 
I n the f o l l o w i n g chapter, the main elements i n these r e s p e c t i v e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are analysed and discussed. Chapter three forms a 
d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s and the n a t i o n - s t a t e s . 
Chapters f o u r and f i v e c o n s t i t u t e the case study. An o v e r a l l per-
spective of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o i l i n d u s t r y i s f o l l o w e d by a d e t a i l e d 
study o f the o i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h various 
governments d u r i n g the e a r l y years of the 1970's. The concluding 
chapter draws together the arguments r a i s e d throughout the study, 
discusses t h e i r relevancy t o a v a i l a b l e evidence, and attempts t o 
e s t a b l i s h what i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n 




Neo-imperialism, as p a r t of the wider t h e o r e t i c a l body t h a t i s 
marxism, argues t h a t s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and h i s t o r i c a l 
change derive p r i n c i p a l l y from the m a t e r i a l bases of s o c i e t y . 
"For marxism i m p e r i a l i s m i s not a p o l i t i c a l or i d e o l o g i c a l 
phenomena but expresses the imperative n e c e s s i t i e s of advanced 
capitalism.^" " N e o - i m p e r i a l i s t s accept as a basic premise a funda-
mental importance f o r the 'means of pro d u c t i o n ' i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s 
o f human a f f a i r s : 
"Marxism t r a c e s the dynamic of s o c i a l a c t i v i t y and 
h i s t o r i c a l development t o i t s r o o t s i n the production 
and r e p r o d u c t i o n of the means of existence. I t i s on 
the m a t e r i a l base, i t s e l f c o n t i n u a l l y changing as men 
e s t a b l i s h g r e a t e r powers of c o n t r o l over t h e i r environment, 
t h a t the sup e r s t r u c t u r e of c u l t u r e , i n s t i t u t i o n s , laws 
and p o l i t i c a l systems a r i s e s . While these s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l 
f o r c e s may and do assume an autonomy of t h e i r own and r e a c t 
upon the m a t e r i a l base they are, i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s , 
r e f e r a b l e t o i t . " 2 
I n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h e r e f o r e , the m u l t i n a t i o n a l - as the l a r g e s t 
and most i n t e r n a t i o n a l o f c a p i t a l i s t e n t e r p r i s e s - i s the d i r e c t 
consequence of the c a p i t a l i s t mode of produc t i o n i n which an i n s a t i a b l e 
search f o r p r o f i t , and i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n of labour and a world 
network of dependent and e x p l o i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s are the e s s e n t i a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e an attempt t o e x p l a i n 
the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i n the wider context o f a general theory o f c a p i t a l i s m . 
Although an e a r l y stage i n the discussion, i t i s important t o p i n - p o i n t 
f o u r a n a l y t i c a l problems w i t h t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t i n h i b i t i t almost 
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from the outset. F i r s t l y , by attempting t o e x p l a i n m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
by means of a general theory, the question a r i s e s as t o the extent 
t o which the phenomena t o be explained i s manipulated simply t o 
s u b s t a n t i a t e the o v e r a l l theory. Whilst not n e c e s s a r i l y d e l i b e r a t e , 
i t may be t h a t the c r i t e r i a used f o r explanation are predetermined 
by the p r e - e x i s t i n g theory and consequently produce explanation 
t h a t f i t s f a vourably i n t o the o v e r a l l a n a l y s i s . 
Secondly, much a n a l y t i c a l c i r c u l a r i t y may be responsible f o r the 
overemphasis upon economic determination i n the nature and r o l e o f 
the m u l t i n a t i o n a l . I n the previous chapter the p o i n t has been h i g h -
l i g h t e d t h a t the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s not economic 
but p o l i t i c a l . Neo-imperialism confuses i t s explanatio n by i n c o r r e c t l y 
equating economic s t r e n g t h w i t h p o l i t i c a l power, and, by assuming 
t h i s , concluding t h a t the power and r o l e of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l can be 
q u a n t i f i e d , i t s behaviour and e f f e c t s described and p r e d i c t e d by the 
mechanics of economic f o r c e s . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t a l k i n g about 
•imperialism' •• i n other words - c o n t r o l . But c o n t r o l i s more than 
economic might, i t involves concepts such as sovereignty and autonomy, 
emotional and psychological f a c t o r s , and questions o f subjugation and 
r u l e . These cannot be q u a n t i f i e d or reduced t o economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
and t o do so i s t o f o l l o w a barren explanatory path. 
T h i r d l y , the n e o - i m p e r i a l i s t argument i s formulated i n absolute terms. 
I t i s argued t h a t m u l t i n a t i o n a l economic s t r e n g t h provides an over-
whelming leverage w i t h which i t forces States t o accept c o n d i t i o n s 
they might otherwise r e j e c t . However, as chapter t h r e e below i n d i c a t e s , 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as a whole mistake m u l t i n a t i o n a l appearance f o r 
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r e a l i t y . I t i s c l e a r from the evidence looked a t throughout t h i s 
study t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are not as strong i n t h e i r economic, 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l , or m o t i v a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as these arguments 
assume, nor i n p r a c t i c e do these f i r m s exercise such a dominating 
leverage i n the contemporary system.' The claim, moreover, t h a t 
the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s manipulate n a t i o n a l e n t i t i e s i s s u r e l y of p o l i -
t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e r a t h e r than economic, f o r the l i m i t a t i o n of n a t i o n a l 
a u t h o r i t y - n a t i o n a l sovereignty - i s by i t s very nature a p o l i t i c a l 
q u e s t i o n i n v o l v i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f f a r g r e a t e r complexity than the 
simply drawn equations of the n e o - i m p e r i a l i s t s . I n t e n s i v e bargaining, 
such as t h a t o f the o i l i n d u s t r y , characterises the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h States, each a c t o r seeking t o maximise i t s b e n e f i t s 
but u l t i m a t e l y w i l l i n g t o seek compromise i n order t o maintain .access 
t o the resources i t desires from the o t h e r j t h e r e f o r e , i t i s not 
uncommon t o see a continu 'if\g dialogue between m u l t i n a t i o n a l s and 
States even a f t e r the dramatic step of n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n has been 
enacted by the State. I t i s i n t h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o resolve competing 
goals and i n t e r e s t s t h a t the p o l i t i c a l nature o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between m u l t i n a t i o n a l s and States l i e s ; both i n the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o i n d i v i d u a l States and a l s o i n i t s p o s i t i o n 'in-between' 
States competing i n t e r e s t s . ^ 
F o u r t h l y , w h i l s t i t i s c l e a r l y possible t o argue t h a t there are 
competing i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the m u l t i n a t i o n a l - S t a t e r e l a t i o n s , i t i s 
misleading t o a s s e r t - as t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n does - t h a t the r e l a t i o n s 
are i n h e r e n t l y , i n e v i t a b l y , and i r r e c o n c i l a b l y c o n f l i c t u a l . This claim 
stems l a r g e l y from an assumed conception of the c a p i t a l i s t system as 
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being founded upon economic c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and d r i v e n by a h i s t o r i c a l 
development of p e r i o d i c c o n f l i c t t h a t i s tantamount t o a 'law' of 
7 
human development and r e l a t i o n s . However, s p e c i f i c t o the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s , where c o n f l i c t has occurred i t has r e s u l t e d from p a r t i c u l a r 
circumstances r a t h e r than any inherent p r o p e n s i t y f o r c o n f l i c t . I n % 
v i r t u a l l y a l l the cases of high t e n s i o n between the a c t o r s there has 
been eventual agreement and s t a b i l i t y achieved, l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t of 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l acquiescence t o State demands i n the face of mounting 
pressure and c o l l e c t i v e s t a t e b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s . Together these 
a n a l y t i c a l problems amount t o an insurmountable b a r r i e r t o complete 
and persuasive explanation, as the more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n below 
re v e a l s . 
Standing f i r m l y i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n of w r i t e r s such as Marx 
and Lenin are the ' S t a t e - c a p i t a l i s t ' and ' S u p e r - c a p i t a l i s t ' arguments 
t h a t c o n s t i t u t e the two main contemporary n e o - i m p e r i a l i s t l i n e s of 
thought. The former argues t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s the instrument 
of the developed c a p i t a l i s t States, e x p l o i t i n g the resources and cheap 
labour t o be found i n the less-developed States, thereby ensuring the 
continued s u r v i v a l of what Lenin c a l l e d " p a r a s i t i c or decaying 
c a p i t a l i s m . " The l a t t e r view argues t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l has l e f t 
behind i t s 'home' State t i e s and acts independently i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
system, a new phenomenon of c a p i t a l i s t development, c r e a t i n g a l l s t a t e s 
i n t o dependencies and e x p l o i t i n g them f o r i t s own aggrandisement. The 
d i f f e r e n c e i n the l e v e l of a n a l y s i s r e f l e c t s the formers emphasis upon 
the ' n a t i o n a l ' development of c a p i t a l and the l a t t e r s emphasis upon 
the ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n ' of c a p i t a l . To begin with,however, i t i s 
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important t o review the Marx-Lenin t r a d i t i o n t h a t forms the "basis 
o f a l l the l a t e r w r i t i n g s before moving onto d i s c u s s i o n of 
contemporary arguments. 
Marx argued t h a t the productive forces released by the c a p i t a l i s t 
mode o f production could not be contained w i t h i n the confines o f 
the advanced c a p i t a l i s t States. Marx d i d not develop a theory of 
i m p e r i a l i s m but three aspects of h i s thought have become c e n t r a l 
t o neo-imperialism. F i r s t l y , Marx asserted t h a t c a p i t a l i s m i s an 
i n h e r e n t l y expansionist system: 
"The c o n d i t i o n s of bourgeois s o c i e t y are too narrow t o 
comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the 
bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand, by 
enforced d e s t r u c t i o n o f a mass of productive f o r c e s ; on 
the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by more 
thorough e x p l o i t a t i o n of the o l d one's." 9 
The c a p i t a l i s t e n t e r p r i s e , be i t the 19th century f i r m or the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l , i s b e l i e v e d t o be f o r c e d abroad by the economic necessity 
of overcoming a tendency f o r the r a t e of p r o f i t t o f a l l . " * " 0 To break 
out o f an i n e v i t a b l e s l i d e i n t o s t a g n a t i o n the e n t e r p r i s e expands 
abroad, mainly t o less-developed c o u n t r i e s , t o e x p l o i t the cheap 
labour, raw m a t e r i a l s , and market, thus producing a higher p r o f i t 
and continued growth. 
This f i r s t point,however, h i g h l i g h t s a problem t h a t runs through-
out t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , namely the assumption o f too high a l e v e l of 
systematic r a t i o n a l i t y . I n attempting t o e x p l a i n using " s c i e n t i f i c ' 
methodology. Marx d e l i v e r a t e l y created an a b s t r a c t i o n : 'pure c a p i t a l i s m ' . 
The p e r f e c t 'closed system' o f t o t a l re-investment simply does not e x i s t . 
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There are too many immeasurables f o r such a system t o be compared t o 
' r e a l i t y ' or f o r a s t r i c t law o f d e c l i n i n g p r o f i t t o be advocated. 
Capitalism as a productive 'form' and as a systematic ideology has 
been replaced i n many areas o f the world and i s under t h r e a t i n 
others. Even i n the h i s t o r i c a l b i r t h p l a c e of c a p i t a l i s m , 'mixed-
economies' and ' w e l f a r e - s t a t e ' s o c i e t i e s r e f l e c t the weakening i n 
the s t r i d e n c y of ' l a i s s e z - f a i r e ' ideology. I n terms o f the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l , expansionism i n the marxian sense does not e x i s t . M u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s are growing i n size and .scope and p r o f i t s are reaching new 
l e v e l s , " ^ but such trends hide the u n c e r t a i n basis of these f i r m s 
growth. The m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are, i f anything, dependent upon the 
continued g o o d w i l l of the States i n a l l o w i n g them t o operate w i t h i n 
t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . I t i s claimed t h a t these f i r m s make themselves 
indispensable, but the r i s e i n the s t r e n g t h and scope o f the obsoles-
c i n g bargain lessens the f o r c e o f t h i s claim. I n some i n d u s t r i e s 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s have been reduced t o c o n t r a c t o r s , pressured i n t o 
unwanted j o i n t - v e n t u r e s w i t h State companies, or simply expropriated.''' 
For some the pressure has fo r c e d them t o withdraw r a t h e r than t r y to 
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' f i g h t - i t - o u t * w i t h the State. ^ There i s a grea t d i f f i c u l t y t h e r e -
f o r e i n t r y i n g t o p r o j e c t Marx's idea of c a p i t a l i s t expansionism i n t o 
the contemporary system, although as we s h a l l see t h i s has not stopped 
others from t r y i n g . 
Marx's second p o i n t i s r e l a t e d t o the present-day claim t h a t m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s are by nature monopolistic and o l i g o p o l i s t i c . Marx argued 
t h a t the e v l y p e r i o d of c a p i t a l i s m characterised by a high degree of 
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competition, would be replaced by a c o n s o l i d a t i o n of c a p i t a l and 
a lpwer l e v e l o f competition. By r a t i o n a l i s i n g production, t e c h -
n o l o g i c a l advance, and mergers, a small number of f i r m s are l e f t 
i n the market. Monopoly c a p i t a l i s m i s t h e r e f o r e established l e a v i n g 
economic (and thus p o l i t i c a l ) power i n the hands of a few. M u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s w i t h massive R & D expenditures, high technological, l e v e l s 
and r e l a t i v e l y small numbers,^ are bel i e v e d t o be the u l t i m a t e 
evidence of Marx's theory. However, there i s l i t t l e evidence t o 
suggest t h a t these m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are able t o s u s t a i n any level, of 
cooperation f o r any l e n g t h o f time, competition and s e l f - i n t e r e s t 
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c o n s t a n t l y *breaking-out'. Moreover, m u l t i n a t i o n a l s do notexercise 
t o t a l c o n t r o l over t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n d u s t r i e s ; the r i s e of indepen-
dent f i r m s and of State-owned companies have provided a l t e r n a t i v e s t o 
the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s and s i g n i f i c a n t l y undermine the a b i l i t y o f such 
f i r m s t o exercise c a r t e l power over S t a t e s . ^ 
T h i r d l y , Marx argued t h a t c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y i s d i v i d e d i n t o a r u l i n g 
bourgeois class owning the means of production, and a p r o l e t a r i a n mass 
e x p l o i t e d by the former. I n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system t h i s meant t h a t 
wealth and poverty became p o l a r i s e d between r i c h and poor c o u n t r i e s . 
Translated i n t o the contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, i t i s argued 
t h a t a c a p i t a l i s t "metropolis' a t t r a c t s economic surplus ( p r o f i t s ) 
drawn from less-developed ('periphery') States through the medium of 
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a c t o r s such as the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . 'The law of the class s t r u g g l e ' 
thus concludes t h a t r i c h (developed) States e x p l o i t poor ( l e s s -
developed) States by means of the dependent r e l a t i o n s created by the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . 
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Apart from doubts as t o what 'class' a c t u a l l y i s , g r e a t e r doubts 
must be expressed over i t s usefulness i n e x p l a i n i n g m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . 
Marx's concept i s too s i m p l i s t i c t o o f f e r convincing explanation. 
The abstracted view of two homogeneous class blocs, mutually 
a n t a g o n i s t i c and i r r e c o n c i l a b l e , v e i l s the complexities of i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Where, f o r instance, does t h i s theory place the 
Arab s t a t e s w i t h t h e i r immense wealth, m i l i t a r y power, but under-
developed i n d u s t r i a l i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e s ? C o n f l i c t , o f course, does 
occur, but i t i s not i n e v i t a b l e . United Nations programmes, r e g i o n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e s , and reviews such as the 'Brandt Report', 
i n d i c a t e attempts t o increase cooperation and understanding between 
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r i c h and poor i n the world. The discussion of 'dependencia* models 
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below, i n d i c a t e s t h a t such r e l a t i o n s h i p s are r a r e l y the 'zero-sum' 
s i t u a t i o n s p o s i t e d by the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Marx was not a t t e m p t i n g t o o f f e r a s p e c i f i c explanation of Imperialism, 
and h i s arguments may t h e r e f o r e be claimed t o form merely a b a c k c l o t h 
t o today's arguments. But since these three elements have been sub-
sumed i n t o contemporary thought, i t i s important t o note t h a t the flaws 
evident above are c a r r i e d through t o modern t h e o r i e s . 
Lenin took up the concept o f monopoly c a p i t a l i s m and placed i t a t the 
centre of h i s own study, and i t i s Lenin who can be a c c r e d i t e d w i t h 
the development o f the f i r s t f u l l theory of economic i m p e r i a l i s m . 
Imperialism represented f o r Lenin "the monopoly stage of c a p i t a l i s m " , 
i t s e l f being the highest and f i n a l stage t o be reached by c a p i t a l i s m . 
Not only had c a p i t a l i s t c o n c e n t r a t i o n reached i t s highest p o i n t i n the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a r t e l s of the period, but i t was characterised by a new 
f e a t u r e : . 
a 
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"Under the o l d c a p i t a l i s m , when f r e e competition 
p r e v a i l e d , the export o f 'goods' was the most 
t y p i c a l f e a t u r e . Under modern c a p i t a l i s m , when 
monopolies p r e v a i l , the export of ' c a p i t a l ' has 
become the t y p i c a l f e a t u r e . " 21 
At the hea r t o f t h i s new stage of development i s the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c a r t e l : 
"Monopolistic c a p i t a l i s t i c combines-cartels, 
syndicates, t r u s t s - d i v i d e among themselves, 
f i r s t of a l l , the whole i n t e r n a l market of a 
country, and impose t h e i r c o n t r o l , more or less 
completely, upon the i n d u s t r y o f t h a t country. 
But under c a p i t a l i s m the home market i s i n e v i t -
a b l y bound up w i t h the f o r e i g n market. Capitalism 
long ago created a world market. As the export 
o f c a p i t a l increased, and as the f o r e i g n and 
c o l o n i a l r e l a t i o n s and the 'spheres of i n f l u e n c e ' 
o f the b i g monopolist combines expanded, t h i n g ' s 
' n a t u r a l l y ' g r a v i t a t e d towards the foundation of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a r t e l s . " 22 
The competition between the large c a p i t a l i s t c a r t e l s makes i t an 
inescapable imperative, i n Lenin's view, f o r home s t a t e s t o secure 
the areas o f overseas trade f o r t h e i r 'own' f i r m s and prevent thern 
f a l l i n g i n t o the hands of competitors. C a p i t a l i s t competitive 
investment t o extend c o n t r o l i s claimed t o necessitate the e x t e n t i o n 
o f p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l i n the form o f empire, thus forming V...a s o l i d 
basis f o r i m p e r i a l i s t oppression and the e x p l o i t a t i o n of most o f the 
co u n t r i e s and nations of the world; a s o l i d basis f o r the c a p i t a l i s t 
23 
p a r a s i t i s m of wealthy States." ^ P o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t 
i n e v i t a b l y ensues from such competition; Lenin's 'Law o f Uneven 
Development' allows f o r nothing e l s e . " 
Described by one c r i t i c as a "work of n e g l i g i b l e i n t e l l e c t u a l q u a l i t y 
25 
but vast p o l i t i c a l consequence", Lenin's work i s c r i t i c i s e d on a 
number of p o i n t s . F i r s t , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the economic and 
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p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y m o tivations behind WWI are not proved. The 
economic advantages t o be gained from such c o n f l i c t were small w h i l s t 
the s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l gains are obvious d u r i n g a peri o d o f 
?6 
renaissance f o r German power." Second, the question of monopoly 
f o r today's system i s u n l i k e l y t o receive the answer t h a t Lenin 
gave f o r the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s do not represent the forces of t o t a l 
c o n t r o l p o s i t e d i n t h i s view. Moreover, Lenin's f a i t h i n the r o l e 
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played by 'finance c a p i t a l ' ' must be countered by the f a c t t h a t 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are very l a r g e l y s e l f - f i n a n c i n g o rganisations f r e e 
o f many t i e s t o Banks. The evidence t h a t the m a j o r i t y of m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l investment goes not t o less-developed States but t o the 
developed States appears t o be i n d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o Lenin's 
argument. 
F i n a l l y , the post-Second World War p e r i o d has seen the primacy of 
the p r i n c i p l e of ' n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ' and the broadly 
v o l u n t a r y dismantlement o f the formal empires through the de-
c o l o n i s a t i o n process. When t h i s process began t o gather pace the 
Marx-Lenin t h e s i s appeared dead; how could c a p i t a l i s m expand as 
t h i s view argues i t must t o survive? What i s the r o l e of the i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l monopoly-cartel or m u l t i n a t i o n a l - wit h o u t the formal 
presence and p r o t e c t i o n of t h e i r 'home' States? 
The challenge has been taken up by the S t a t e - c a p i t a l i s t and super-
c a p i t a l i s t arguments r e f e r r e d t o above. To de a l f i r s t w i t h the 
S t a t e - c a p i t a l i s t school; two sub-views e x i s t ; the Neo-Leninist 
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which accepts the Marx-Lenin t r a d i t i o n but regards the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l as the instrument of c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e s t o e x p l o i t over-
seas economic advantages i n an ' i n f o r m a l ' framework of m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
'empire'} and what may be c a l l e d the ' A m e r i c a n i s a t i o n a l i s t ' which 
argues t h a t both the t r a d i t i o n and the n e o - l e n i n i s t s are c o r r e c t 
i n t h e i r analyses but t h a t r a t h e r than the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s a c t i n g as 
the instruments of a l l developed States they are a c t u a l l y the agents 
o f only one, the l a r g e s t c a p i t a l i s t country - The United States. 
Again these arguments accept t h a t economic fo r c e s a ct as the major 
dynamics i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, and the t h e s i s t h a t the s i g n i -
f i c a n c e o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s economic r a t h e r than p o l i t i c a l . Nec-
L e n i n i s t w r i t e r s such as Maurice Dobb, Richard Wolff, and Turn Kemp 
i m p l i c i t l y accept the c e n t r a l ideas of economic determinism, c a p i t a l 
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c o n c e n t r a t i o n and the class nature o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. 
However, the r a p i d d i s m a n t l i n g of form a l empires necessitated a d j u s t -
ments t o the o v e r a l l explanation. M u l t i n a t i o n a l s thus became the 
cornerstones of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; by c r e a t i n g and d i s t r i b u t i n g 
l a r g e amounts of investment the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are conceived as 
spinn i n g all-embracing webs of dependent and e x p l o i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s 
these e n t e r p r i s e s are the p r i n c i p a l means, i n t h i s view, by which the 
o l d formal empires were simply replaced by i n f o r m a l ' i n v i s i b l e * means 
of c o n t r o l . 
Imperialism, i n t h i s view, i s fundamentally economic, being d e f i n e d a 
"...a r e l a t i o n between two co u n t r i e s or areas i n v o l v i n g the 
c r e a t i o n o f s u p e r - p r o f i t f o r the b e n e f i t of one of them, e i t h e r 
by means o f some form of m o n o p o l i s t i c a l l y r e g u l a t e d trade 
between them, or by an investment of c a p i t a l by one of them 
i n the other a t a higher r a t e of p r o f i t than t h a t p r e v a i l i n g 
i n the former," 30. 
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Moreover, m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are claimed t o s t i l l drag t h e i r 'home' 
States overseas w i t h them, through the extension o f ' i n f o r m a l ' 
spheres of p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . Thus: 
"...modern c a p i t a l i s t i m p e r i a l i s m comprises a complex 
of p r i v a t e corporate p o l i c i e s , supplemented by induced 
government support, seeking t o develop secux-e sources 
of raw ma t e r i a l s and food, secure markets f o r manufactures, 
and secure o u t l e t s f o r both p o r t f o l i o and dix-ect c a p i t a l i s t 
investment." 31 
But from the evidence a v a i l a b l e , 'home' government support -
when r e a l l y needed by the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , has been d i s t i n c t l y 
l a c k i n g and when given has been s i n g u l a r i l y i n e f f e c t u a l , weak, and 
3? 
l a r g e l y counter-productive. " 'Home* government confidence i n the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l has been undermined by the success o f the r e n e g o t i a t i o n 
o f the p o s i t i o n of m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i n 'host' States c e n t r a l t o the 
obsolescing bargain. The questions of / l o y a l t y ' r a i s e d by events i n 
the o i l i n d u s t r y d u r i n g the 'seventies', e s p e c i a l l y among 'american' 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s and the US government, bear witness t o the u n c e r t a i n t y 
and i n s t a b i l i t y f e l t i n 'home' coun t r i e s over the r o l e played by 
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these e n t e r p r i s e s and the repercussions f o r t h e i r own s i t u a t i o n . 
N e o - i m p e r i a l i s t s fm'ther claim t h a t State c o n f l i c t s have now been 
superseded by a world competition among m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , t y i n g up the 
newly emerging States as e f f e c t i v e l y as the o l d empires had once done 
"While not r e l a x i n g the economic s t r a n g l e h o l d over these 
t e r r i t o r i e s and sectors where the e x t r a c t i o n o f surplus value, 
and i t s r e a l i s a t i o n , can take place smoothly and on an 
expanded scale, major t a c t i c a l changes have been made i n the 
p o l i t i c a l f i e l d , there has been withdrawal from untenable 
p o s i t i o n s . P o l i t i c a l power has been passed t o the nascent 
bourgeois and new independent s t a t e s have come i n t o existence. 
I f we look, however, a t the a c t i v i t i e s o f the b i g e x t r a t e r r i -
t o r i a l companies i n these areas, they are as important as ever. 
New p r i v a t e investment takes place as, and when, expedient. 
Government a i d goes i n the prop up the economies of unviable 
s t a t e s which have been brought i n t o existence as the r e s u l t 
of ' d e c o l o n i s a t i o n ' . . . . 
The new s t a t e s , whose r u l e r s i n f a c t are hostages 
f o r the continued presence o f the monopolistic concerns 
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which they cannot do without, show l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y 
of being able t o generate t h e i r own supplies of 
c a p i t a l on a scale adequate to b u i l d up balanced i n -
• d u s t r i a l economies. Their dependence on the world 
market grows r a t h e r than diminishes and economic 
independence i s a mirage." Jk. 
The problem w i t h t h i s view i s t h a t w h i l s t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are 
very important a c t o r s , t h e i r investments have been i n c r e a s i n g l y 
r e g u l a t e d by States. Of course f o r e i g n investment takes place 
only where expedient; few successful businessmen i n v e s t i n un-
favourable c o n d i t i o n s . Investment presumably continues t o f l o w i n t o 
t h e s e c o u n t r i e s because m u l t i n a t i o n a l s s t i l l f e e l t h a t t h e i r r e t u r n s 
w i l l m e r i t i t . There i s l i t t l e t o stop governments from r e n e g o t i a t i n g 
the o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s once the m u l t i n a t i o n a l has been enticed i n t o 
e n t r y , as the Arab o i l States have discovered t o t h e i r b e n e f i t . With 
the a c q u i s i t i o n of staWiood comes al s o the r i g h t t o r e f u s e access. 
This r i g h t has been used s p a r i n g l y since i t i s more u s e f u l as a 
b a r g a i n i n g counter and i t s implementation i s more a sign t h a t bargain-
i n g has f a i l e d . 
States are not hostages. With b e t t e r bank balances, g r e a t e r knowledge 
and t e c h n i c a l experise gained through ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' agreements, 
c o l l e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n s and b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s , i t i s i n c o r r e c t 
to claim e i t h e r t h a t these cou n t r i e s do not possess s u b s t a n t i a l bar-
g a i n i n g power or t h a t they are unable t o do w i t h o u t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . 
The o v e r a l l p i c t u r e o f the government m u l t i n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i n d i c a t e s a g r e a t e r degree of balance than i s accepted by t h i s i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n . The accepted desire f o r the obvious b e n e f i t s t h a t the 
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m u l t i n a t i o n a l s can o f f e r i s balanced against the dangers of l o s t 
sovereignty and e x p l o i t a t i o n , but also against the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
d e s i r e f o r access and i t s awareness t h a t i t s terms of e n t r y w i l l be 
under pressure once investment begins t o flow. The m f i j o r i t y o f 
bargains appear t o r e f l e c t t h i s pi-agmatic understanding o f each 
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a c t o r s p o s i t i o n and i n t e r e s t s . y Bargaining takes place w i t h i n the 
o v e r a l l context o f the n a t i o n - s t a t e s system, but the bargaining 
i t s e l f takes place on the basis o f a r e a l i s t i c a p p r a i s a l of mutual 
advantages r a t h e r than from a p o s i t i o n of absolute c o n t r o l . 
For the A m e r i c a n i s a t i o n a l i s t s the multinational i s predominantly the 
agent o f America. As the l a r g e s t and most advanced c f c a p i t a l i s t 
States, America i s s a i d t o be the i d e a l environment f o r the emergence 
of such f i r m s , and the f a c t t h a t America remains the 'home' f o r the 
t 
vast m a j o r i t y of m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i s regarded as supporing and conclusive 
proof f o r t h i s a s s e r t i o n . Apologists however, d i f f e r as t o whether 
t h i s expansion from one base i s u n i t i n g " c a p i t a l i s m i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y 
or whether i t i s l e a d i n g t o r i v a l r y among c a p i t a l i s t States. 
' S u p e r - i m p e r i a l i s t s ' argue t h a t America i s the "organiser of world 
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c a p i t a l i s m , preserving i t s u n i t y i n the face of Socialism". American 
hegemony i s claimed t o be d i v i d i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system between 
the c a p i t a l i s t r i c h and the under-developed poor. The flows of 
d i r e c t investment suggest t h a t t h ere i s a high l e v e l of m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
a c t i v i t y i n the developed c o u n t r i e s and t h a t American investment i n 
31 
Western Europe i s very l a r g e . But t o argue t h a t t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d 
c a p i t a l i s t u n i t y under American hegemony i s misleading. S e l f - i n t e r e s t 
promotes as much competition as cooperation among these c o u n t r i e s , 
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and French, I t a l i a n and Japanese d i r i g e s t e p o l i c i e s are being more 
moderately f o l l o w e d by other Western European States. Furthermore, 
when i t comes t o the crunch - as i n the 1973-7^' o i l c r i s i s - u n i t y was 
s u p e r f i c i a l , i f t h a t . Confusion and suspicion m i t i g a t e d a g a i n s t 
American attempts t o mold the ' c a p i t a l i s t West' i n t o a coordinated 
and u n i t e d group under i t s leadership. 
Harold Magdoff argues, however, t h a t American encouragement f o r 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s stems from the d e s i r e t o t i e i n the developing c o u n t r i e s 
t o i t s g l o b a l defence against the spread of s o c i a l i s m and the i n f l u e n c e 
o f the Soviet Union: 
"...there i s a close p a r a l l e l between on the one hand, the 
aggressive United States f o r e i g n p o l i c y aimed a t c o n t r o l l i n g 
( d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y ) as much of the globe as p o s s i b l e , 
and on the other hand, an e n e r g e t i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l expansion-
i s t p o l i c y of United States business." ^2 
Thus the Gold War; GIA involvement i n Guatemala; and the involvement 
i n Vietnam are a l l claimed t o e x p l a i n a b l e i n terms of a defence of 
economic i n t e r e s t . Domestically, the government-business r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i s s a i d t o be evidenced by the corporate t a x a t i o n exemptions, executive 
r e l i e f p r o v i s i o n s , and a n t i - e x p r o p r i a t i o n acts such as the Hickenlcoper 
in 
Amendment. 
Two aspects are c e n t r a l t o t h i s argument; f i r s t , t h a t US f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y and m u l t i n a t i o n a l business i n t e r e s t s coincide, and second, t h a t 
there i s a domestic American class i n t e r e s t t h a t cuts across government 
and business. 
American business and f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s and i n t e r e s t s do 
o c c a s i o n a l l y coincide such as i n the ove^rthrow of Mossedegh i n I r a n ; 
the embargo on Cuba; or the p r e s s u r i s i n g of the Allende government 
i n . C h i l e t h a t l e d t o i t s eventual f a l l . But t o extend t h i s t o an 
almost ix'on law of i n e v i t a b i l i t y i s q u i t e wrong. Vietnam was a 
d i s a s t e r f o r American business as w e l l as i t s m i l i t a r y ; the Libyan 
challenge t o the o i l companies brought a feeble response from the 
American government; and the o i l c r i s i s found the l a r g e l y pro-Arab 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i n d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o American p r o - I s r a e l i 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Thus such broad g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s have no place i n 
the a n a l y s i s of m u l t i n a t i o n a l - f o r e i g n p o l i c y r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as a whole, but the S t a t e - c a p i t a l i s t view i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , assumes t h a t the government of a State i s merely the 
re p r e s e n t a t i v e of the r u l i n g economic class. This assumption stems 
mainly from Marx's claim t h a t : "The executive of the modern s t a t e i s 
but a committee f o r managing the common a f f a i r s of the whole bour-
g e o i s i e . " Thus the a s s e r t i o n t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s represent 
the l a r g e s t concentrations o f c a p i t a l -in s o c i e t y and t h e r e f o r e of 
p o l i t i c a l power, leads t o the conclusion t h a t government merely 
r e f l e c t s t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and goals. The dis c u s s i o n i n chapter f o u r 
below h i g h l i g h t s the problems of such a claim. The o i l ' s h u t t l e ' t o 
government cannot be 'proved* t o c o n s t i t u t e a mechanism f o r the 
expression of class conciousness, i t may only be assumed. v I n 
a d d i t i o n , the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the ' p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l ' s o c i e t y t h a t i s 
sa i d by some t o be emerging may have f a r reaching i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the 
already weak and unconvincing concept of c l a s s . ^ O v e r a l l , there i s 
l i t t l e s upporting evidence f o r the super-imperialism argument. 
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But what of i m p e r i a l r i v a l r y ? I s such d i s u n i t y t h a t e x i s t s being 
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o such a high l e v e l o f tension? For w r i t e r s such as 
Ernest Handel American investment threatens the independence o f 
Europe and i t i s t o meet t h i s t h r e a t t h a t European i n d u s t r y i s now 
r i s i n g t o challenge North America. However, there i s l i t t l e e v i 
dence t o support the view t h a t t h ere i s an intense b a t t l e baking 
place between the c a p i t a l i s t States t o c o n t r o l each other's 
economic t e r r i t o r y . American investment i s being challenged i n 
Europe and European investment i s sl o w l y crossing the A t l a n t i c t o 
America, but these trends are as y e t i n t h e i r e a r l i e s t stages and. 
UQ 
i n no respect c o n s t i t u t e an i m p e r i a l r i v a l r y . 
The c e n t r a l theme of the S t a t e - c a p i t a l i s t argument i s t h a t m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s are the agents of n a t i o n a l l y - s t r u c t u r e d c a p i t a l . The 
fo r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n suggests t h a t t h i s l i n e o f thought i s funda-
mentally weak. F i r s t l y , the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s c l e a r l y do not c o n t r o l 
the States (hos t ) whether f o r t h e i r own purposes or f o r those o f 
t h e i r 'home' States. The obsolescing bargain i s too st r o n g and 
s i g n i f i c a n t a movement, e s p e c i a l l y i n the 'host' States, f o r the 
'zero-sum' argument t o continue t o c a r r y any r e a l f o r c e . I n some 
s i t u a t i o n s i t may be t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s gain g r e a t e r b e n e f i t s 
than the State, but t h i s does not remove the f a c t t h a t States have 
the sovereign r i g h t t o access nor does i t a l l o w f o r such a broad 
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n t o be made regarding the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s r o l e i n the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system as one of domination. Secondly, the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s , w h i l s t forming s i g n i f i c a n t l y l a r g e a c t o r s i n t h e i r r e s -
p e c t i v e i n d u s t r i e s and i n n a t i o n a l economies, are by no means mono 
p o l i e s . A l t e r n a t i v e s e x i s t i n the form of State champions and 
'independents*. Moreover, the o i l i n d u s t r y suggests t h a t f o r mult 
n a t i o n a l s t o operate a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r o l over governments, they 
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must form an absolute monopoly over t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r sector, t o 
/4.0 
f a i l t o do so i s t o be l i a b l e t o being undermined. T h i r d l y , 
there i s l i t t l e evidence t o support the view t h a t 'home' govern-
ments i n e v i t a b l y , and i n a l l cases, support the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . 
The p o i n t r e s t s upon the question of class r u l e . The s t u d i e s of the 
o i l i n d u s t r y below show t h a t such linkages cannot be proved; the 
f a i l u r e o f t h i s view t o s t a t e t h a t clasa-conciosness i s an a s s e r t i o n 
r a t h e r than a f a c t again d i s t o r t s i t s e x p l a n a t i o n . F o u r t h l y , argument 
i s confused over the str e s s being placed upon the n a t i o n a l and i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s . From the time of Lenin there has 
appeared t o be a c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the claim t h a t c a p i t a l i s t 
monopolies are a t the same time n a t i o n a l l y o r i e n t a t e d and dominant 
w h i l s t a l s o c o n s t i t u t i n g the c e n t r a l u n i t s of a world market based 
upon a new e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l c a p i t a l . The problem i s l e f t unresolved 
by l a t e r w r i t i n g s . 
The emphasis of the S t a t e - c a p i t a l i s t s upon economic determinants 
i s mistaken; the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l l i e s w i t h the 
bargaining process and the f a i r l y balanced d i s t r i b u t i o n o f b e n e f i t s 
t h a t emerge from i t . The r e c o n c i l i n g of competing (not c o n f l i c t i n g ) 
goals on the r e a l i s t i c basis of a mutual awareness t h a t each a c t o r 
b e n e f i t s from such a dialogue, i s the essence of the p o l i t i c a l impor-
tance o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l , be i t i n the context of b i l a t e r a l or 
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m u l t i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . ^ 
' S u p e r - c a p i t a l i s t ' arguments claim t h a t c a p i t a l i s now e n t i r e l y 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e d and t h a t t h i s remains the only v a l i d l e v e l o f 
explanation. I n t h i s view the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s a new 
phenomenon i n the development of c a p i t a l i s m ; i t i s an autono-
mous a c t o r e x p l o i t i n g a l l c o u n t r i e s f o r i t s own designs. But by 
e l e v a t i n g c a p i t a l t o t h i s new l e v e l through m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
productive investments, a t e r r i t o r i a l non-coincidence i s s a i d t o 
bo produced between the new c a p i t a l i s t form and the t r a d i t i o n a l 
State u n i t s . ' C r i t i c a l r i v a l r y * r e s u l t s from the t e n s i o n between 
the two c a p i t a l i s t forms as the States become i n c r e a s i n g l y sub-
ordinate t o the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . The emergent r e l a t i o n s h i p i s 
eh. 
likened t o t h a t of 'manager-client': 
"To these g i a n t accumulating companies, n a t i o n a l 
governments - even q u i t e powerful governments of 
developed c o u n t r i e s which once had i m p e r i a l power 
are but c l i e n t s t a t e s , granted concessions of 
c a p i t a l investment only on c o n d i t i o n o f good 
behaviour; e.g. tax allowances, s t a t e a i d , c r e d i t 
guarantees, trade union laws, and so on. These 
companies ... are the new empires. While the very 
l a r g e s t o f the n a t i o n - s t a t e s the USA, the EEC as 
the new superstate, Japan, perhaps s t i l l the UK 
are regarded as p r o v i d i n g basic p r o t e c t i o n i n a 
competitive world, the companies are q u i t e oppor-
t u n i s t i c i n t h i s regard and prepared t o s w i t c h 
bases where i t i s t o .their advantage t o do so. The 
challenge t h a t these companies pose t o the demo-
c r a t i c choices o f the peoples i n r i c h and poor 
co u n t r i e s a l i k e , as t o t h e i r common r a t e s and paths 
of economic growth, brings together the common 
i n t e r e s t s of both." 55 
The m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s thus envisaged as i n c r e a s i n g i t s a b i l i t y t o 
decide independently how, where, and when t o act, i r r e s p e c t i v e of 
n a t i o n a l considerations. On the other hand, the State i s regarded 
as l o s i n g i t s sovereign independence i n i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s ; i t s f i e l d of choice has been severely narrowed by 
the growth of these e n t e r p r i s e s and the development of the State i s 
claimed t o be open t o the whims and f a n c i e s of m u l t i n a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n 
makers beyond the boundaries o f t h a t s t a t e . 
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However, B i l l Warren, w h i l s t arguing w i t h i n the confines of the 
n e o - i m p e r i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' , provides a s a l i e n t c r i t i q u e of the 
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S u p e r - c a p i t a l i s t argument. Warren argues t h a t the p o s i t i o n of the 
State i s now g r e a t e r r a t h e r than weaker than i t once was. The 
increased involvement o f m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i n States has created un-
c e r t a i n t y and i n s t a b i l i t y . To redress a perceived imbalance govern-
ments have been f o r c e d t o take an a c t i v e r o l e i n t h e i r s o c i e t i e s t o 
r e - a s s e r t t h e i r p o s i t i o n s of sovereign a u t h o r i t y w i t h regard t o the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . Warren i s e s s e n t i a l l y t a l k i n g of economic r e l a t i o n s 
r a t h e r than o v e r t l y p o l i t i c a l i n t e r - a c t i o n s . However, i n order t o 
r e - a s s e r t t h e i r economic p o s i t i o n s governments have undertaken 
processes of r e n e g o t i a t i o n and bargaining t h a t are of p o l i t i c a l 
importance, not j u s t i n themselves, but because the whole issue being-
d e a l t w i t h i s t h a t o f n a t i o n a l sovereignty. 
Super-capitalism, l i k e the other n e o - i m p e r i c i l i s t arguments, s u f f e r s 
from i t s dogmatism. By b o l d l y a s s e r t i n g the m u l t i n a t i o n a l t o be of 
a supra-national character, by a s s e r t i n g the primacy o f economics t o 
the e x c l u s i o n of a l l other f a c t o r s , and by assuming t h a t n a t i o n a l 
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independence i s more than a normative a b s t r a c t i o n t h i s view i s l e d 
i n e x t r i c a b l y toward vague p r e d i c t i o n s of the f u t u r e world t h a t bear 
l i t t l e r e l a t i o n t o the r e a l i t y of the obsolescing bargain i n the 
contemporary system, a f u t u r e wherein... 
"...a regime o f North A t l a n t i c M u l t i n a t i o n a l corporations 
would tend t o produce a h i e r a r c h i c a l d i v i s i o n of labour 
between geographical regions corresponding t o the 
v e r t i c a l d i v i s i o n of labour w i t h i n the f i r m . I t would 
tend t o c e n t r a l i s e h i g h - l e v e l decision-making occupations 
i n a few key c i t i e s i n the advanced c o u n t r i e s , surrounded 
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by a number of r e g i o n a l subcapitals, and confine 
the r e s t of the viorld t o IOVJ l e v e l s of a c t i v i t y 
. and income, i . e . t o the s t a t u s of towns and 
v i l l a g e s i n a new I m p e r i a l system." 38 
The focus i n the S u p e r - c a p i t a l i s t view has thus moved considerably 
towards the e f f e c t s of i m p e r i a l i s m r a t h e r than i t s causes, and i n 
t h i s s h i f t i s r e f l e c t i v e of the n e o - i m p e r i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as 
a whole. Most obvious has been the emergence of 'Depe.ndencia' 
arguments and s t u d i e s t h a t i d e n t i f y an i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy i n 
which an underdeveloped 'periphery' of States are dependent upon 
an advanced c a p i t a l i s t 'core'.^ 7 A.G. Franks' 'law of C a p i t a l i s t 
Development'argues t h a t underdevelopment i s not a t r a d i t i o n a l 
s t a t e o f a f f a i r s , nor a stage o f development t o be passed through, 
but the i n e v i t a b l e product of the i n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of the 
world system of c a p i t a l i s t development.^ The e x p r o p r i a t i o n of 
p r o f i t s by the few from the many} the p o l a r i s a t i o n of wealth and 
poverty; and a p e r p e t u a t i o n of dependency i n poor c o u n t r i e s 
through the r e - c r e a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s t c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n these 
States by m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , ' thus produces a world i n which: 
"The c a p i t a l i s t system a r i s e s l i k e a c e n t r a l s t a r which 
e x p l o i t s an e n t i r e system of s a t e l l i t e s which i n t h e i r 
t u r n e x p l o i t those lower down the system. Within the 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , t h e r e f o r e , we f i n d a system 
of i n t e r n a l e x p l o i t a t i o n l i n k e d to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
system." 61. 
The obsolescent bargaining of recent years would seem t o c o n t r a d i c t 
t h i s view. The pressure upon m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t o l i m i t t h e i r 
operations, d i s c l o s e i n f o r m a t i o n , r e - i n v e s t p r o f i t s and a l l o w State 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , or u l t i m a t e l y face e x p r o p r i a t i o n , i s less evidence o f 
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' s a t e l l i t i s a t i o n ' than of the exercise of sovereign a u t h o r i t y . 
The n e o - i m p e r i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n involves core assumptions 
about the way t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system should, be ordered. 
Absolute independence and e q u a l i t y are normative values t h a t 
pervade these arguments. But these values are i n f e r r e d r a t h e r 
than e x p l i c i t , shadows r a t h e r than substance, and h i n t e d a t by the 
use o f terminology such as 'dependence' and ' e x p l o i t a t i o n ' . These 
are not o b j e c t i v e terms and are r a r e l y d e f i n e d . What then do these 
terms r e a l l y mean i n the context o f t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ? 
One t h e o r e t i c i a n has ventured t o d e f i n e dependence as a ' c o n d i t i o n -
i n g s i t u a t i o n i n which the economies of one group of c o u n t r i e s are 
cond i t i o n e d by the development and expansion of othe r s . " I n t h i s 
respect then there can be no independent State since a l l States axe 
in f l u e n c e d by the developments of others! What i s r e a l l y being 
argued i s t h a t some States are being e x p l o i t e d by others. I n other 
words, there i s an i m p l i c i t conception o f ' i n j u s t i c e ' i n t h i s argument 
t h a t i s tantamount t o a s u b j e c t i v e value judgement since i t i s n e i t h e r 
e x p l i c i t nor 'proved'. R. Jenkins makes the staggering c l a i m t h a t 
"The world i s i n h e r e n t l y e x p l o i t a t i v e " . I n order t o support these 
claims the arguments f a l l back upon the r e l a t i v e s a f e t y of economic 
equations, f o r what these t h e o r e t i c i a n s u t i l i s e i s the concept of 
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"unequal exchange" J i n which there i s a discrepancy i n the value c f 
t h i n g s exchanged i n favour o f the advanced S t a t e s . ^ There are 
t e r r i b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t r y i n g t o o b j e c t i v e l y d e fine what i s f a i r , 
can any l e v e l of i n e q u a l i t y or imbalance be s a i d to be f a i r ? Even 
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i n these purely economic cons t r u c t s i t i s impossible t o draw the 
'terms of tr a d e ' i n measurable ways. There i s more i n v o l v e d than 
economics; f o r c e n t u r i e s philosophers have t r i e d t o c l a r i f y means 
by which state i n f l u e n c e i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system may be 
evaluated, 
By i n s i s t i n g t h a t the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s economic 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d i s t o r t s i t s a n a l y s i s . Monocausality avoids com-
p l e x i t y , and the p o l i t i c a l and r e l a t i v e nature of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
r o l e i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. 'Rule' ( i m p e r i a l i s m ) cannot be 
confined t o the s t e r i l i t y o f the economic forces and systematic 
r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h i s argument, f o r , i n the words of one w r i t e r : 
" . . . f o r the u t i l i t a r i a n psychology which u n i t e s Marxism 
w i t h the c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy, the broad 
i n s t i n c t i v e l i f e o f man remains l i k e a r i v e r underground, 
not so much unheard as unexplored. I n the d a i l y l i f e o f 
s o c i e t i e s i t c o n s t a n t l y b u r s t s t o the surface and leaves , 
l i t t l e i n the h i s t o r y o f the simple p a t t e r n s of our t h e o r i e s " . 3 
Economies are important t o the Neo- M e r c a n t i l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a lso 
Unlike the previous arguments, however, t h i s view does not attempt 
t o e x p l a i n w i t h i n the context of a general theory r e l y i n g instead 
upon h i s t o r i c i s t approaches. The n e o - m e r c a n t i l i s t argument r e s t s 
upon f o u r main p o i n t s . F i r s t , economic i n t e r e s t s - i n c l u d i n g m u l t i 
n a t i o n a l s - are subordinate t o o l s f o r State f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; the 
economic and p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y requirements being synonymous w i t h 
the ' n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t ' as perceived by government. Second, the 
expansion of m u l t i n a t i o n a l s d u r i n g the post-war p e r i o d i s an insep; 
able p a r t of the extension of 'home* State spheres of i n f l u e n c e 
throughout the world. T h i r d , i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t a b i l i t y r e s u l t i n g 
from a r e l a t i v e d e c l i n e i n American hegemonical r u l e i s l e a d i n g t o 
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a r e - a s s e r t i o n of n a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d behaviour wherein 
t h e - m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are i n c r e a s i n g l y under pi^essure from 'hosts'. 
Fourth, the u t i l i s a t i o n o f m u l t i n a t i o n a l s as the instruments o f 
n a t i o n a l p o l i c y and of n a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t r e f l e c t the b e l i e f 
t h a t the fundamental nature of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i s anarchic 
and i s d r i v e n by the r e a l i t i e s of State power. In essence the neo-
m e r c a n t i l i s t s argument focuses upon: 
"...the system of n a t i o n a l i s t i c r e g u l a t i o n of economies 
which i s designed t o advance a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e s 
economic, p o l i t i c a l , and m i l i t a r y power i n competition 
w i t h r i v a l s . " 68 
The importance o f economic i n t e r e s t s such as the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
t o the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i s r a t i o n a l i s e d by t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
upon f o u r a s s e r t i o n s : ^ ( l ) Wealth i s a c r u c i a l means t o power, 
f o r defensive or aggressive purposes; ( 2 ) power i s an e s s e n t i a l 
means t o wealth; ( 3 ) wealth and power are each the proper ends of 
n a t i o n a l p o l i c y ; (A) there i s a long-term- harmony between these 
ends. The o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p between economics and p o l i t i c s i s 
t h e r e f o r e d e f i n e d as one of "mutually-supporting o b j e c t i v e s , each 
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capable o f being used as a means t o the attainment of the o t h e r . " 
The assumption o f a d i r e c t c o r r e l a t i o n between m u l t i n a t i o n a l spread 
and 'home' country p o l i t i c a l expansion i s a c e n t r a l p o i n t t h a t needs 
t o be proved by t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . What i s the r e a l nature of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p ( i f any) between economics and p o l i t i c s ? This i n t e r p r e 
t a t i o n i s l a r g e l y d i r e c t e d a t America as the 'home' of so many m u l t i 
n a t i o n a l s , and i t i s i n the American c o n t e x t ' t h a t the f o l l o w i n g d i s 
cussion centres. 
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Like B r i t a i n before i t / America i s regarded as s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
o r d e r i n g the post-war world i n order t o a s s e r t i t s economic, 
m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l hegemony over as much of the globe as 
p o s s i b l e i n the face of a r i s i n g Soviet Union. M u l t i n a t i o n a l s , 
aided by American p o l i t i c a l expansionism, found i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c o n d i t i o n s favourable and t h e i r growth was r a p i d d u r i n g t h i s 
p e r i o d and obstacles few. I n t u r n , these e n t e r p r i s e s both 
c a r r i e d American values and i n t e r e s t s overseas and provided an 
economic bulwark against s o c i a l i s m : 
"American p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y supremacy a f t e r World 
War Two was a necessary p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the predominant 
p o s i t i o n of American m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i n the world economy . 
But the r e c i p r o c a l of t h i s i s also t i n e ; corporate expan-
sionism i n t u r n became a support o f America.'s i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
and m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n . " 71. 
'Pax Americana* i s s a i d t o have stemmed from the extension of 
American support t o Western Europe f o l l o w i n g the war, thus c r e a t i n g 
the 'necessary' c o n d i t i o n s f o r m u l t i n a t i o n a l growth i n t h i s area, 
the ' s u f f i c i e n t ' c onditions i n v o l v i n g not only t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
advance, but 'home' State p o l i c y support, l i b e r a l i s t : . c ideology, and 
domestic p o l i t i c a l consent i n America. 
C r u c i a l t o t h i s a s s e r t i o n o f 'home' State support and d i r e c t i o n of 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between business and government. 
Robert G i l p i n argues t h a t , i n general, "there has tended to be a 
n a t u r a l harmony o f i n t e r e s t s between American p o l i t i c a l and business 
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l e a d e r s h i p . " ' Three aspects of m u l t i n a t i o n a l growth are c i t e d i n 
support o f G i l p i n ' s argument. F i r s t , m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , by t r a n s f e r r i n g 
American technology and c a p i t a l i s t t r a d i t i o n overseas are seen as 
p l a y i n g leading r o l e s i n f u r t h e r i n g the l i b e r a l politico-economic 
order. Second, American growth i s said, t o be sustained by cheap and 
a v a i l a b l e raw m a t e r i a l and energy s u p p l i e s . Third, the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the American balance o f payments i s argued t o provide 
funds f o r the f i n a n c i n g of American f i n a n c i a l and d i p l o m a t i c commitments. 
The exte n t t o which the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s are able t o disseminate the 
'American dream' t o 'host' c o u n t r i e s i s , however, l i m i t e d . The 
presence of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s has more o f t e n than not proved the 
focus f o r xenophobic r e a c t i o n s . I n many o f the less-developed States they 
represent a f f l u e n c e and mate r i a l i s m t h a t i s o f t e n out of keeping w i t h 
the general c o n d i t i o n s t o be found i n these c o u n t r i e s . Moreover, 
these e n t e r p r i s e s are used as r a l l y i n g p o i n t s f o r the venting of 
p o l i t i c a l unrest and hav:e i n some cases provided the excuse f o r a new 
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regime t o take pov;er. Western Europe has also undergone a q u e s t i o n -
ing o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t h r e a t t o 'European' values. The r e a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t 'La D e f i Americain' focused a t t e n t i o n upon the s o c i o - o u l t u r a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of the m i l t i n a t i o n a l s . M u l t i n a t i o n a l s d e l i b e r a t e l y 
f o s t e r a low p r o f i l e i n many States t o avoid such r e a c t i o n s and i n 
many instances t r y t o e s t a b l i s h a n a t i o n a l l y - o r i e n t a t e d colour t o 
t h e i r operations i n order t o generate l o c a l g o o d w i l l ; the scope 
f o r expounding the v i r t u e s o f American values i s t h e r e f o r e l i m i t e d . 
The m u l t i n a t i o n a l s s e l l i n g t h e i r goods i n the American market have 
been in s t r u m e n t a l i n promoting American growth. The supplies of o i l 
since the beginning of the century have been o f p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e 
as domestic American production has d e c l i n e d and consumption grown. 
However, w i t h the emergence of various producer ' c a r t e l s ' , i t i s 
l i k e l y t h a t any s p e c i a l advantages America one had w i l l be lessened or 
l o s t e n t i r e l y . 
The m u l t i n a t i o n a l s do ' r e p a t r i a t e ' s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l s of t h e i r 
earnings t o America. However, the ever t i g h t e r c o n t r o l s being 
imposed upon the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s by 'host' governments, f o r c i n g the 
re-investment of p r o f i t s , high tax payments, and r o y a l t y or l i c e n s e 
r e t u r n s , means t h a t l e s s funds f i n d t h e i r way back t o America, 
Moreover, i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t t o draw a d i r e c t l i n k between 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l earnings and American f o r e i g n venture f i n a n c i n g . Such 
moneys as are r e q u i r e d can e a s i l y be drawn from domestic sources and 
i t i s s p e c u l a t i o n t o suggest otherwise. 
Neo-mercantilists continue t o argue t h a t America's p o s i t i o n i s 
i n e v i t a b l y i n d e c l i n e and t h a t the r o l e o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s t o 
counter the " h i s t o r i c tendency f o r the d i f f u s i o n of knowledge and 
technique t o undermine the centre's i n d u s t r i a l supremacy." I f 
t h i s i s the case then the c r i s i s f o r America, i s acute w i t h the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s p o s i t i o n overseas under pressure from obsolescent bargaining. 
The m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i n t h i s context are. ^hus i n a p a r a d o x i c a l p o s i t i o n ; 
as the main means by which knowledge and technology i s t r a n s m i t t e d t o 
'host 1 States they are thus the major f a c t o r s i n the d e c l i n e of t h e i r 
"home* State which i n t u r n i s becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y dependent upon 
these very e n t e r p r i s e s ! The un d e r l y i n g r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n s conception of an American d e c l i n e r e s t s on a conception of i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l anarchy. 
With almost Mobbesian l o g i c the n e o - m e r c a n t i l i s t s conceive of the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system as one o f inherent c o n f l i c t m i t i g a t e d by the 
presence o f a dominant hegemonic power t h a t orders the system on the 
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basis of dependent r e l a t i o n s h i p s i t has created. This view sees 
the strong dominating the weak, r i c h dominating the poor. Powel-
l s believed t o be sought not merely f o r m i l i t a r y or i d e o l o g i c a l 
motives, but f o r i t s own sake. R, Hammond argues t h a t a t the heart 
o f m u l t i n a t i o n a l expansion l i e s "the good old game o f power p o l i t i c s . 
The r i s e and f a l l o f America i s seen as being c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the 
c e n t r a l dynamic of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , namely the i n t e r - a c t i o n 
between ascending and descending s t a t e s : 
" I n the sh o r t run, the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power and the nature 
of the p o l i t i c a l system are major determinants o f the 
framework w i t h i n which wealth i s produced and d i s t r i b u t e d . 
I n the long run, however, s h i f t s i n economic e f f i c i e n c y and 
i n the l o c a t i o n of economic a c t i v i t y tend t o undermine and 
transform the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l system. This p o l i t i c a l 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t u r n gives r i s e t o changes i n economic 
r e l a t i o n s t h a t r e f l e c t the i n t e r e s t s of the p o l i t i c a l l y 
ascendent s t a t e i n the system." 78 
With the dec l i n e of America i t i s claimed t h a t a renewed c o n f l i c t 
and competition over the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the world's resources and 
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power w i l l c h a r a c t e r i s e the system; s t a t e s becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y 
i n v o l v e d i n "the s t r u g g l e f o r the world p r o d u c t " . ^ 0 
The problem w i t h t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n l i e s w i t h i t s f a i l u r e to 
e s t a b l i s h c o n c l u s i v e l y the l i n k which i t assumes between economics 
and p o l i t i c s , t h a t i s the c o r r e l a t i o n between American business and 
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f o r e i g n p o l i c y d r i v e s . To some observers, the example c i t e d by neo 
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m e r c a n t i l i s t s i n support o f t h e i r argument, the Gold. War, does not 
hold up t o g e n e r a l i s a t i o n . During t h i s period the i n t e r e s t s o f m u l t i 
n a t i o n a l s and government coincided^ the expansion of Socialism being 
regarded as a t h r e a t t o both; "The 'high p o l i t i e s ' o f America's 
n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y were the 'high p o l i t i c s ' of America's i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
business as w e l l ; the two t r a c k approach t o p o l i t i c s and economics 
was b u i l t on a s i n g l e road-bed." J But the post-Cold War' period, 
the events o f the ' o i l c r i s i s ' , and the broad challenge t o the 
multinationals-government concensus among domestic American 
opi n i o n , suggests t h a t such agreement on i n t e r e s t s i s n e i t h e r i n e v i t -
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able nor 'on-going'. The misunderstanding of the 'home' State-
m u l t i n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , as w e l l as the r e f u s a l to acknowledge 
the presence of or d e r i n g elements i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system-law, 
standards of m o r a l i t y ^ c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n mecha.nisms - together 
undermine t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s explanation of m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t a t u s 
and r o l e . 
The 'Sovereignty-at-Bay' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n regards the m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
as being a d i s t i n c t and independent a c t o r i n i t s own r i g h t . I t i s 
p r i m a r i l y an economic a c t o r , i t s o r g a n i s a t i o n a l f l e x i b i l i t y enabling 
i t t o expand and consequently t o r e s t r i c t the freedom of States w i t h i n 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. This view argues t h a t t h i s development of 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i s e s s e n t i a l l y f o r the b e n e f i t of a l l since i t o f f e r s 
the best chance of achieving the l i b e r a l i s t i c dream o f : 
"...a great r e p u b l i c o f world commerce, i n which n a t i o n a l 
boundaries would cease t o have any great economic importance 
and the web of trade would bind a l l the people of the world 
i n the p r o s p e r i t y of peace." 86 
Economic d r i v e again forms the c e n t r a l f e a t u r e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The 
sup p o s i t i o n of "parento optimum" dynamics i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
economic system i s believed t o have st i m u l a t e d m u l t i n a t i o n a l expan-
s i o n . The o r g a n i s a t i o n o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l - u n i q u e l y s t r u c t u r i n g 
productive c a p i t a l on a g l o b a l f i n a n c i a l and executive base - has 
allowed these f i r m s t o take advantage of t e c h n o l o g i c a l and market 
changes, and t o promote t h e i r independence from the r e s t r i c t i v e n e s s 
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o f n a t i o n - s t a t e s . The o b j e c t i v e s of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l are the 
' m u t u a l l y - r e i n f o r c i n g goals of increased p r o f i t a b i l i t y and a r e d u c t i o n 
of u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . The argument u t i l i s e s the 'product-cycle' theory 
which claims t h a t expansion i s explained as a defensive necessity; the 
f i r m s merely p r o t e c t i n g t h e i r established markets and products from 
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new competitive c o n d i t i o n s . The m u l t i n a t i o n a l growth of the post-war 
period, i s thus regarded as being divorced from the arena o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s ; the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s thus s a i d t o be an autonomous 
a c t o r , d e a l i n g only a t 'arms l e n g t h ' w i t h States: 
"...the m u l t i n a t i o n a l represents the s e p a r a t i o n of economics 
from p o l i t i c s i n the i n t e r e s t of promoting world peace and 
development." 89 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e the t r a n s - n a t i o n a l economic nature o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
character t h a t i s claimed t o circumscribe n a t i o n - s t a t e sovereignty. 
The p r e s c r i p t i v e argument apart - t h i s t h e s i s i s not concerned w i t h the 
moral questions - how f a r does t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a c t u a l l y o f f e r a 
r e a l i s t i c answer t o the c e n t r a l question of the e x t e n t t o which m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s are independent actors? 
Like the previous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s looked a t above, t h i s argument r e j e c t s 
the p o l i t i c a l focus f o r t h a t of the economic. But the arguments of 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l autonomy and economic interdependence once again avoid the 
importance o f the f a c t . t h a t what they are also t a l k i n g about i s n a t i o n -
s t a t e sovereignty. They are t a l k i n g about ' c o n t r o l ' of States and 
peoples. They are i n f a c t t a l k i n g about p o l i t i c s not economics and, 
as been evident throughout t h i s chapter, the c e n t r a l element i n t h i s 
p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i s the d i p l o m a t i c or bargaining process between 
a c t o r s . The bargaining, moreover, d u r i n g the post-war p e r i o d has seen 
the r o l e of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i n c r e a s i n g l y r e g u l a t e d by governments 
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r a t h e r than State s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o these f i r m s . 
This ' r e - a f f i r m a t i o n ' o f State sovereignty has been l a r g e l y b u i l t 
upon m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r a l weakness and n a t i o n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
i n b a r g aining. As w i l l be seen b e l o w , ^ the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s - be 
they copper ente.rprises i n Chile, o i l companies i n In d i a , or motor 
manufacturers i n B r i t a i n - f i r e very much t i e d s t r u c t u r a l l y t o the 
n a t i o n - s t a t e s . I t i s t h i s inherent weakness t h a t has been e x p l o i t e d 
by many States, i n d i v i d u a l l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y , t o s u c c e s s f u l l y r e -
negotiate t h e i r p o s i t i o n s w i t h regcird t o the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . 
At the r i s k of r e p e t i t i o n , State bar g a i n i n g has advanced on f o u r 
f r o n t s j which together cast serious doubts on the argument t h a t 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s f o r c e t h e i r own c o n d i t i o n s upon governments as a 
r e s u l t of a c o n t r o l l i n g p o s i t i o n . F i r s t l y , i n the e x t r a c t i v e i n -
d u s t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y o i l , the m u l t i n a t i b n a l has i n most cases been 
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reduced t o the st a t u s of c o n t r a c t o r i n the 'hos-J^ * States. Secondly, 
higher t a x a t i o n l e v e l s } investment requirements; p r i c e - s e t t i n g and 
market guarantees; and p a r t i c i p a t i o n agreements have meant t h a t 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s have l o s t many of t h e i r ' t r a d i t i o n a l * f u n c t i o n s t o 
the States and also opened them up t o n a t i o n a l involvement i n t h e i r 
s u b s i d i a r i e s . T h i r d l y , the cooperation among governments a t both 
the r e g i o n a l and g l o b a l l e v e l s t o produce r i g o r o u s m u l t i l a t e r a l 
codes of conduct, has r e i n f o r c e d the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s 
o f many co u n t r i e s and added t o the pressure upon m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t o 
conform t o State-produced standards of behaviour since these codes 
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represent 'norms' against which t h e i r actions can be judged. L a s t l y , 
both developed and developing States have es t a b l i s h e d ' n a t i o n a l 
champions' t o take over many of the r o l e s played by m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s , or t o ent e r i n t o j o i n t ventures, or simply t o 
compete w i t h them. 
This n a t i o n a l r e a c t i o n i s acknowledged by some a p o l o g i s t s o f t h i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but argue t h a t t h i s i s t o be expected as a r e s u l t 
o f the u n d e r l y i n g changes. To reduce tension d u r i n g t h i s change-
over o f power, i t may be necessary t o e s t a b l i s h some form o f i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t o r y body t o 'hold the r i n g ' u n t i l the new more 
harmonious r e l a t i o n s h i p s are e s t a b l i s h e d f u l l y : 
"The basic asymmetry between m u l t i n a t i o n a l e n t e r p r i s e s 
and n a t i o n a l governments might be t o l e r a t e d up t o a 
p o i n t , but beyond t h a t p o i n t there i s a need t o redress 
the balance. When t h i s occurs, the response i s bound t o 
have some o f the elements o f the world c o r p o r a t i o n 
concept; a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o some body, charged w i t h 
weighing the a c t i v i t i e s o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l e n t e r p r i s e 
against a set of s o c i a l y a r d s t i c k s t h a t are m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
in scope." 93 
The most obvious body f o r t h i s purpose would seem t o be the United 
Nations. However, so f a r t h i s body has managed t o e s t a b l i s h a 
general code of ' r u l e s ' and a centre f o r the study of t r a n s -
n a t i o n a l a c t o r s . More s i g n i f i c a n t have been the r e g i o n a l , producer, 
and consumer organisations i n pressing f o r m u l t i n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n . ^ 
This has not prevented States abusing these c o l l e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s t o 
gain i n d i v i d u a l advantages, and f o r some observers such a world 
body i s excessively o p t i m i s t i c : 
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"The r e s u l t i n g s t r u g g l e among n a t i o n s to t i l t i n 
t h e i r d i r e c t i o n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of b e n e f i t s gen-
. e r a t e d by the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s suggests a p o t e n t i a l 
f o r fragmentation and d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , not the 
cooperation and harmony of the *sovereign-at-bay' 
t h e s i s . " 95 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n viould t h e r e f o r e appear to d i s t o r t the r o l e 
played by the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, g r a n t i n g 
i t an o v e r - s t a t e d degree of autonomy and s t r e n g t h and under-
e s t i m a t i n g the p o s i t i o n of the n a t i o n - s t a t e s . 
L i k e the 'sovereignty-at-bay' argument, the 'Global Jteach' i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n c l a i m s t h a t the s o v e r e i g n t y of S t a t e s i s r e s t r i c t e d by 
the overwhelming economic s t r e n g t h of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . U n l i k e 
the preceding view, however, t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n concludes t h a t : 
" . . . i f g l o b a l c o r p o r a t i o n s do not undergo profound 
changes i n t h e i r g o a l s or s t r a t e g i e s , or are not 
e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l l e d , they w i l l c o n t r i v e to a c t 
as d i s t u r b e r s of the peace on a g l o b a l s c a l e . " 96 
P e s s i m i s t i c a l l y p o r t r a y i n g the m u l t i n a t i o n a l - S t a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p 
97 
as "The Coming Clash", i t i s argued t h a t m u l t i n a t i o n a l s c o n s t i t u t e 
a malign and dangerous f o r c e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . Only by 
i n s t i t u t i n g a widely-based r e g u l a t o r y system with enforce^y powers, 
and a s u b s t a n t i a l and i r r e v e r s i b l e s h i f t i n the r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
the world's r e s o u r c e s towards the lower s i x t y per cent of the worlds 
population w i l l the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system be r e s t o r e d to balance and 
e q u a l i t y . 
The argument i s again posed i n economic terms: "The d r i v i n g f o r c e 
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behind g l o b a l o l i g o p o l y competition i s the necessity t o grow i n 
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order t o maintain or increase market shares." O r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
s t r u c t u r e , i n other words f l e x i b i l i t y , i s believed t o have 
p r o p e l l e d these e n t e r p r i s e s i n t o a p o s i t i o n of autonomy and c o n t r o l 
i n the system. But, t o r e t u r n t o a p o i n t made throughout t h i s 
chapter, the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s not a homogeneous actor. Although 
i t may provide a unique f l e x i b i l i t y f o r growth, i t also provides 
an i n h e r e n t weakness by opening the f i r m t o a m u l t i p l i c i t y of State 
pressures. Tied t o the n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t o r y s t r u c t u r e s , m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
r e q u i r e continued governmental agreement f o r t h e i r operations, and 
the c o n d i t i o n s under which they continue are 'thrashed out* i n the 
p o l i t i c a l process of bargaining and r e n e g o t i a t i o n . 
Howeverj g l o b a l reach t h e o r i s t s argue t h a t the c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e 
i n b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s t h a t r e s u l t s i n m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l i s t h a t 
of p h i l o s o p h i c a l outlook and ideology; the e n t e r p r i s e i s a consciously 
a n t i - g e o p o l i t i c a l a c t o r i n d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o the " i r r e l e v a n t 
n a t i o n a l i s m " of t e r r i t o r i a l l y i n f l e x i b l e States,'' This argument 
f o l l o w s from the previous misconception o f the s t r u c t u r e of the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l , but, furthermore, a l s o stems from an u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o 
acknowledge the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the obsolescing bargain. 
Richard Barnet and Ronald M i l l e r noted t h i s bargaining t r e n d i n t h e i r 
chaptez- e n t i t l e d "The Fower of the Poor", but argue t h a t problems 
of enforcement of laws, i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r i n g , and the establishment 
of counter-organisations, handicap State attempts t o c a p i t a l i s e on 
the changing balance o f b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s . These are c e r t a i n l y 
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problems f o r governments, but the example of the o i l i n d u s t r y and the 
e x t r a c t i v e s e c t o r i n general appears t o suggest t h a t these are not so 
insurmountable as Barnet and Mull e r claim. These a p o l o g i s t s c i t e the 
case o f B r a z i l t o support t h e i r o v e r a l l argument, but as Peter G a b r i e l 
remarks: 
"A p r e d i c t i o n t h a t B r a z i l w i l l continue t o favour the 
f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r once he has f u l f i l l e d h i s promise ( i . e . 
brought h i s technology and know-how), even while a l l 
c o u n t r i e s around her are s u c c e s s f u l l y w r e s t l i n g over 
more favourable terms from him, has t o be founded on 
. f a i t h r a t h e r than h i s t o r i c a l precedent or curr e n t 
example." 101 
The d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t i t assumes t h a t both 
the economic dynamic and the asymmetry of the f i r m s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
the State are u n i v e r s a l l y accepted, and t h a t consequently "the burning 
p o l i t i c a l issue concerns the use of t h a t power. I s the g l o b a l corpora-
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t i o n i n the business of e x p l o i t a t i o n o r development?" ' This q u e s t i o n 
i s f r a u g h t w i t h value-judgements and moral debate and as such l i e s 
o utside the b r i e f of t h i s d i scussion, but such debate r e s t s upon the 
c e n t r a l question as t o whether t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f e r s convincing 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s s t a t u s and r o l e ? 
The a c t o r s are drawn i n t h i s view w i t h sharply c o n f l i c t i n g goals: 
"Global companies have used t h e i r g r e a t levers of 
power-finance c a p i t a l , technology, o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
s k i l l s ^ and mass communications - t o create a 'Global 
Shopping Centre' i n which the hungry of the world are 
i n v i t e d t o buy expensive snacks and a 'Global Factory' 
i n which there are fewer and fewer jobs. The world 
managers v i s i o n of 'One V/orld 1 t u r n s out t o be two 
d i s t i n c t worlds - one f e a t u r i n g r i s i n g a f f l u e n c e f o r 
a small t r a n s a c t i o n a l middle class and the other 
e s c a l a t i n g misery f o r the gre a t bulk of the human 
f a m i l y . The d i c t a t e s of p r o f i t and the d i c t a t e s of 
s u r v i v a l are i n c l e a r c o n f l i c t . " 103 
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The a v a i l a b l e evidence, however, suggests that.where the m u l t i n a -
t i o n a l s have attempted to use leverage against governments, they 
104 
have been l a r g e l y unsuccessful. The d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the a c t o r s i s one i n which an awareness of mutual i n t e r e s t 
i s i n f l u e n t i a l i n producting compromise and eventual agreement, 
r a t h e r than one of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e c o n f l i c t . For t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
the m u l t i n a t i o n a l threatens the whole of the e s t a b l i s h e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s t r u c t u r e : 
" I t i s not j u s t , or even mainly, a q u e s t i o n of whether 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l companies can circumvent p a r t i c u l a r laws 
and r e g u l a t i o n s . I t i s t h a t the whole framework of 
thought and, a c t i o n i s founded on the s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y 
concept of the sovereign s t a t e . Outside t h a t framework 
the whole substance of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y has 
been b u i l t f o r the b e t t e r p a r t of f o u r hundred years. 
I n t h i s s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y framework, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c o r p o r a t i o n i s an o u t s i d e r . " 105. 
The t e s t of the l e g i t i m a c y o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l f o r t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
i s i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . I t i s argued 
t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s maintain a poai.tion of c o n t r o l through t h e i r 
monopoly of knowledge.''"^ The m u l t i n a t i o n a l s do possess a number of 
f a c t o r s t h a t enhance t h e i r p o s i t i o n w i t h regard t o knowledge. F i r s t l y , 
the massive expenditure on 'R&D' by these forms i s w e l l beyond the 
c a p a b i l i t i e s of most States. Secondly,, these e n t e r p r i s e s have lon g -
e s t a b l i s h e d o r g a n i s a t i o n a l experience. T h i r d l y , they have h i g h l y -
developed i n f o r m a t i o n - g a t h e r i n g networks. L a s t l y , t h e i r management 
teams are experienced and expert. 
However, i t must also be noted t h a t the t h r e s h o l d of knowledge have 
been f a i l i n g i n recent decades. This has f u r t h e r aided the obsolescent 
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b a r g a i n i n g of many governments. States have been strengthened by 
a number of developments i n t h i s con"t*ext. The State educational 
programmes as they reach m a t u r i t y are beginning t o bear f r u i t i n 
the form of h i g h l y educated and knowledgable c i t i z e n s . Fany w i l l 
have been sponsored t o Western u n i v e r s i t i e s by t h e i r government or 
by m u l t i n a t i o n a l s own educational scholarships. Moreover, governments 
have l e a r n t from the experience they have gained through the p a r t i c i -
p a t i o n and j o i n t venures they have entered i n t o w i t h the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . 
I n a d d i t i o n , there have been a l t e r n a t i v e sources f o r these States t o 
acquire knowledge, namely the i n c r e a s i n g number of independent f i r m s 
and the c o u n t r i e s such as the Soviet Union. Lastly,, these States 
have undertaken t o cooperate amongst themselves t o share t h e i r exper-
t i s e and knowledge t o t h e i r mutual advantage. 
The d e s i r e f o r r a p i d and s u b s t a n t i a l change i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c o n d i t i o n leads t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t o an over-estimate of the 
s t a t u s of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l e n t e r p r i s e . I t i s a c c r e d i t e d w i t h absolute 
power, absolute monopoly on knowledge, and absolute c o n t r o l over 
s t a t e s . The r e l a t i v e and p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the r o l e of the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s missed a l t o g e t h e r . 
I n a l l these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s independence i s equated d i r e c t l y w i t h 
power; the more powerful an a c t o r the more independent i t i s believed 
to be. For these arguments, power i s economic s t r e n g t h . According to 
Klaus Knorr, power can be regarded i n two ways. F i r s t , as ' p u t a t i v e ' 
power (the 'capacity' t o i n f l u e n c e o t h e r s ) ; and second, as ' a c t u a l i s e d ' 
-53-
power (the 'exercise* of t h a t capacity. But i f power c o n s t i t u t e s 
the i n f l u e n c i n g of one a c t o r by another i n order t o change i t s p o l i c y 
i n f avour of the i n f l u e n c e r ; then t h i s i s s u r e l y a p o l i t i c a l concept 
since i t involves the element o f ' c o n t r o l ' and i f p o l i t i c s i s d e f i n e d 
10O 
as the r e s o l u t i o n o f "who gets what, when, and how, " ' then the 
q u e s t i o n posed as a r e s u l t o f the above discu s s i o n i s who c o n t r o l s 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n of bargaining advantages - the States or (as the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s c l a i m ) the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s ? 
For these arguments reviewed above, m u l t i n a t i o n a l s e x e r t overwhelming 
a c t u a l i s e d power through t h e i r g l o b a l networks of dependent States. 
Underpinning t h i s a s s e r t i o n i s the b e l i e f , c l a r i f i e d by Knorr, t h a t 
there i s an asymmetry o f p u t a t i v e power w i t h i n the b a r g a i n i n g process 
(which gives r i s e t o claims of ' i n j u s t i c e ' ) i n favour of the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s . However, these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s have been seen t o o v e r s t a t e 
the s t r e n g t h of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l i n t h e i r arguments above, and t o 
understate the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the obsolescing bargain. The m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s do not appear t o c o n t r o l the governments w i t h which they 
d e a l j t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p r e f l e c t s , l a r g e l y , a balanced i n f l u e n c e i n 
which there i s a mutual respect f o r what each needs and each can o f f e r } 
I n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system as a whole the context f o r such barg a i n i n g 
i s t h a t of the sovereignty of States, and w i t h the u l t i m a t e r i g h t o f 
access may l i e the basis of d e c i s i v e b a r g a i n i n g power. 
The g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y w i t h these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i s t h a t power 
cannot be c o n c l u s i v e l y q u a n t i f i e d , e s p e c i a l l y v?hen removed from the 
a b s t r a c t i o n s o f economic determinants. By attempting t o e x p l a i n the 
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m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i n t h i s way the arguments avoid the importance of 
the 'diplomatic, n e g o t i a t i n g , r o l e of these f i r m s . The f u l l 
p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of t r a n s l a t i n g these t h e o r i e s i n t o ana-
l y t i c a l t o o l s can be seen i n the case study of the o i l i n d u s t r y i n 




This chapter asks three questions w i t h regard t o the a c t o r s . F i r s t , 
do the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s possess a d i s t i n c t i v e , c l e a r l y d e f i n a b l e , and 
separate i d e n t i t y ? Second, i f such an i d e n t i t y e x i s t s , how f a r does 
i t provide m u l t i n a t i o n a l s w i t h autonomy? Th i r d , what can be concluded 
about the r o l e s and sta t u s o f the actors i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system 
and the p a t t e r n of r e l a t i o n s between them? 
I f the d e f i n i t i o n o f p o l i t i c s as the r e s o l u t i o n o f competing i n t e r e s t s 
i s correct,"'" then m u l t i n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y may stem from the extent t o 
which these e n t e r p r i s e s determine the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f world resources 
w i t h i n the competing i n t e r e s t s o f the n a t i o n - s t a t e s system. This r o l e 
may be o f a b i l a t e r a l or m u l t i l a t e r a l nature, t h a t i s , a m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
may be bargaining w i t h a s i n g l e State or a c t i n g as broker betvreen a 
number of States. The extent t o which m u l t i n a t i o n a l autonomy i s b u i l t 
upon such a r o l e i s , as the previous chapter i n d i c a t e s , open t o i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n but nevertheless appears t o l a r g e l y depend upon the respective 
b a r g a i n i n g a b i l i t i e s o f the a c t c r s . 
I t may be t h a t , as some clai m , m u l t i n a t i o n a l s o r i g i n s are traceable t o 
the Fuggers of 15th century Europe. I t i s more accurate, however, to 
date t h e i r beginnings a t the advent of the determined founders of these 
e n t e r p r i s e s , men l i k e Henry Deterding of Royal Dutch S h e l l , Sosthenes 
Behn ('The Buccaneer') of ITT, or V.'illiam Kesketh Lever of Unilever i n 
the ea.rly decades of the 20th century. 
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One f a i r l y n e u t r a l and generalised d e f i n i t i o n o f the m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
i s ' a s : 
"...a c l u s t e r of corporations of d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l i t i e s 
t h a t are j o i n e d together by a parent company through bonds 
of common ownership, t h a t respond t o common, s t r a t e g y , and. „ 
t h a t draw on a common pool of f i n a n c i a l and human resources." 
The problem w i t h such a u n i v e r s a l d e f i n i t i o n i s t h a t i t masks the 
f a c t t h a t these e n t e r p r i s e s do not a l l conform t o any one p a r t i c u l a r 
•type' or confine t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s t o any one i n d u s t r y or sector. 
M u l t i n a t i o n a l s are involved i n e x t r a c t i v e i n d u s t r i e s such as copper 
mining^ manufacturing from cars t o computers, and i n primary commod-
i t i e s . Many have d i v e r s i f i e d i n t o new areas} o i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
have r e c e n t l y extended t h e i r range of ownership to department s t o r e s , 
p r o p e r t y holdings^, and other energy sectors l i k e c o a l . However, the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s looked a t e a r l i e r argue t h a t i r r e s p e c t i v e of these 
d i f f e r e n c e s the basic nature of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l remains the same 
and t h a t t h i s i n h e r e n t character provides an overwhelming dominant 
barga i n i n g power w i t h which t o c o n t r o l States. To evaluate how 
c r e d i b l e t h i s argument i s , the f o l l o w i n g discussion focuses upon the 
economic, o r g a n i s a t i o n a l , and m o t i v a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l , and then reviews the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s s t a t u s i n the con-
t e x t of the n a t i o n - s t a t e s system.-
The m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s sai d f i r s t l y t o be cha r a c t e r i s e d by i t s s i z e . 
As t a b l e 1 suggests, these corporations have very l a r g e turnovers 
indeed and i n general operate i n a large number of c o u n t r i e s . The 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of size i s claimed t o be t w o - f o l d ; f i r s t l y , the absolute 
size of these corporations i s o f t e n l a r g e r than many of the States w i t h 
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which they deal. With the assumption that 'might i s right', these 
firms are claimed to possess the absolute capacity to thus control 
governments. Secondly, the international d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n or 'multi-
nationality* of these firms i s argued to provide a wider set of 
options for investment, production, or s a l e s , and therefore a 
greater f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e i r bargaining with governments. 
The multinationals are very big organisations^ to the United Wations 
in' 1973 there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence that "...for most p r a c t i c a l 
purposes, those with l e s s than plOQ million in sales can be ignored." 
Although c r i t i c i s e d as an a r b i t r a r y concept, s i z e i s s i g n i f i c a n t . A 
revealing American census in I 9 6 6 showed that although there were 
3 multinationals operating from the US, only 298 accounted for 
5% of t o t a l assets and 66% of s a l e s by overseas s u b s i d i a r i e s . ^ 
However, the equation s i z e equals power equals control i s a mistaken 
one. Corporations the s i z e of Exxon or Ford cannot be e a s i l y ignored 
by any government, and as a r e s u l t the multinationals can obviously 
exert pressure; but the obsolescing bargain indicates that the s i z e 
of these enterprises has not prevented smaller States from r e s t r i c t i n g 
them or even expropriating m.An ejtampk. is Peru' s nationalisation of 
Exxon's subsidiary that l e f t ths multinational with a long struggle 
for compensation. 
Although the correlation between si z e and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i s subject 
7 
to debate, the c r u c i a l question i s e s s e n t i a l l y the p o l i t i c a l one of 
how much bargaining influence does raultinationalism provide? 
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TABLE I 
The Estimated Value Products of the World's Largest Firms in. 1 9 7 3 . 
indicating -
(a) the number of countries i n which t h e i r subsidiaries are located 
(b) the approximate percentage of t h e i r t o t a l production undertaken 
overseas. 
Company Country of re- Value product 
(a) Cb) g i s t r a t i o n . fjj'OOOm) 
American 
Telephone & 
1 7 . 4 Telegraph USA na 5 
General Motors USA 8 . 1 21 24 
Exxon (Esso) USA 5 . 7 2 5 81 
Royal Dutch-
4 3 S h e l l Group Netherlands-UK 5 . 4 7 0 
Ford Motor Co USA 5»o 3 0 3 6 
ITT USA 4 . 2 4o 6 0 
Sears Roebuck USA 4 . 1 na 40 
IBM USA 3 . 8 8 0 3 6 
Unilever Netherlands-UK 3 . 8 3 1 7 0 
P h i l i p s Netherlands 3 . 7 2 9 6 7 
General E l e c t r i c USA 3 . 6 3 2 1 5 General 
Telephone & 
Electr o n i c s USA. 3 . 1 na 1 5 Texaco USA 3 . 1 3 0 6 5 Siemens FRG 2 . 8 5 2 1 7 
Chrysler USA 2 . 6 2 6 2 2 
Mobil O i l USA 2 o 5 6 2 4 5 
US Steel USA 2 . 3 na 6 0 
I C I UK 2 , 3 46 4 2 Gulf O i l USA 2 . 3 6 1 7 5 Hitachi JAP 2 , 2 na 0 
Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries JAP 2 o 2 na 1 0 
Volkswagen FRG 2 . 0 1 2 2 5 Standard O i l of 
Cal i f o r n i a USA 2 „ 0 2 6 46 
Source: Adapted from Buckley P.J. and Casson M„j 'The Future of the 
Multinational Enterprise'; Macmillan Pressj ( 1 9 7 6 ) } 
pp. 1 2 - 1 3 . 
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I f multinationalism means anything at a l l i n respect of bargaining, 
the ' f l e x i b i l i t y ' of a wide d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i s of most significance 
when i n i t i a l entry negotiations take place or i n times of 'confront-
ation' with p a r t i c u l a r States. Such advantage i s evident i n the 
ea r l y concession rounds of the o i l industry, or i n the 1 9 ? 1 Libyan 
g 
dispute. However, such 'power* i s q u a l i f i e d by events. Once the 
multinational has made i t s i n i t i a l investment, i t i s open to 're-
negotiation' and 'hostage' bargaining by the States, The Middle 
Eastern o i l concession framework has been wiped away by the 'host' 
Statesj i n Libya the multinationals were forced to concede to 
o 
government demands and indeed BP found i t s operations nationalised. 
Moreover, the emergence of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining groupings among 
States has reduced the p o s s i b i l i t y of using 'divide-and-rule' 
t a c t i c s . The multinationals therefore are d i s t i n c t i v e i n t h e i r s i z e 
and scope of operations, (see Table I I ) but to claim that they are 
autonomous as a r e s u l t i s incorrect. Paradoxically, the bigger these 
firms are the more they need the r e l a t i v e s e c u r i t y of the States 
system, for the bigger they are the more v i s i b l e , the more feared, 
and the more vulnerable to r e s t r i c t i o n they become. 
Concern i s also expressed in a b e l i e f that o l i g o p o l i s t i c ^ control 
r e s u l t s from the f a c t that a small number of multinational enterprises 
are seen to dominate t h e i r respective industries. Table I provides 
some support for t h i s argument. Taking three of the most important 
'commanding heights of industry'-- motor manufacture, petroleum, and 
e l e c t r o n i c s — o f the 2 5 firms portrayed, f i v e are leading car makers, 
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six of the seven o i l 'majors' are present, and eight are prominent 
electronics firms. Power i s said to stem from several sources of 
olig o p o l i s t advantage! re a d i l y available c a p i t a l , a h i g h l y - s k i l l e d 
management and workforce, high research and development expenditure, 
raw material access, advertising, d i s t r i b u t i o n , and marketing net-
works and knowledge. 1 1 These features are not unique to the multi-
nationals, internationally-structured firms also possess them* What 
i s d i s t i n c t about the multinationals i s that they appear to possess 
• a l l ' of them. 1 2 
Oligopolist power, however, ultimately requires co-ordinated c a r t e l - . 
l i k e behaviour by the multinationals. Most c r u c i a l l y t h i s means the 
avoidance of harmful, d e s t a b i l i s i n g , competition and unity i n the face 
of a common threat such as national pressure for regulation. The 
problem for t h i s view i s that such competition does e x i s t and that 
there i s evidence to show that the multi-nationals do not t o t a l l y 
dominate the market. In the o i l industry, the 'Red Line Agreement' of 
1928 collapsed as s e l f - i n t e r e s t overcame common cause, a theme that has 
continued into the seventies with the majors i n a b i l i t y to successfully 
unit during the 1971 Libyan dispute despite a j o i n t co-ordinating 
13 
committee being established. 
The s i g n i f i c a n t factor i n t h i s i n a b i l i t y to achieve l a s t i n g multinational 
c a r t e l s i s that these companies are not alomr&r others are available to 
Stat e s ; and moreover are being chosen in preference to the multination-
a l s . Free from the t a i n t of multinationalism, w i l l i n g to offer terniB 
that under-cut multinationals since they are free from the worry of 
compromising t h e i r operations elsewhere ('leapfrogging'), these firms 
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have expanded in number, s i z e , and confidence during the post-war 
period. The most famous of these i s probably ENI (the I t a l i a n 
national o i l company)^-* but a whole spectrum of private and public 
independent contracting companies provide viable a l t e r n a t i v e s to 
multinationals for s t a t e s . 
The global organisational structure of the multinational i a believed 
to form a powerful bargaining l e v e r against the st a t e s . Subsidiaries 
are claimed to respond to a global strategy formulated by the parent 
which ignores the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s of States i n which they operate. 
Money, managers, and materials are said by c r i t i c s to move around the 
globe without reference to the national i n t e r e s t s of S t a t e s . ^ 
This argument i s oversimplistic i n i t s portrayal of the multinational 
structurej no major d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s made among t h e i r structures. 
These corporations are complex actors, often structured upon a highly 
TABLE I I 
Variations i n International D i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of Multinational Enterprises 
by Nationality of Parent, I 9 6 8 - 6 9 . 
Nationality of Number of Percentage of parents with o f f i l i a t e s 
Parent Parents i n 
1 2 - 9 1 0 - 1 9 over 
country countries countries counts 
United States 2,468 5 0 38 9 3 United Kingdom 1 , 6 9 2 4 3 4 8 6 3 Belgium-Lux. 2 5 3 5 3 3 7 4 1 France 5 3 8 3 9 5 1 8 2 West Germany 9 5 * + 4 ? 4 7 5 1 Netherlands 2 6 8 3 4 5 6 7 3 
Switzerland 4 4 7 4 7 4 5 6 1 
Sweden 2 5 5 3 6 5 1 9 3 Denmark 1 2 8 42 * 3 1 
I t a l y 1 2 0 4 7 . 5 * 5 2 , 5 5 
Sources UN Department of Economic and S o c i a l A f f a i r s , "Multinational 
Corporations i n World Development", Appendix: Table 4 . Reprinted 
i n P.J. Buckley and M. Casson. "The Future of the Multinational 
Enterprise" ( 1 9 7 6 ) Macmillan, p.l^K 
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devolved authoritative system: 
• "Firms are often compared to ships. Well, Unilever i s 
not a ship, i t i s a f l e e t - several d i f f e r e n t f l e e t s , 
several hundred subsidiary companies - and the ships 
many di f f e r e n t s i z e s , doing a l l kinds of d i f f e r e n t 
things, a l l over the place." 17 
Multinationals do not a l l operate on the same organisational basis. 
The numerous variations l a r g e l y f a l l into two very broad groups, 
18 
the c e n t r a l i s e d and the decentralised. The former i s the type 
of structure that i s envisaged by most c r i t i c s of the multinational. 
I t i s said to e n t a i l close control over policy formulation and imple-
mentation, highly co-ordinated global management, and corporate unity 
i n the d i r e c t i o n and goals of i t s development. I t i s s a i d to be 
further characterised by high intra-company trading and h o s t i l i t y 
towards national demands for j o i n t ventures or p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The 
problem with t h i s conception i s that there appear to be few multi-
nationals that have retained t h i s structure into the contemporary 
period. Associated mainly with the extractive multinationals i n 
t h e i r v e r t i c a l l y - i n t e g r a t e d form, t h i s structure has been superceded 
by looser groupings of the decentralised type, i n which the subsidia-
r i e s operate almost as 'national' companies, j o i n t ventures are more 
possible, and yet common corporate resources are s t i l l drawn upon. 1^ 
This change i n organisation r e f l e c t s the r e a l i t i e s of changing State 
relationships and events. The tensions a r i s i n g from the c e n t r a l i s e d 
structure led, in countries such as the oil-producing states, to 
increasing c a l l s for nationalisation and to the obsolescing bargaining 
of the 'seventies'. With the national inroads into the multinational 
structure, the extractive corporations adapted to t h e i r new operating 
conditions with new structures. Paradoxically, these developments 
further emphasised the lack of autonomy among the multinationals 
from the nation-states system. The interpretations regard these 
structures as the bonds of informal control over States, and i n terms 
of economic growth these structures probably provide d i s t i n c t advantages, 
but i n terms of the p o l i t i c a l question of control the decentralised 
structure emphasises the l i m i t a t i o n s upon multinational independence i n 
i t s response to national requirements. Ultimately, without such adapta-
tion and continued access to the States, the multinationals' foundations 
would be severely undermined. 
Multinational f i n a n c i a l strategy i 6 also claimed by c r i t i c s to be un-
related to the best i n t e r e s t s of the states system. The international 
mobilisation of c a p i t a l , transfer-pricing, intra-firm trading, and a s s e t -
l i a b i l i t y management, are a l l emphasised to support t h i s argument. Whilst 
these practices p e r s i s t , t h e i r l e v e l remains low with the advent of i n t e r -
ventionist governments at a national l e v e l and inter-governmental coop-
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eration at the international l e v e l . F i n a n c i a l disclosures, tax and 
investment regulation, and the inter-relationships sponsored between govern-
ments and enterprises through j o i n t ventures, a l l r e s t r i c t the f i n a n c i a l 
f l e x i b i l i t y of many multinationals to exert a dominating pressure upon 
States. 
The question remains as to the motivation of the multinationals„ I t i s 
reasonable to assume that what the executives of multinationals have in 
common i s t h e i r b e l i e f that "there i s a need to plan, organise, and 
manage on a global s c a l e . " This need, i n turn, may well r e s t upon 
a desire for s t a b i l i t y in the operating conditions. This s t a b i l i t y 
can of course be achieved either through control or by the e s t a b l i s h -
ment of 'modus vivendi'. I t i s i n t h i s context that the multinationals 
adaptation to the States pressure i s s i g n i f i c a n t , as the obaolescing 
bargain represents a renegotiation of conditions on the basis of mutual 
2? 
gain, a symbiotic balance of i n t e r e s t s . ' " 
Multinationals are c l e a r l y not independent actors as a r e s u l t of t h e i r 
inherent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , the status of these corporations being s i g n i -
f i c a n t l y related to the character of the States. 
In three centuries the States have established themselves as the predo-
minant actors i n the international system: international law i s made 
by and for States, international morality stems from national d e f i n i t i o n , 
and international organisations are rooted i n t h e i r national membership. 
This position has been b u i l t upon three fundamental conceptaj t e r r i t o r i -
a l i t y , legitimacy, and sovereignty, which together govern the behaviour 
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and r e l a t i o n s in the 'society of States'. 
In the r a t i o n a l l i b e r a l i s m of the 1 7 t h century, S t a t e s - l i k e individuals•» 
found t h e i r rationale i n the b e l i e f that they should be allowed an 
independent freedom of action to determine t h e i r own a f f a i r s . But, i n 
a world where a balance of nuclear terror reigns, where space-travel i s 
j u s t another headline, and where international communications, trade, 
and tourism have reached new l e v e l s of intensity, whatever r e a l i t y the 
idea of independent action may have had has been c l e a r l y eroded and the 
boundaries of State i n t e r e s t s become blurred. 
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Yet, States have not only maintained t h e i r status i n the system, 
but t h e i r numbers have grown i n the 20th century. However, j u s t as 
individuals i n the domestic analogy could not escape the attentions 
of each other, so too the actors i n the international sphere. As 
the volumes of current l i t e r a t u r e t e s t i f y , the States cannot Ignore 
each other, nor the growth of the new multinational actors. Multi-
nationals may 'bend the rules* to gain advantages, they may portray 
themselves as the replacements for the States, but the trends of recent 
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years indicated by the new bargains that have been struck suggest 
that i t has been the multinationals that have had to adapt to the 
States system and the exi s t i n g order. 
T e r r i t o r i a l i t y , may be said to form the p r a c t i c a l basis f o r State 
independence. In most cases, States have well-defined and generally-
recognised boundaries i n which t h e i r control i s regarded as paramount 
by other States. I t i s a re c i p r o c a l acceptance of the l i m i t s of 
authority. The States are immobile, rooted to the very areas that 
provide them with international status. T e r r i t o r y provides security, 
but occasionally also for tension which s p i l l s over into open c o n f l i c t . 
However, unlike the interpretations looked at i n the previous chapter1, 
c o n f l i c t does not appear to be an inherent part of the system. From 
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an admittedly quasi-Lockian standpoint, the t e r r i t o r i a l i t y concept 
seemB to provide one of the fundamental and commonly-shared principles 
i n the system, responding to a general sense of s e l f - i n t e r e s t wherein 
States are made aware of the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. 
At f i r s t sight the multinationals do not appear to conform to t h i s 
• t r a d i t i o n a l ' t e r r i t o r i a l b a sis. Operating productive or service 
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outlets throughout the world, these corporations have no obvious 
andl cifC 
t e r r i t o r i a l base^described by some as "footloose giants" overseeing 
?6 
" i n v i s i b l e empires", ' mobile, f l e x i b l e , and constantly i n motion, 
Their c a p i t a l , employment, and product flows are of an almost 
viscous nature. Multinationals would seem to d i f f e r from States i n 
t h e i r breadth of perspectivej tho former concerned with the global 
and the l a t t e r with the national, atomistic view. 
The picture, however, i s more complex. States are increasingly more 
'penetrated* than they once were. Religious organisations, m i l i t a r y 
a l l i a n c e s , worker migrations, as well as the multinationals are bringing 
the concept of t e r r i t o r i a l i t y into question. I t may be that penetration 
challenges the image of a 'gemeinschaff international community, sup-
porting the analyses of the interpretations and Stan3.ey Hoffman's view 
that : " I t i s one of Rousseau's deepest insights...that interdependence 
2 
breeds not accommodation and harmony, but suspicion and incompatability" 
Power and the balance may provide the basis for an ordered world 
('gesellschaft') society, and i n t h i s scheme of things the multinational 
role i s as a new source of power and of c o n f l i c t . Whether the 
' r e a l i s t ' philosophy i s strengthened in i t s b e l i e f that the international 
system i s characterised by the "perpetual and r e s t l e s s desire for 
2 8 
power" remains open to debate. I f the multinationals role i s guided 
by such power concerns then the history of t h e i r development during the 
'seventies' i s c l e a r l y one of f a i l u r e as can be seen elsewhere i n t h i s 
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study. The re-affirmation of the States position with regard to the 
operating conditions of multinationals within t h e i r boundaries has 
checked whatever drive to autonomy these enterprises may have been 
engaged i n . 
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The sheer s i z e of the multinational and the uncertainty that surrounds 
it-means that tensions a r i s e as a r e s u l t . Doubts over the correlation 
between economic and p o l i t i c a l aspects of the nation-state, are 
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centred upon the multinationals part in the 'technotronic revolution' 
and whether the State has the capacity to cope. Apologists of the 
'Functionalist', 'neo-functionalist' and • t r a n s a c t i o n a l i s t " schools 
of thought argue the t r a d i t i o n a l State concept i s challenged by new 
actors such as multinationals, and that the t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries of 
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States must change to accommodate economic development. 
A l l these views, however, assume that the multinationals are indeed 
'multi-national' i n the sense of being supra-national enterprises. But 
the multinational, whilst a d i s t i n c t i v e actor, i s part of an international 
system that i s overwhelmingly molded by the nation-states. There are no 
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" s t a t e l e s s islands" on the contemporary world scenej parents and 
s u b s i d i a r i e s are registered and bound by the j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e i r 
respective 'home' and 'host' States. S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s evident from 
the case study below that the largest of multinationals - the o i l majors -
ultimately have to take account of the t e r r i t o r i a l I n t e g r i t y of the 
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states i n which they operate. J Thus, returning again to the central 
question of autonomy, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to support the argument that the 
multinationals represent new t e r r i t o r i a l forms that are independent of 
of outdated States^ rather these firms have become reinforcing elements 
in the States system as they are increasingly regulated by national 
controls. 
Throughout t h i s study the term 'nation-state' has been used. This 
term implies the acceptance of a d i r e c t correlation between the 
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boundaries of State and nation. Nation i s a notoriously d i f f i c u l t 
34-
and elusive concept to define}^ i t can be conceived i n many d i f -
ferent ways} h i s t o r i c a l l y , economically, l i n g u i s t i c a l l y , geographi-
c a l l y , p o l i t i c a l l y or r e l i g i o u s l y . I t may be any one of these or a 
3t> 
combination. •* The problem with t h i s conception of the nation-state 
i s that i n many cases State and nation do not nearly coincide. 
Modern State boundaries are l a r g e l y the r e s u l t of the power struggles 
of past centuries. S i g n i f i c a n t i n the 20th century has been the 
emergence of the former colonial t e r r i t o r i e s as sovereign States in 
t h e i r own right. For many of these States, colonial boundaries have 
3< 
been retained often i n contradiction to t r a d i t i o n a l t r i b a l patterns. 
The question that i s of i n t e r e s t here i s whether or not the multinat-
ionals are any more unified than the States, and equally, whether 
they are any stronger as a r e s u l t of State i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s ? In 
other words are they any more independent? The problem for the multinationals t e r r i t o r i a l spread are very much 
refle c t e d i n t h e i r membership or workforce. For the most part, multi-
nationals draw upon l o c a l nationals to man t h e i r s u b s i d i a r i e s . Member-
ship i s therefore heterogeneous. The companies may t r y to stimulate non-
national, company-wide loyalty among i t s employees, but i n so doing 
c o n f l i c t s with i t s o r i g i n a l purpose i n employing the l o c a l people, 
namely to reduce the 'foreignness' of t h e i r operations and lessen 
tensions. Moreover, as the discussion of the o i l majors below high-
l i g h t s ^ those i n most of the c r u c i a l decision-making r o l e s at the 
managerial l e v e l of these enterprises are nationals of the State i n 
which the parent i s registered, i n t h i s case the United States or 
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B r i t a i n . Thus the organisation of the multinational c a r r i e s with 
i t the consequences of i t s origins, i t s very operational breadth 
stimulating forces of fragmentation. These enterprises are thus at 
l e a s t as diverse as some States and, moreover, i n some ways the 
States possess more cohesiveness than the multinationals. Contem-
porary State cohesion stems from an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with a t r a d i t -
ional geographical area or h i s t o r i c a l awareness, that reinforces an 
association with p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l or p o l i t i c a l systems. 
T e r r i t o r i a l authority i s often j u s t i f i e d by the claim that popular 
consent confers legitimacy. Multinationals and States a l i k e claim 
t h e i r positions are legitimised by t h e i r a b i l i t y to f u l f i l l the 
expectations of t h e i r respective constituencies. For multinationals, 
the gaining of the mantle of legitimacy i s v i t a l . Under pressure 
from many sides to provide a convincing rationale for t h e i r important 
position in the international system, t h e i r s u r v i v a l i n the States 
system i s threatened: 
"The f l a k w i l l get thicker. I f we don't j u s t i f y our 
existences before those who can a f f e c t and perhaps control 
our destinies, then we s h a l l at l e a s t get pieces shot out 
of us, i f we don't get shot down altogether." 3 8 
The legitimacy of the State has been said to be based upon i t s claim 
to f u l f i l l the expectations of: 
"...some universal expected l e v e l of economic welfare, a 
c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l autonomy f o r the nation, and 
a degree of national p o l i t i c a l status." 3 7 
The goals of national p o l i t i c a l status and autonomy have become 
entwined with the national pursuit of economic welfare as a r e s u l t 
of increased trading, larger markets, and accelerated demand as well 
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as higher expectations as a r e s u l t of r i s i n g incomes. In response 
to.the need to secure t h e i r goals the State has become increasingly 
interventionist. Multinational growth has resulted i n t h e i r 
becoming the focus f o r intense national debate over t h e i r legitimacy 
as sources of welfare development. To support t h e i r position i t may 
be that the multinationals need to challenge the States on the basis 
of t h e i r claim that they are more e f f i c i e n t and e f f e c t i v e i n a l l o c a t i n g 
resources. 
On the other hand, i t i s c l e a r that the actual benefit to States of 
multinational involvement i s questioned. Welfare growth i s claimed 
< « 
to be hindered by disruptive c a p i t a l flows, R&D expenditure, adver-
t i s i n g practices, and market manipulations. Such c r i t i c i s m s are 
fraught with emotive language, but the point being made i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
that governments are unable to act as free agents to achieve t h e i r 
welfare goals as a r e s u l t of multinational interference which infringes 
upon State authority. As we have already seen above i t i s the develop-
ing countries that are portrayed as the litmus t e s t f o r multinational 
legitimacy. Concerns voiced about the lack of substantial growth 
in these countries, the r i s i n g problem of 'marginal men', and the 
b e l i e f that the r i c h States are getting r i c h e r and the poor poorer, 
together form a powerful backdrop to national doubts about the multi-
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national enterprise. 
Yet, whilst t h i s general context of suspicion prevails, there i s 
evidence to suggest that many States are coming to terms with the 
multinational problem and finding p r a c t i c a l answers that both f u l f i l l 
t h e i r needs and also allow the multinationals a continued role i n t h e i r 
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s o c i e t i e s . As the demands of Chile upon the major copper enterprises 
i n -the early 'seventies', the code of practice established by the 
International Bauxite Agreement, and the pressures upon the o i l 
majors a l l indicate, governments are able to r a i s e the threshold of 
access to t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . The corporation-State r e l a t i o n s h i p i s 
therefore f a r from being u n i v e r s a l l y 'zero-sum'f information and 
knowledge i s being increasingly shared, j o i n t ventures undertaken, 
l o c a l nationals employed, 'participation' extended, and higher taxation 
and royalty l e v e l s agreed. The position of the multinationals thus 
appears as a paradox; the more dependent the States become upon them 
and the greater t h e i r importance i n the system, the greater the suspicion 
and h o s t i l i t y toward them. In order to gain more legitimacy the multi-
nationals are thus forced to f a l l back upon the States, identifying 
t h e i r subsidiaries with l o c a l markets and peoples and reinforcing t h e i r 
position within a State-centric system. 
Anxiety over multinationals i s d i r e c t l y 'linked to the concept of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty has been of p r a c t i c a l .importance ever since 
the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) embodied the idea into the physical 
r e a l i t y of a world of States, For Alan James, sovereignty i s l i k e 
marriage, i t i s absolute, one e i t h e r i s or i s not sovereign. J This 
i s true of the Westphalian declaration i n that i t offers a tautology: 
only sovereign States can make t r e a t i e s , but only t r e a t i e s can make 
States sovereign. However, sovereignty i s i n f a c t a r e l a t i v e concept. 
"The concept of the sovereign State has implied both supremacy within 
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and equality of status without." The significance of sovereignty 
l i e s i n any discrepancy between the absolute nature of the 'de jure' 
concept and the p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of international l i f e , that i s , 
« 
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the 'de facto' l e v e l of authority and equality enjoyed by a State. 
I t i s within the context of these two aspects of sovereignty that the 
debate over the multinational i s held. In other words, how f a r do 
the multinationals l i m i t the p r a c t i c a l sovereignty of States and 
thereby leave the concept as a mere lega l abstraction without any 
grounding i n r e a l i t y ? 
The extent to which a multinational a f f e c t s the authority of a State 
depends very much upon the type of State, the nature of the multi-
nationals operations and the period i n which the re l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s . 
The problem i s thus complex and i n many respects defies generalisations 
such as those of the interpretations looked at e a r l i e r . In a l l States 
there i s a constant appraisal of the balance between costs and benefits 
a r i s i n g from t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with the multinationals, j u s t as there i s 
such a process being undertaken within the corporations. In offering 
a discussion of the factors involved i n such national deliberations, 
two points must be made. F i r s t , the discussion i s not concerned with 
the moral question of whether the multinationals ought to be involved 
i n these countries, nor even whether the multinationals provide more 
costs or benefits to States* What i s of in t e r e s t here are the factors 
i n the evaluation of a States relationship with the multinationals. 
Second, the danger of such a discussion - necessarily limited by space-
i s that a ra t i o n a l debate i s assumed to take place when of course 
individuals prejudices and interests,emotional factors, or p o l i t i c a l 
needs may a l l influence and d i s t o r t the balance of the argument. 
Moreover, such a generalised picture does not mean that these factors 
e i t h e r a l l appear a t the same time or are applicable to a l l States. 
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In the 'home* States the debate focuses upon three factors, whether 
the multinationals are 'good ambassadors'\ whether they contribute 
anything to the 'home' treasuriesj whether these enterprises act as 
agents f o r the home States interests and what influence they have 
upon the foreign policy of these States. 
The home countries are very much the 'advanced' nations of the economic 
world and are also the countries wherein the majority of multinational 
parents are registered. The size, scope, technical achievement, and 
dynamic expansion of these firms are regarded by t h e i r supporters as 
representing the best of the 'home' State economic, social, and p o l i t i c a l 
systems. Their success i s regarded as r a i s i n g home State status and 
prestige. However, opposite views are expressed from many 'pressure' 
groups; - youth organisations, consumer groups, and p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c s -
a l l express doubts that aggressive marketing techniques, management 
that displays ruthless 'social darwinian' type behaviour, power concen-
tr a t i o n s i n the hands of the few, and continuing bribery and corruption 
scandals, do anything but tarnish the image of the home States.-^ 
Secondly, there i s debate of the multinationals and the 'home' State 
balance of payments. In America supporters of these firms argue that 
o 
repatriated earnings and taxes enrich the State,•* but i n other 'home' 
countries such as B r i t a i n and Sweden trade unions claim that the m u l t i -
nationals transfer jobs to areas i n which wage levels are lower. In 
America one group has claimed that 900,000 jobs have been so 'exported' 
between I965 and 1971.^ 
Thirdly, multinationals are accredited with the world-wide acquisition 
of much needed resources f o r these countries, such as o i l , copper, 
and electronic components. C r i t i c s argue that these have been 
gained at the expense of 'home' State foreign p o l i c y j the vast scope 
of these operations requiring the protection and active support of the 
government. By drawing the home States into c o n f l i c t s with other States 
or by allowing themselves to be used by other States, there firms are 
working against the best interests of the 'home' States,-^ 
The balance of factors i s therefore economic i n content, but i t i s 
equally clear that the significance of the debate i s p o l i t i c a l } does 
the multinational enhance or weaken the sovereignty of the State? The 
implications of the reference to multinationals a f f e c t upon foreign 
policy i s s i g n i f i c a n t and i s largely dealt with f u r t h e r below, but i t 
i s important t o note here that the role of the multinational as a 
•go-between', as an inte r n a t i o n a l bargaining actor open to varying 
national pressures i s recognised. In terms of how t h i s balance i s 
resolved by the respective 'home' govern«ien_ts, i t may be s u f f i c i e n t 
to note the muted changes made i n B r i t a i n and America, and the proposal 
of the American government to de-regulate the o i l industry. The 
confidence i s there that these firms are quite easily directed i n t o 
the path of the 'national i n t e r e s t ' ^ i n other western countries t h i s 
confidence i s less evident and some measure of regulation has been 
i n t r o d u c e d . J 
The s i t u a t i o n i s complicated f o r the 'home' States by the f a c t that 
they are also the main 'host' States.-^ Moreover, i n speaking of 
'host' States i t i s important to make a d i s t i n c t i o n between those 
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States such as the oil-producing countries that are escaping the 
57 
•developing nation' tag and those that are not. 
The advantages said to accrue to a country by playing 'host' are 
again economic i n nature. By introducing the multinational to the 
economy i t i s believed that new sources of cap i t a l are tapped f o r 
expansion. Such investment may be directed i n t o areas of greatest 
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need, such as those of high unemployment. The presence of producers 
such as these, exporting much of t h e i r goods, may mean more foreign 
exchange and taxable income f o r the State. For a l l these States the 
presence of these firms r e f l e c t s a hope f o r national growth and 
development. In e f f e c t the economic need i s that of the p o l i t i c a l 
onej enhance the States p r a c t i c a l sovereignty, But i n order to get 
what they want the States have to bargain, they have to balance t h e i r 
enticements with t h e i r fears of losing control over the giants that 
they i n v i t e i n . The type of fears held by the 'host' States may well 
r e f l e c t the d i f f e r i n g natures of the multinationals operations. Over 
ha l f of multinational investment i n the less-de.veloped countries i s 
i n extractive industry, whilst i n the developed countries over ha l f i s 
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i n manufacturing. 
Multinationals operating i n the extractive industries have often been 
accused of 'stealing' the resources of the hosts without regard f o r 
t h e i r future. This suspicion i s given added impetus by the fact that 
these forms often work i n 'enclave' conditions within these countries. 
Where t h i s has been the case, such as Abadan i n Iran, Alcan i n Guyana, 
Shell-BP i n Nigeria (during the c i v i l war), feelingsof estrangement 
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and alienation from the 'foreign' enterprise have grown up or been 
a c c e n t u a t e d A d d i t i o n a l l y , since the product i s invariably 
exported to the developed ('home') States, and that top management 
i s also from these States, and that production i s geared to consumer 
demands, the conclusions are drawn i n the host States that the 
benefits must also accrue t o the home 'countries'. Real or not, 
these fears have entered the psychological mileu that provides a 
common perspective among many 'host' governments, from which t o 
establish regulations f o r multinational behaviour. 
Concern over the manufacturing m i l t i n a t i o n a l s i s more muted than f o r 
the extractive industries, yet i n countries such as France and I t a l y 
national policy has been s i g n i f i c a n t l y governed by the fears that 
multinationals w i l l come to dominate t h e i r economies, l i m i t i n g 
entrepreneurship, and exercising a c r u c i a l influence over national 
economic and social development.^ Of even more concern i s the 
spec i f i c fear that certain advanced and p r o f i t i a b l e areas w i l l be 
dominated by these firms. One-third of Canadian industry i s controlled 
by foreign d i r e c t investment; 6Qffo of a l l manufacturing and &% of mining 
and smelting are i n foreign hands. 1395 of B r i t i s h manufacturing i s 
multinational owned. In Belgium, over h a l f of the petroleum sector 
i s held by foreign d i r e c t investment, and i n Mexico i n 1970, 100$ of 
the rubber industry and 7% of the chemical and tobbaco sectors were 
foreign owned through multinationals. Most of these investment i s 
American with US companies representing 80$ of investment i n Canada 
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and 70jC i n B r i t a i n . In t h i s context i t i s 'technological dependence' 
that worries the States. O i l products, computers, electronics, and 
motor manufacture are a l l c l e a r l y v i t a l i n d u s t r i a l sectors t o the 
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developed countries and the presence of multinationals i n t h i s f i e l d 
6^  
can cause unease, and tension. 
The arguments against the multinational position i n 'host* States 
are sometimes placed i n a broader context of a threat to the c u l t u r a l 
i d e n t i t y of these States. In the less-developed countries t h i s has 
been characterised as 'coca-colonialism', and i n the developed 
countries as 'La Defi American'. In Canada mounting f r u s t r a t i o n and 
anxiety over the high leves of US d i r e c t investment has resulted i n a 
more str i d e n t stance against the 'elephant neighbour', and culminating 
i n a government programme to nationalise the American dominated o i l 
industry i n Canada. Ultimately, where the costs are f e l t to be too 
high f o r the State i t has the a b i l i t y to r e s t r i c t access. As some 
observers have concluded, " I f multinational firms were purely exploi-
t i v e i n t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , they would be denied access to most countries." 
The questions of how the i n t e r - s t a t e relationships are affected by 
the multinationals presence i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system remains. F i r s t l y , 
and perhaps most obviously, the multinational represents a meeting place 
f o r national j u r i s d i c t i o n s . With the parent registered i n the 'home* 
State and the subsidiaries i n the 'host', the basic condition f o r 
possible tension between d i f f e r e n t national a u t h o r i t i e s i s evident. 
Such tension may arise when one of the States involved wishes to extend 
national j u r i s d i c t i o n a l decisions to the parts of the multinational 
enterprise outside the t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries of that State, and r a i s i n g 
the problem of infringement upon the sovereign authority of another 
State. There are few examples at such tension a r i s i n g from the m u l t i -
nationals, and even fewer of any significance. However, those that have 
occurred have usually involved the United States. Through the two 
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p r i n c i p a l policies of A n t i t r u s t and Denial, implemented by the US, 
serious questions have been raised within ho3t countries over the 
role of the m i l t i n a t i o n a l and the threat to the sovereignty of these 
States as a r e s u l t . 
From the Alcoa case i n 19^5. the IGI case of 1951, to the Continental 
68 
Ore case of I962, American j u r i s d i c t i o n a l prospective has added the 
weight of precedent to the guiding legal p r i n c i p l e tnats 
"...any State may impose l i a b i l i t i e s . . . f o r conduct outside 
i t s boundaries that has consequences within i t s borders 
that the State reprehends." 69 
The problem of a n t i t r u s t i s largely associated with US-Western Europe 
relations, the best known of these cases i s probably that of the BP 
merger with Standard O i l i n I968 that came as something of a shock to 
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the US. The basis of the differences may rest i n the attitu d e s 
towards competition} to the Americans competition i s a 'per se' good, 
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whilst t o the Europeans i t i s not. However, the s i m i l a r i t y i n the 
European Communities a n t i t r u s t a r t i c l e s and the American l e g i s l a t i o n ; 
the continuing dialogue between the governments involved through 
forums such as the OECDj and the establishment of agreements between 
countries such as that of West Germany and America f o r a n t i t r u s t con-
sultation,: has led one w r i t e r to conclude o p t i m i s t i c a l l y t h a t : 
" I n t h i s important f i e l d of a n t i t r u s t , I am therefore 
inclined to f e e l that the international f i r m presents 
no r e a l threat to community between nations." 72 
The Denial policies may be more problematic. The 'Trading with the 
Enemy Act' (1917) and ' Export Control Act' (19^*9) form the basis 
f o r American trade embargoes upon unacceptable States. The American 
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attempt to persuade France to decease from atomic weapon production 
i n the mid-sixties was b l a t a n t l y pursued by the p r o h i b i t i o n of 
advanced technology to France. In 1964, the American oubsidiary-
IBM France was banned from s e l l i n g computers to the French government. 
The problem i s that national prestige and s e l f - i n t e r e s t are so c l e a r l y 
involved i n such instances. Again i t i s mainly the developed countries 
that are involved and as such t h i s r e f l e c t s the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the 
relations between the •home* States, 
The competition between 'home' governments to furt h e r the prospects of 
' t h e i r ' multinationals may lead to tensions. The emergence of State-
sponsored companies such as GFP i n France, BL i n B r i t a i n , KNI i n I t a l y , 
have led these countries to promote the international interests of t h e i r 
proteges. Viewed withi n the context of the debate over whether Europe 
should follow the " A t l a n t i c i s t " path or the "Gaullist", the encourage-
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ment of these firms may occasionally touch o f f resentments. However, 
these tensions must not be overstressedt*there i s l i t t l e evidence to 
suggest that State relations are complicated to any great degree by 
the presence of the multinationals i n the context of the problems j u s t 
discussed. 
In both the developed and developing States, the desire to s a t i s f y 
r i s i n g domestic aspirations through material growth has produced 
competition among some countries f o r the d i r e c t investment of mu l t i -
nationals: 
"There i s a l i t t l e game which consists of a multinational 
company doing the rounds of a l l the European countries to 
f i n d out which w i l l o f f e r the most advantageous conditions 
f o r a given implantation." 7^ 
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T h i s p o i n t i s of course t i e d up wi t h the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s a b i l i t y to 
use i t s investment f l e x i b i l i t y t o i t s b e s t advantage t h a t was d i s c u s s e d 
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above. The enticements of tax h o l i d a y s , loans, guarantees on the 
l i m i t s o f government c o n t r o l s and on la b o u r s t i m u l a t e 'begger-thy-
neighbour' behaviour and provide the opportunity f o r the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
t o p l a y one government o f f a g a i n s t another. Of course, i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t not to assume t h a t both governments, and m u l t i n a t i o n a l s a l i k e 
a r e i g n o r a n t of the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a consequent r e - n e g o t i a t i o n o f 
c o n d i t i o n s once the investment has been made, a s has been the case i n 
the e x t r a c t i v e s e c t o r s . Moreover, the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f groups o f 
c o u n t r i e s with common b a r g a i n i n g o f f e r s has reduced the leo-way f o r 
the companies i n some a r e a s . 
The u n d e r l y i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the s e problems o r t e n s i o n s i s t h a t of 
n a t i o n a l autonomy or s o v e r e i g n t y and how the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i n f r i n g e 
upon i t or complicate i t s workings. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o argue i n the 
l i g h t o f so few supporting examples, t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s a c t a s 
s i g n i f i c a n t c o m p l i c a t i n g a c t o r s i n the r e l a t i o n s between S t a t e s . I n 
some c a s e s they do cause problems and t e n s i o n s among the S t a t e s , b u t i n 
the main they appear to r e f l e c t the p r e - e x i s t i n g t e n s i o n s i n the system 
t h a t stem from n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s : 
" . . . i t i s not so much a case of KNC's c o l l i d i n g with 
governments, as i t i s a case o f governments c o l l i d i n g 
w i t h governments." 77 
F o r some the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s r e p r e s e n t "agents o f change, s o c i a l l y j 
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economically, and c u l t u r a l l y . " I n othe r words, the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s 
can c r e a t e a world without d i v i s i o n s and c o n f l i c t s . The p a r t i c u l a r 
p e r s p e c t i v e s of S t a t e s , governed by pr i d e and p r e s t i g e , can be r e p l a c e d 
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by the u n i t i n g agent of the multinational. However, the development 
of national policies to r e s t r i c t the operations of the multinational, 
the declaration of international codes of conduct, and the fa c t that 
the multinationals very structures are nationally-orientated, raises 
great doubts about the v a l i d i t y of such claims. I t may be that the 
development of producer cartels , consumer groupings, and co l l e c t i v e 
bargaining organisations, w i l l i n d i r e c t l y sponsor wider p o l i t i c a l co-
operation between governments and reduce in t e r n a t i o n a l tensions. 
However, the history of the EEC and the ACM i s not encouraging i n 
anct 
t h i s r e s p e c t A even the OPEC group has had to work hard to prevent i t s 
disi n t e g r a t i o n i n the period following i t s great advances i n the early 
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•seventies'. I t therefore appears u n l i k e l y that the nation-State 
w i l l f i n d i t s e l f replaced by multinationals or that new p o l i t i c a l 
structures w i l l arise as a consequence of t h e i r presence. 
In that the multinationals constitute diplomatic mechanisms, acting as 
a bargaining fulcrum between the competing pressures of States, then i t 
may be argued f o r c i b l y that they represent important means by which 
inter-State demands can be expressed and i n some measure resolved. The 
relationship between the actors i s thus symbiotic i n naturej a mutual 
recognition that each has something that the other desires. Bargaining, 
taking place withi n t h i s o v e r a l l context, establishes the working basis 
f o r the relations between enterprise and nation-State i n the interna-
t i o n a l system. To see how t h i s i s acted out i n practice, a case study 
of the o i l industry i s included i n the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 1+ 
THE ACTORS IN THE INTERNATIONAL OIL SlfSTEM 
Three groups of a c t o r s form the nucleus of the o i l i n d u s t r y : the o i l 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , the home S t a t e s and the ho s t S t a t e s . As the p r e v i o u s 
c h a p t e r has shown, the use of such terms can hide the many c o m p l e x i t i e s 
among and between the a c t o r s . I n the o i l i n d u s t r y t h e r e i s l i t t l e t h a t 
can be s a i d to be s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . O i l company i s not a synonym f o r 
o i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l . Three main types of company c o - e x i s t s State-owned 
companies, American independents, and the o i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . The 
S t a t e s i n v o l v e d a r e no s i m p l e r t o c a t e g o r i s e j home S t a t e s a r e a l s o 
h o s t s and are a l s o both consumers and producers, host S t a t e s may be 
producers • only o r consumers only o r both, and may a l s o be home to 
S t a t e companies a s p i r i n g to m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t a t u s . G e n e r a l i s a t i o n s and 
c o n c l u s i o n s must t h e r e f o r e be made with c a u t i o n and q u a l i f i c a t i o n i n 
the l i g h t of the v a r i a t i o n s and d i s t i n c t i o n s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o i l 
system. 
The r e a l focus f o r a t t e n t i o n f o r t h i s s t u dy i s the seven largest, o i l 
companies, the o i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , a l s o known as 'The .Majors 0 o r the 
'Seven S i s t e r s ' , T h i s ' e l i t e ' group t o g e t h e r account f o r ^ 6% of world 
production and more than 5$ of a l l s a l e s , ^ These companies pos s e s s 
massive t u r n o v e r s , a r e v e r t i c a l l y - i n t e g r a t e d , and are p r i v a t e . F i v e 
a r e American-baseds Exxon, Texaco, Gulf, Standard O i l of C a l i f o r n i a 
( S o C a l ) , and two a r e B r i t i s h - b a s e d s B r i t i s h Petroleum (BP) and Royal 
2 
D u t c h - S h e l l . These f i r m s have expanded r a p i d l y throughout the twen-
t i e t h century to cover every c o n t i n e n t of the world with t h e i r v a s t 
networks of o p e r a t i o n s . By i n v e s t i n g i n t o a l l ' s t a g e s ' of the o i l 
i n d u s t r y — e x p l o r a t i o n , production, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , d i s t r i b u t i o n , 
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r e f i n i n g and m a r k e t i n g — t h e s e f i r m s a r e i n the p o s i t i o n t o h e a v i l y 
i n f l u e n c e the flow o f o i l throughout the world. The emergence of the 
o i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r World War Two, has c o i n c i d e d 
with the p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s a r i s i n g from n a t i o n a l i s m i n g e n e r a l , 
but from the d r i v e to n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n the former c o l o n i a l 
t e r r i t o r i e s i n p a r t i c u l a r . I n t h e s e l a t t e r a r e a s , the o i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , 
a s l e a d i n g e n t e r p r i s e s of the former c o l o n i a l powers, a r e port r a y e d a s 
the agents of n e o - c o l o n i a l i s m and form the focus f o r n a t i o n a l i s t i c 
h o s t i l i t y and demagogic r h e t o r i c . S u s p i c i o n and antagonism r e g a r d i n g 
the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s has been f u r t h e r f o s t e r e d by the p r o p e n s i t y of the 
companies to compete i n one a r e a w h i l s t c o l l u d i n g i n another: 
"Each l i n k e d to a l l the o t h e r s through a web of j o i n t 
v e n t u r e s and co n c e s s i o n s a c r o s s the globe, from A l a s k a 
t o Kuwait; s h a r i n g now wi t h one partner, now with another, 
i n d i f f e r e n t permutations. I t was t h i s strange c a v o r t i n g 
of the s i s t e r s , competing one moment and conniving the 
next, which had made them such an enduring s u b j e c t o f 
s u s p i c i o n and i n v e s t i g a t i o n by p o l i t i c i a n s , economists, 
and n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r s . " 3 
The o i l - m u l t i n a t i o n a l s have been the s u b j e c t of debate f o r decades. 
Charged w i t h t r a n s m i t t i n g the worst f e a t u r e s of c a p i t a l i s m , of i n s t i -
g a t i n g wars and r e v o l t s , and w i t h c a u s i n g f r i c t i o n between S t a t e s , the 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s a r e s a i d to i n f r i n g e the s o v e r e i g n a u t h o r i t y of S t a t e s . 
I n t h e i r defence, s u p p o r t e r s of the s e f i r m s argue t h a t i t i s the 
f a i l u r e of the S t a t e s to agree on common needs and aims t h a t c o m p l i c a t e s 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and the r o l e of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l . At the 
ce n t r e o f debate l i e s the nature of the e n t e r p r i s e i t s e l f . As the 
d i s c u s s i o n i n Chapter 3 has shown, the c h a r a c t e r of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
i s c l a imed by many to enable i t to manipulate S t a t e s . To recapitulate.^ ive 
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f e a t u r e s a r e s i n g l e d out f o r s c r u t i n y : s i z e , o l i g o p o l i s t i c behaviour, 
s t r u c t u r e , f i n a n c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n and ownership p a t t e r n s . These, i t 
i s argued, form a g l o b a l f l e x i b i l i t y t h a t proves c r u c i a l when b a r g a i n -
i n g w i t h S t a t e s t h a t do not p o s s e s s such a freedom of movement. 
By almost every s t a t i s t i c the o i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l s aire enormous concerns. 
Table I I I suggests something of the s i z e o f these companies - the 
number of c o u n t r i e s i n which they operate, the vast, numbers of employees 
a c r o s s the globe, the l a r g e s i z e of t h e i r revenues and r e t u r n s on t h e i r 
investment, a l l f a c t o r s t h a t i n d i c a t e t h a t these are no o r d i n a r y f i r m s . 
S i z e i s equated by a l l the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t have been looked a t i n 
t h i s s t u dy with independence. The l a r g e r the e n t e r p r i s e the more 
autonomous i t i s claimed to be. Frequent comparisons a r e drawn between 
the s i z e o f these f i r m s and the GNP of many S t a t e s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c o n t r o l i s s a i d to be e x e r c i s e d through t h e ' p u r s e - s t r i n g s ' power of 
f i n a n c i a l flows and domination of the c r u c i a l s t ages of the i n d u s t r y . 
T h i s i s b e l i e v e d to be r e i n f o r c e d by an o l i g o p o l i s t i c p a t t e r n of 
behaviour among the majors t h a t , f o r some a t l e a s t , c o n s t i t u t e a 
" p r i v a t e government of o i l " . ^ S h a r i n g a common i n t e r e s t i n maximised 
p r o f i t s and market s t a b i l i t y , l i n k e d through j o i n t ventures, and o f t e n 
with c l o s e p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t s , t h e s e f i r m s a r e b e l i e v e d to a c t as an 
u n o f f i c i a l c a r t e l . The famous 'As I s ' agreement of 1928, the ' O i l 
Committee' of the Second World War, and the London P o l i c y Group (LFG) 
of 1971. a s w e l l as the u n w i l l i n g n e s s of majors to take advantage of 
a f e l l o w major when i t i s c h a l l e n g e d by a S t a t e such a s BP i n I r a n i n 
195L and i n L i b y a i n 19711 a r e a l l regarded as examples of the w i l l i n g -
ness of the majors to c u r t a i l t h e i r competition to maximise t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n with regard to S t a t e p r e s s u r e s . The majors a r e regarded as 
-8> 
being c l o s e l y i n t e r - r e l a t e d i n many more s u b t l e ways: 
" G i a n t companies share a community of i n t e r e s t s guarded 
through patents, banking t i e s , common c a p i t a l u n d e r w r i t i n g 
and accounting s e r v i c e s , i n t e r l o c k i n g d i r e c t o r s h i p s 
through a t h i r d f i r m , b i d d i n g understandings i n r e l a t i o n 
to p u b l i c lands, r e c o g n i s e d t e r r i t o r i a l p r e r o g a t i v e s , 
crude o i l and product exchange arrangements, and 
p r i c e - f i x i n g . " 6 
Some evidence would seem to support these arguments. The American 
majors a r e l a r g e l y l i n k e d t o a s m a l l number of banks, the most promi-
nent of which being the Chase Manhattan, and a l s o with c e r t a i n law 
»«K 7 f i r m s ^ a s t h a t o f the long-standing o i l company lawyer John McCloy. 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , the p r i c i n g of crude o i l by the majors d u r i n g the p o s t -
war p e r i o d on the b a s i s o f Mexican G u l f F r e i g h t Charges' t h a t a r t i f i -
c i a l l y r a i s e d the p r i c e o f Middle E a s t produced o i l i s h i g h l i g h t e d i n 
t h i s c o n t e x t . 
However, i t should be noted t h a t none of the s e c a s e s were s u c c e s s f u l 
f o r v e r y long. They were e i t h e r c u r t a i l e d by government p r e s s u r e such 
a s was the case of the LPG, or by the i n t e r v e n t i o n of independent 
companies such a s Standard of In d i a n a ' s e n t r y i n t o the Middle E a s t i n 
TABLE I I I : THE SEVEN MAJOR OIL COMPANIES, 1973 
Average Net Rate of 
Net Income Return 
A s s e t s A s s e t s . 
/>m #m % 
Exxon US 12,993 2,443 18 .8 
Royal D u t c h - S h e l l Neth/UK 9,852 1.780 17.3 
Texaco US 7.583 1,292 17.0 
G u l f US 5,489 800 14 .6 
Mobil US 5.430 849 15.6 
SoCal US 5,513 844 15.3 
BP UK 4,439 760 13.8 
Source: C h r i s t o p h e r Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, O i l : The B i g g e s t 
B u s i n e s s , London, Eyre Methuen, 1975« P«4. 
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the l950' siOr even by the outbreak of competitive forces with i n the 
c a r t e l as i n the "As I s ' agreement wherein competition f o r new con-
cession areas and the l i m i t a t i o n s of the agreement proved too much 
f o r a l a s t i n g understanding. Moreover, the emergence of more force-
f u l leadership i n the host States and of a col l e c t i v e organisation 
(OPEC), has seen the control of pri c i n g wrested from the multinationals. 
The consequence of t h i B development i s t h a t the majors are now c r i t i c i s e d 
f o r passing on producer price rises to the consumers and taking advan-
tage by ammassing large p r o f i t s ; Exxon's p r o f i t s , f o r example, rose 
from f>2.h b i l l i o n (net) i n 1973 to /S3.I i n I97*f (gross). 8 Such control 
i s , as can be seen from the foregoing discussion, said to stem from the 
size and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of the multinational. However, i f the r e l a t i o n -
ship between the actors i s looked at from the other end, i t i s also 
possible that i t i s a f a i l u r e of p o l i t i c a l ' w i l l ' on behalf of the 
governments involved that may have allowed such situations to develop. 
This debate r e f l e c t s d i f f e r e n t perceptions of the o i l majors re l a t i o n s 
with t h e i r home States, i n other words,.the extent t o which these two 
actors work together i n the in t e r n a t i o n a l sphere, a point discussed i n 
d e t a i l below. 
To return to the central theme of t h i s discussion! how independent are 
the o i l multinationals as a r e s u l t of t h e i r inherent characteristics? 
Certainly the a b i l i t y to draw upon a d i v e r s i f i e d sourcing of crude o i l 
reduces the dependence of the majors on a small number of producers 
whose security of supply i s uncertain as a r e s u l t of p o l i t i c a l factors. 
Shortfalls of crude can be made up from other sources thus undermining 
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to some ex t e n t the f o r c e of t h r e a t s to withhold s u p p l i e s . Venezuelan 
crude has covered f o r production l o s s d u r i n g the A r a b - I s r a e l i con-
f l i c t s of 1956, 1967 and 1973 J L i b y a covered f o r f a l l s d uring the 
1973-7^ embargo} and G u l f S t a t e s have covered f o r the f a l l s caused by 
the I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n and I r a n - I r a q war i n 1978-80. T h i s a b i l i t y t o 
•go elsewhere* has been r e i n f o r c e d by the ' s i s t e r s * ' w i l l i n g n e s s to 
work to g e t h e r i n moments of c r i s i s to share-out a v a i l a b l e crude 
s u p p l i e s a s i n 1956, I967 and 1973-74. 
Examples of m u l t i n a t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n a l f l e x i b i l i t y being used t o c o e r c e 
stubborn h o s t s a r e fewj the e a r l y c o n c e s s i o n rounds, the I r a n i a n 
c r i s i s o f 1954, I r a q i n I968, and L i b y a i n 1971-72. Two main f a c t o r s 
account f o r t h i s r a r i t y . F i r s t , host governments have had a l t e r n a t i v e s 
to the majors, the r a p i d growth i n the number of independents and the 
e v e r - p r e s e n t S o v i e t Union, has widened the f i e l d f o r h o s t s seeking to 
widen the range of c o n c e s s i o n a i r e s . The pu rc ha si ng of Libyan crude by 
•mystery' f i r m s i n f l a t e d p r i c e s d u r i n g BP's d i s p u t e with t h a t country 
over i t s n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . The Arabian O i l Company (Japan) stepped i n 
to o f f t a k e o i l d u r i n g the Libyan d i s p u t e and ENI under E n r i c o Mattel 
(who considered i t a duty to undermine the domination of the majors) 
stepped i n t o I r a q d u r i n g IPC's d i s p u t e with t h a t S t a t e . Second, the 
emergence of OPEC a s an e f f e c t i v e , producer c a r t e l has l e f t l i t t l e room 
f o r manoeuvre f o r the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s to a c t u a l l y go elsewhere, or to 
p l a y one S t a t e o f f a g a i n s t another. O i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l s a r e composed 
of parent companies and ' o u t l y i n g ' s u b s i d i a r i e s and a f f i l i a t e s , l i n k e d 
t o g e t h e r by i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n a l , f i n a n c i a l , and managerial 
networks. As w e l l a s p r o v i d i n g f l e x i b i l i t y , these s t r u c t u r e s a l s o 
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l a y the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s open to the l e g a l and the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
requirements of the many S t a t e s i n which they operate. Such p r e s -
s u r e s can be n a t i o n a l such as those governing c o n c e s s i o n s l i k e the 
Venezuelan Awards of 1922; the 1955 Libyan Lawi the 1936 Venezuelan 
Labour Law: p r o f i t - s h a r i n g agreemens among producer S t a t e s i n the 1950*s 
and the j o i n t venture requirements such as the I r a n i a n O i l Act of J u l y 
1957 o r f i n a l l y , n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n laws such I r a q ' s Law 80 of I96I. I n 
home S t a t e s , monopoly or a n t i - t r u s t laws may be used to t h r e a t e n the 
o i l majors to change p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c i e s . T h i s s u b s i d i a r i e s and p a r e n t s 
a l i k e can be i n f l u e n c e d i n t h e i r behaviour by the r e g u l a t o r y environment 
of the S t a t e i n which they a r e d o m i c i l e d . I n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation by 
governments, wether of a formal or i n f o r m a l nature, can r e i n f o r c e t h e s e 
n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s . I n f o r m a t i o n - s h a r i n g , c o l l e c t i v e p r i c e or supply 
demands, or the a r t i c u l a t i o n of common p o l i t i c a l aims, can be e f f e c t i v e 
i n f l u e n c e s upon the majors a s the OAPEG and OPEC a c t i v i t i e s d i s c u s s e d 
i n Chapter 5 shows. These s t r u c t u r a l a s p e c t s of the majors do not 
t h e r e f o r e appear to provide a d e c i s i v e element of independence from the 
S t a t e s . 
The m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , however, a r e claimed to e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l by means 
of t h e i r predominance i n the b u s i n e s s ' i n - b e t w e e n i n ot h e r words, of 
t r a n s p o r t , d i s t r i b u t i o n , and s a l e s . There a r e two a s p e c t s to t h i s 
argument. F i r s t , the v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l and 
second, i t s h o r i z o n t a l i n t e g r a t i o n . For c r i t i c s , both amount to the 
same t h i n g , an attempt to monopolise the i n d u s t r y and c o n t r o l i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s . Up to 1973 the majors were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 80$ 
of world crude o i l production, over 70$ of r e f i n i n g c a p a c i t y , and 50$ 
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FIGURE I : The Royal Dutch-Shell Group of Companies. 
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of tanker capacity, (more when chartered tankers are also considered). 
Since 197^ these figures have changed d r a s t i c a l l y , largely as a r e s u l t 
<xn<L 
of n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s ^ a s was noted e a r l i e r , control over production has 
f a l l e n to J&jfc, r e f i n i n g capacity to Wv%>, and product sales were 5\% i n 
1976. 
The importance of the role played by the majors i n these areas cannot 
be ignored or underestimated. However, how f a r do the majors exercise 
control as a r e s u l t of t h i s position? During the late 1950's when the 
surplus of crude o i l was depressing prices, the majors sought to cut 
the posted-price upon which producers revenues were also calculated. 
Already h i t by production cuts, the e f f e c t of lower prices would have 
been severe f o r the States. Majors* on the other hand, could look 
forward to increasing p r o f i t s by reducing the surplus and buying at 
cost a t at time of s t a b i l i s i n g prices. Only by a hurried c o l l e c t i v e 
approach by the States were posted-prices able to be maintained i n 
I96O. In the 'seventies' such 'manipulation' by majors i s said to have 
j 
occurred with a reduction i n majors supplies to independents, and to 
have deliberately been used to create an o i l shortage i n the US during 
the winter of 1972 i n order to raise p r i c e s . ^ 
Yet, during the 'seventies' the host governments have taken control of 
the production i n t h e i r areas, regulating output and prices, and 
reducing the role of the majors i n t h e i r States to contractors. At 
present o i l producers s t i l l l a r gely depend upon the majors f o r the 
export and marketing of t h e i r o i l . However, the instances of auctions 
i n time of shortages^ sales to independents, and d i r e c t government-to-
government sales may well be s i g n i f i c a n t factors i n the r e l a t i v e 
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decline i n the majors overall position i n the in t e r n a t i o n a l o i l 
system during the past decade. This development has been reinforced 
b y i n i t i a t i v e s taken by the OAPEG group, such as the establishment of 
i t s own independent tanker f l e e t (AMPTC) i n the 1960's, In addition, 
joint-marketing arrangements such as that between B r a z i l i a n and I r a q i 
State o i l companies may prove to be a popular option f o r governments.^ 
As host State takeovers of production stages and of marketing shares 
are. squeezing the v e r t i c a l l y - i n t e g r a t e d company, c r i t i c s argue that 
horizontal integration i s now being used by the majors to maintain 
t h e i r position i n the f i e l d of energy. By investing i n coal, shale 
o i l and nuclear energy, the majors are looking t o become 'energy cor-
porations* o I t i s worth noting, however, that i n some countries the 
majors are lat e entrants i n t o the f i e l d s of coal and nuclear energy. 
In B r i t a i n and France State monopolies i n these two areas clear l y 
r e s t r i c t any expansion by the majors. In American, however, there 
remains large scope f o r such development. The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
l i m i t s of such development, however, often rests upon an assumption of 
the major-home government relationship as w i l l be seen from the d i s -
cussion of t h i s point below. What then does t h i s suggest f o r the 
central question of multinational autonomy? The ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' v e r t i c a l 
integration of the multinationals i n some States has come under a greats 
deal of pressure and i n some places l o s t altogether. The opportunities 
f o r expanding in t o new areas of the energy industry appear r e s t r i c t e d . 
In e f f e c t the structures of the multinationals have been overtaken by 
events. The continued role of the majors appears therefore to rest 
upon a State willingness to allow access to i t s crude i n return f o r 
t h e i r access to the in t e r n a t i o n a l networks and the s t a b i l i t y offered 
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by the majors i n the o i l system. The multinationals again appear to 
be part of the wider States system, although a very important part. 
The f i n a n c i a l organisation of the o i l multinational i s open to deep 
suspicion among governments and secrecy among the multinationals. 
Discussion again turns on the question of control. World-wide out= 
l e t s guided by parental overview i s claimed to allow investment and 
p r o f i t s to be directed to the most p r o f i t a b l e areas irrespective of 
p a r t i c u l a r national requirements or int e r e s t s . Thus the wealth of the 
majors i s said by one observer to flow " i n giant waves from one 
12 
country to another." Moreover, the costs involved i n the o i l 
industry are so immense that i t i s argued that States have no choice 
but to depend upon the multinationals and thus to accept t h e i r terms. 
The popular image of the multinationals i s one of massive p r o f i t s 
gained at the consumers or producers'expense. To a large extent t h i s 
machiavellian image i s a 'hang-over' from the e a r l i e s t days of the 
industry and J.D. Rockerfeller's Standard O i l Trust. High p r o f i t s 
are s t i l l very much i n evidence, as Table I I I shows. In 1973. BP's 
net p r o f i t s were #760 m i l l i o n , an increase of 332$ i n one y e a r . ^ 
Following the success of host bargaining i n Arab and OPEC States, the 
point at which majors p r o f i t s were maximised was moved 'downstream' 
as the chairman of Mobil explained i n 197^: 
"For a long time our foreign p r o f i t s were on crude o i l 
because our taxes i n the Middle East were so low. Now 
these p r o f i t s are going to have to s h i f t downstream f o r 
the simple reason that the Middle East governments now 
14 
control prices and our p r o f i t s on crude." 
Multinational strength, argued by the interpretations, also obviously 
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implies State weakness. Some States lack foreign exchange, 
investment cap i t a l , or f i n a n c i a l reserves. theae countries are said 
to be unable to bargain on equal terms with the majors, as was the 
case i n India during the early stages of i t s o i l industry's develop-
ment indicated by the discussion l a t e r i n the chapter. In Western 
Europe, the post-war period i s said to have provided ideal conditions 
f o r American majors to expand whilst the States were s t i l l weak from 
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c o n f l i c t . Even America i s regarded by some to be dependent upon 
the majors. 
Yet t h i s argument i s flawed by what i t ignores. The majors might 
have massive turnovers, but they also have massive commitments f o r 
which these revenues must be used, p a r t i c u l a r l y as these firms search 
f o r o i l i n areas of greater d i f f i c u l t y and costliness (and usually i n 
p o l i t i c a l l y stable areas). Despite the State takeovers of recent 
years the majors are s t i l l involved as contractors i n the upstream 
operations, usually providing the 'risk c a p i t a l ' and technical exper-
t i s e . Moreover, multinational c a p i t a l i n the o i l industry i s largely 
in-^t) 'fixed assets', leaving the firms open to obsolescent bargaining 
by States, leaving few opportunities f o r f i n a n c i a l 'manipulation' by 
the firms. 
States are often stronger than the interpretations allow f o r . The o i l 
producers have increased t h e i r revenues to enormous levels, especially 
following the ' o i l c r i s i s ' of 1973, as Table IV shoVte. I f as the 
interpretations claim, wealth r e a l l y does mean autonomy, then these 
States must be some of the most independent i n the world. The position 
of the majors has ce r t a i n l y been eroded by these hostss from the 
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early '50-50' p r o f i t - s h a r i n g agreements, the abolishing of royalty 
expensing, and the pricin g and production terms, the f i n a n c i a l 
position of these States has changed dramatically. Individual 
national i n i t i a t i v e s have been reinforced by the OAPEC establishment 
of the Arab Petroleum Investment Company. Additional finance has 
also been available to States through the Eurocurrency market, the 
World Bank, AID, and Soviet Union •credits'. 
TABLE IV: OIL REVENUES OP THE PRODUCER STATES, SELECTED 
YEARS (m i l l i o n of Dollars) 
Country 1965 1970 1972 1973 1974 
Saudi Arabia 655 1,200 3,107 4,900 19,400 
Iran 522 1,136 2,380 3,900 14,900 
Venezuela 1,135 1.406 1,948 2,800 10,000 
Libya 371 1,295 1,598 2,200 8,000 
Kuwait 671 895 1,657 2,100 7,900 
Nigeria na 411 1,174 2,000 7,000 
Iraq 375 521 575 1,500 5,900 
Abu Dhabi 33 233 551 1,000 4,800 
Algeria na 325 700 1,000 3.700 
Indonesia na 239 555 800 2,100 
Qatar 69 122 255 400 1,200 
Others (b) 16 150 222 550 1,700 
Total 3,847 7,933 14,722 23,150 86,600 
(a) 
(a) World Bank estimate, (b) Excl. N. American/Communist States. 
Source: Petroleum Economist, May 1974. Repr, J.S. Szyliowicz & 
B.E. O'Neill, The Energy Crisis and US Foreign Policy. 
Preager, 1975. P.85. 
Furthermore, countries such as India have endeavoured to establish 
State-owned r e f i n e r i e s to lessen t h e i r dependence upon outside companies 
Majors do possess great wealth, and they can and do attempt to use to 
gain favourable operating conditions, especially through the threat 
of de-investment (as i n Libya i n 1972) or transfer- p r i c i n g (as i n Japan 
i n 1973), but i n most cases the government has been able to ef f e c t 
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s u f f i c i e n t counter-veiling power to l i m i t the majors' strategy. 
New governments have come to power i n many host countries i n the 
post-war period which have been w i l l i n g t o press home t h e i r sovereign 
r i g h t s , h i g h l i g h t i n g the p r a c t i c a l weaknesses of the majors, and 
substantially changing the e x i s t i n g bargains and the p o l i c i t a l 
balance. 
The l a s t characteristic of the o i l multinational that may have some 
bearing upon the c r u c i a l question of autonomy i s that of ownership. 
In other words, what l e v e l of accountability do these firms display 
with regard to t h e i r stockholding constituencies? Such a discussion 
has to be lai'gely speculative since i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence i s available 
to support any f i r m conclusions. Everyday management of o i l multination-
als i s obviously complex and f o r t h i s reason alone can be said to be 
' separated' from the accountability of stockholders or sp e c i a l i s t 
'watchdog' government agencies. Only the most general of discussions 
i s often p o s s i b l e , ^ and only the 'biggest' of decisions examined 
during annual meetings?-takeovers, dividends, or controversial issues 
l i k e operations i n South Africa or accusations of p o l i t i c a l bribery. 
One can point t o i l l e g a l payments to President Part of South Korea, 
to the US Finance Committee, and to President Nixon's re-election 
campaign fund as evidence of o i l major p o l i t i c a l subterfuge aimed at 
17 
gaining future leverage on government or 'favours at court'. Yet, 
one can also point t o legal requirements of annual reporting and 
auditing, of representatives of the people to investigate, and of 
stockholders t o question top executives to explain t h e i r decision and 
actions at any time. That at least i s the theory, i n practice such 
accountability can be seen only to scratch the surface. I t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to draw f i r m conclusions about the extent of stockholders interests, 
whether they are dividends only or also p o l i t i c a l issues. Morever, 
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as the'Church Committee* found to i t s members f r u s t r a t i o n , astute 
company executives are diplomatically expert in^giving any real 
18 
information away. However, the amount of independence that accrues 
to the multinationals as a r e s u l t of t h i s weak accountability i s 
dubious. In the l i g h t of the other features of greater importance, 
wherein i t i s clear that the majors are largely l i m i t e d by States' 
regulations, i t i s unlikely that the majors derive any more autonomy 
from a weakening of t h e i r l i n k s of accountability. 
The o i l multinationals are, however, undoubtedly d i s t i n c t actors i n 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. Their size and scope as well as the impor-
tance attached to o i l by States sets them apart from any other company 
or organisation. Structural and f i n a n c i a l characteristics offex* the 
majors some bargaining f l e x i b i l i t y to 'go elsewhere* i f needs be. This 
obviously must put the firms i n a strong position with regard to the 
immobility of the States. The early concession rounds and the recent 
'buy-back* agreements can be seen i n t h i s l i g h t . However, t h i s position 
of bargaining influence must not be overstated. The appearance of m u l t l 
national strength, as can be seen both from the e a r l i e r chapters and 
from the present analysis, often hides a r e a l i t y of weakness. Global 
f l e x i b i l i t y i s tempered by the regulation and legal r e s t r i c t i o n of 
subsidiary operations, as well as by the prevailing atmosphere of public 
opinion i n the host State. The global involvement i n o i l places the 
majors at the centre of a vast network of overlapping national j u r i s -
d i c t i o n s , goals, and pressures. The history of the majors during the 
' s i x t i e s ' and 'seventies' i s one i n which governments have successfully 
pressed the majors f o r the control of production f a c i l i t i e s , p r i c i n g 
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control, greater revenues, and supply control. Home States have 
taken ever greater interest i n the majors as t h e i r demand f o r o i l 
continues to grow and supply appears to become more uncertain as 
a r e s u l t of p o l i t i c a l factors. 
Yet the majors remain important. They continue to operate i n a l l 
stages of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l industry and s t i l l possess a great deal 
of bargaining power. What then can be said to be the position of the 
multinational following t h i s b r i e f review of i t s main features? The 
position of the majors appears to rest upon three c r u c i a l factors. 
F i r s t , the bargaining status of the f i r m i s governei largely by i t s 
need f o r crude o i l supplies and f o r markets, and by the States' desire 
f o r the technical and f i n a n c i a l or supply services that the fi r m can 
o f f e r . I t can therefore be regarded as a symbiotic relationship. 
Second, the importance of o i l to the States and the awareness of 
possible escalations of tension between competing national goals and 
r e s u l t i n g i n s t a b i l i t y , places great diplomatic importance upon the 
majors as the means of balancing State interests and of communicating 
the d i f f e r e n t goals to the various States without d i r e c t contact, i n 
other words, acting as a form of 'lig h t n i n g conductor*. Thiixi, those 
two roles take place withi n the context of a State-dominated system, 
i n which national sovereignty guides int e r n a t i o n a l behaviour. In 
p r a c t i c a l terms t h i s aspect can be seen i n the threat or act of with-
drawal of access to a State from the multinational. However, two 
f u r t h e r points must be looked at since the majors are only half of the 
story. F i r s t ? as chapter 2 indicates, i t i s argued that the majors 
receive support from t h e i r home States to maintain t h e i r position 
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overseas. Secondly, t h i s support i s claimed to be based upon class 
in t e r e s t s . 
In the o i l industry there can be said to be two home States, America 
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and B r i t a i n . T r a d i t i o n a l l y claimed to have a 'special relationship', 
these countries share many s i m i l a r i t i e s . P o l i t i c a l and economic 
attitud e s centre largely upon the individual and equal opportunity i n 
society, p o l i t i c a l structures are organised on the basis of a b e l i e f 
i n representative democracy, and social and c u l t u r a l values a common 
h i s t o r i c a l heritage. Internationally, governmental perceptions of 
'national i n t e r e s t ' have, i n general, r a r e l y conflicted. Two World 
Wars, The At l a n t i c Charter, and NATO t e s t i f y to close alliance i n times 
of ' c r i s i s * . On the other hand, no two States are exactly a l i k e , and 
there are obvious and important differences between these home States. 
America dwarfs B r i t a i n i n almost every respect. But s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r -
ences are peshaps most cl e a r l y seen when t h e i r respective attitudes t o 
the majors are b r i e f l y noted. B r i t a i n has followed a generally 
' i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t ' road i n the post-war period i n her economic, social 
and p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . The 'mixed economy' has seen the extension of 
public interest i n t o many previously private industries. BP i s 
majority-owned by the B r i t i s h government following Winston Churchill's 
i n i t i a t i v e s p r i o r to World War One aimed at establishing a 'national 
champion' i n o i l . Despite t h i s government holding and two government-
sponsored directors, i t should be noted that the f i r m acts e n t i r e l y as 
a private enterprise with no State influence that can be seen to be 
ef f e c t i v e . In America^ private enterprise continues to be predominant, 
and the US majors are e n t i r e l y private companies i n t h i s respect. There 
has been l i t t l e interference with these firms since the 1911 A n t i t r u s t 
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action against the Standard Trust, government l i m i t i n g i t s interest 
to i n t e r m i t t a n t congressional enquiries. Differences apart, these 
two States are home to the o i l multinational parent companies. 
The focus f o r a l l the interpretations looked at i n Chapter 2 i s 
that of America as the home f o r f i v e of the seven s i s t e r s , and the 
following discussion w i l l also largely be concerned with the American 
case. The argument that the majors e n l i s t home government support t o 
gain advantages overseas i s not without supporting evidence. From 
the State sponsorship of BP i n I905 and the manipulation of B r i t i s h 
'spheres of influence' i n Persia (Iran) and Mesopotamia (Iraq) to 
advance the position of BP (Anglo-Persian O i l Company as i t when was), 
to the sending of gunboars to Mexico following the expropriation of 
Shells' assets, t o the pressure exerted upon Iran i n 1951~54 to restore 
BP's former position, B r i t a i n has been c l e a r l y active on i t s majors 
behalf. America too has been active. The self - i n t e r e s t e d use of the 
•open door' pr i n c i p l e enabled the US majors to enter the previous 
monopoly of BP, the Middle East, as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of US governmental 
pressure to revise the San Remo Treaty of 1920. The overthrow of 
Mossedegh i n Iran i n 195^ with the involvement of the CIA that resulted 
i n the securing of American majors p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Iran's o i l industry 
through the 'Consortium', the dispatch of US troops t o the Lebanon 
during the I r a q i revolution, the economic sanctions against Peru i n 
I968, and f i n a l l y the acceptance of the LPG i n 1971, a l l appear to con-
f i r m the interpretations view of the home States' r o l e . 
Despite t h i s seemingly persuasive evidence, questions remain as to why 
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these States have not acted decisively to prevent the erosion of the 
majors position i n the host States, what the nature of the r e l a t i o n -
ship between government and f i r m actually i s , and i f a j o i n t i n t e r e s t 
does exi s t , does i t follow inevitably that home States w i l l a c t i v e l y 
support the majors? 
How s i g n i f i c a n t are economic and p o l i t i c a l factors to the majors' 
relations with home States? A b r i e f review of American involvement 
i n Iraq may provide some clues with which to t r y and answer t h i s 
question. After a prolonged B r i t i s h presence i n the Mesopotamian 
o i l industry, the revision of the 1920 San Remo Treaty saw the entry 
of US majors i n t o the area. In 1958, the I r a q i monarchy was over-
thrown by the Kassim n a t i o n a l i s t coup. American troops were dispatched 
to the Lebanon and Syria to deter any tampering with American o i l 
assets by the new I r a q i regime. In the following years I r a q i pressure 
grew on the majors to produce more, to increase government revenues, 
and allow State involvement i n the Industry. In I 9 6 I t h i s pressure 
culminated i n Law 80, expropriating some concession areas from the 
majors. Shortly afterwards Kassim himself was overthrown, but the 
pressure continued. In I967 the Iraq National O i l Company (INOC) was 
established to work the concession areas and furt h e r 'under-worked* 
concessions were expropriated by Law 97, and i n 1972 the main production 
f a c i l i t i e s of the majors passed into State hands. 
This b r i e f h i s t o r y indicates the strength of the obsolescing bargain 
i n Iraq, but what can i t t e l l us about the major-home relationship? 
The San Remo Treaty offered B r i t a i n the chance to maintain her pre-
sence i n Mesopotamia through BP, f o r the US the chance to provide a 
foothold f o r 'her' majors. America was experiencing one of i t s periodic 
panics over o i l supplies and the dominant position of B r i t a i n i n the 
producing areas stimulated the American diplomatic offensive. More-
over, although not reaching maturity u n t i l much l a t e r , the B r i t i s h 
ascendency had reached i t s height and was destined to decline there-
a f t e r whilst America was emerging r e a l l y f o r the f i r s t time from i t s 
i s o l a t i o n i s t chrysalis and broadening i t s in t e r n a t i o n a l horizons. Yet, 
the US majors were already in/olved i n Saudi Arabia and Iran and were 
reluctant to extend t h e i r commitments i n the area much furt h e r . I t 
would appear that at t h i s point p o l i t i c a l interests guided the US 
i n i t i a t i v e rather than any r e a l desire to protect the postion of the 
majors. 
However, the Kassim revolution brought together majors and home States 
i n defence of t h e i r mutual economic and political interests. Successful 
i n the short-term i n securing a declaration of a status quo on o i l 
interests from the new regime, i n the long-term national pressure 
proved successful. Superpower tensions, the spread of Arab nationalism, 
and national and international public opinion, dissuaded America from 
i d e n t i f y i n g her 'national i n t e r e s t ' with that of the majors as they 
came under mounting pressure from Iraq. Rhetoric continued but was not 
reflected i n action. America could not a f f o r d p o l i t i c a l l y to be seen 
to be supporting the majors against the national desire to own the o i l 
industry wit h i n i t s own borders at a time i n which national s e l f -
determination was an important l e i t m o t i v of inte r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . 
In t h i s case, therefore, there i s l i t t l e to suggest that the interests 
of the home State inevitably coincide with those of the majors. 
C r i t i c s claim, however, that there i s a deeper, more insidious, i n t e r -
est between home State and major, that of 'class'.21 
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The executive branch of government and the o i l majors are said to 
form a c a p i t a l i s t or business 'r u l i n g class'. In t h i s view such 
home State controls as ex i s t are irr e l e v a n t * 
"The growth of the executive branch of government, with 
i t s agencies that p a t r o l the complex economy, does not 
mean merely the "enlargement of government" as some sort 
of autonomous bureaurocracy: i t has meant the ascendency 
of the corporation's man as a p o l i t i c a l eminence." 22 
Economic in t e r e s t , i t i s argued, determines p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t , govern-
ment policy and business strategy i s the r e f l e c t i o n of the interests 
of those who hold economic power i n society. As the main concentra-
tions of economic power the multinationals are claimed, to determine 
the nature of home government foreign policy, and makes a mockery of 
the domestic p o l i t i c a l process: 
"The dominant role of Big Business i n both p o l i t i c a l parties, 
the f i n a n c i a l holdings of certain key members of Congress, 
the ownership of the mass media, the industry-government 
shuttle i n the regulatory agencies and, most important, the 
ideology prevailing throughout the society of salvation 
through p r o f i t s and growth a l l help, to explain why the 
government of the world's mightiest nation musters so l i t t l e 
power to protect the interests of i t s people." 23 
For some c r i t i c s t h i s i n t e r e s t remains a vague and general fe e l i n g , 
surfacing only i n the a t t i t u d e s and values expressed through the 
language of 'the national i n t e r e s t ' , 'Free World', and 'pax americana* 
r h e t o r i c : 
"Overseas investments were indispensable components of 
the national mission. I t was the c i v i c duty of the 
corporations to f i n d o i l and markets. And i n turn, the 
developing countries were t o l d again and again by 
Democrat and Republican Secretaries of State that i t 
would be "wise and prudent" f o r them to put out the 
welcome mat f o r the Yankee corporate emissaries. I f 
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approaches were resisted, i f demands were unreasonable, 
i f contracts were broken, property threatened or confis-
cated, then the oilmen were to run to the White House. 
And they d i d . There they found sympathetic l i s t e n e r s , 
often t h e i r own colleagues or bankers, lawyers and p o l i -
t i c i a n s with whom they had been dealing a l l t h e i r l i v e s , 
ready to take appropriate remedial action." ?M 
a 
Discussion focuses upon what Bai-net and Muller c a l l the industry-
government shuttle": the movement of corporate management to govern-
ment agencies and vice-versa. Whilst o i l industry l i n k s can be traced 
back to Dwight Eisenhower, the l e v e l of interest i s at a lower admini-
s t r a t i v e t i e r . The main significance of the shuttle i s posed succintly 
by M i l l s : 
"...how possible i s i t f o r men to divest themselves of 
t h e i r engagement with the corporate world i n general 
and with t h e i r own corporations i n pa r t i c u l a r . Not 
only t h e i r money, but t h e i r friends, t h e i r interests, 
t h e i r t r a i n i n g - t h e i r l i v e s i n short - are deeply 
involved i n t h i s world. The disposal of stock i s , of 
course, merely a pu r i f y i n g r i t u a l . The point i s not so 
much f i n a n c i a l or personal interests i n a given corpora-
t i o n , but i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the corporate world. To 
ask a man suddenly to divest himself of these interests 
and s e n s i t i v i t i e s i s almost l i k e asking a man to become 
a woman." 25 
and 
There are many examples of such a " s h u t t l e " ^ a b r i e f note should i n d i -
cate the depth of the "revolving-door" t r a d i t i o n . In 1973. H o l l i s M. 
Dole, US Assistant Secretary f o r Mineral A f f a i r s l e f t to j o i n an o i l 
consortium project? his successor was an attorney f o r a leading Texas 
law f i r m with s i g n i f i c a n t o i l i n t e r e s t . Federal Petroleum Commissioners 
are also drawn from t h i s background. Party p o l i t i c s plays a part too. 
One contributor to the Nixon re-election fund was Claude S„ Brinegar 
(Senior Vice-President of Union O i l ) who was l a t e r appointed to the 
headship of the Department of Transportation, another was William P. 
Clements Jr., l a t e r Deputy Secretary f o r Defence (1972) . On the other 
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hand, appointees who were c r i t i c a l of the o i l industry do not appear 
to have lasted very long. Secretary f o r I n t e r i o r , Walter J.Hickel 
was unable to secure his position s u f f i c i e n t to maintain his c r i t i c a l 
stance and soon l o s t his post. John G. Sawhill, head of the Federal 
Energy Administration, whilst largely responsive to the industry, 
was suspected by the industry because of his willingness t o enforce 
• c o n f l i c t of in t e r e s t ' measures, disclosure requirements, and to 
oppose the decontrol of 'old o i l ' prices. Sawhill was asked to resign 
by President Ford, 
Opposition to such appointments has not been absent. Lee Richardson, 
Director of the Office of Consumer A f f a i r s , resigned i n 1974 o f f e r i n g 
a powerful attacK on the FEA, claiming i t to be on a "direct c o l l i s i o n 
27 
course with the best interests of the consumers." In 1973 
Robert H. Morris f a i l e d to be accepted by the Senate f o r his nomination 
to the Federal Power Commission. However, the willingness of Administ-
rations to remove i n t e r n a l c r i t i c s such as David Brooks i n 1970j the 
a b i l i t y of industry t o 'penetrate' sensitive areas of government as i n 
28 
the P h i l l i p s A f f a i r , and the control over information by majors 
influence, suggests to some that a dangerous s i t u a t i o n exists: 
"The access and cameraderie of the oilmen i n government 
reinforced by the advisory system, results i n control 
of the information ("the f u e l of government machinery") 
upon which decisions about resource development and use, 
rationing, price controls, i n f l a t i o n , taxes, foreign 
policy, and l i t e r a l l y war and peace are made." 29 
C r i t i c s of the "shuttle" point to a p r a c t i c a l example to support t h e i r 
argument, that of Occidental's attempt to establish a ref i n e r y i n Maine 
30 
f o r i t s crude o i l imports from Venezuela and Libya i n I968 , 
- I O 5 -
Occidental's plan to establish the r e f i n e r y on the basis of a 'foreign 
trade zone* was supported by Maine, but threatened to demolish the 
c a r e f u l l y constructed management of imports since i f Occidental was 
successful then the majors would f i n d t h e i r import quotas reduced: 
moreover: 
"Cheap foreign o i l and the nightmare of competition would 
return on Armand Hammer's tankers to haunt domestic pro-
ducers and t h e i r multinational brothers." 31 
Despite opposition the Occidental company won the r i g h t to make t h e i r 
application to Washington but l o s t against there to what i s claimed to 
be a d i s t i n c t class in t e r e s t of majors and national executive. For one 
c r i t i c a "secret government" was operating that "dwarfed the m i l i t a r y -
i n d u s t r i a l complex.,.The Board (Foreign Trade Zones Board) appeared 
f i r m l y within the 'secret governments' control....Some Board o f f i c i a l s 
had such close personal t i e s with the o i l industry as to appear them-
32 
selves almost a part of the industry." With the election of the 
Nixon Administration, the majors were confident since o i l money had 
swollen the obvious and less obvious funds of the campaign and Nixon's 
law f i r m had many o i l company c l i e n t s . The r e f i n e r y was not i n f a c t 
b u i l t . However, despite t h i s national pressure forced the Administration 
to eventually drop the o i l import quota scheme despite o i l major 
opposition. 
How f a r does t h i s example indicate class interest? Strong and effective 
pressure was exerted upon government by the o i l industry. However, i n 
the end the objective of maintaining the status quo f a i l e d to be 
achieved. The import quota system f e l l . This unexpected turn of events 
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could not be prevented by the industry led by the multinationals, 
simply because a class interest did not exist, opposition to 
Occidental representing a temporary c o a l i t i o n of convenience be-
tween majors and government. As soon as the p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l 
Interest of the government was seen to be at odds with the o i l 
industry, the c o a l i t i o n was ended. At a time of reduced super-
power tension, greater a v a i l a b i l i t y of o i l supplies, and cheaper 
imports, i t made l i t t l e economic as well as p o l i t l c f i l sense to 
maintain the quota system, at least, to the government. Moreover, 
the emergence of 'consumerism' i n the US required some kind of 
favourable response from government. 
However, i t i s claimed that the governmental f a i l u r e to enact a n t i -
t r u s t actions against the majors constitutes a condoning of the 
a c t i v i t i e s of these firms• r*fae««.wiu4e.to the 'El Paco' a n t i t r u s t action 
blocked by the Nixon Administration, the Alaska pipeline issue, and 
quiet acquiescent to the LPG, as well as the fact that no major a n t i -
t r u s t action has been taken since 1911. Again, however, class did not 
l i e at the root of these actions. For the Attorney General, 
John Mitchell, the reason lay wi-th the f a c t that they were " p o l i t i c a l 
33 
dynamite" endangering the flow of money into the re-election fund. 
The whole question of class or group interest i n p o l i t i c s involves the 
deeper a n a l y s i s A p o l i t i c a l systems and p a r t y - p o l i t i c a l ideology that 
unfortunately l i e s outside the confines of the present study. What 
may possibly be noted b r i e f l y i s a comparison between the Board of one 
of the majors, Mobil, and the executives of government. Both are over-
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whelmingly male dominated, aged betveen 50 and 60, and un i v e r s i t y 
graduates. One-third of the Mobil Board experienced governmental 
o f f i c e before j o i n i n g the Board. Beyond such s i m i l a r i t i e s , i t i s 
only possible to speculate that there i s un l i k e l y to be s i g n i f i c a n t 
c o n f l i c t s of view on the nature of the free enterprise system or the 
social and p o l i t i c a l order i n general between these groups. To note 
such s i m i l a r i t i e s i s not the same as making the large jump to the 
concept of class i n t e r e s t . Class and the relationship between 
economics and p o l i t i c s that underpins i t remain unproved assumptions 
with l i t t l e evidence to support them. 
Home government attit u d e s towards the majors are influenced by national 
and int e r n a t i o n a l pressures, int e r e s t groups, domestic and foreign 
policy goals, and the very nature of the decision making process 
i t s e l f . Government i s ra r e l y a concise, homogeneous, confident body 
following c l e a r l y defined and agreed means and goals. Government i n 
the home States i s a co l l e c t i o n of individuals and i n s t i t u t i o n s that 
together are regarded as providing the central d i r e c t i o n f o r the society 
as a whole. Decisions, attitudes and interests may well c o n f l i c t as 
much as coincide within the confines of the government. Aims are often 
i l l - d e f i n e d , subject to disagreement, and open to d i f f e r i n g interpreta-
t i o n s . Thus governmental attitudes r e f l e c t complex pressures and 
balance of interests. 
With regard to the industry i n America, domestic pressures stem from 
three main sources5 "the multinationals, public opinion, and the decision-* 
making process. The majors can be said to press the government f o r two 
main supportive measures«-financial allowances and diplomatic aid overseas. 
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The system of foreign tax credits and the domestic depletion allowance 
which operated during the ' s i x t i e s ' and 'seventies', may be regarded as 
being the r e s u l t of such corporate pressure, f o r f i n a n c i a l help whilst 
governmental actions i n Iran, Peru, Libya and the shuttle diplomacy of 
Secretary of State Kissinger i n 1973-7^ represent diplomatic e f f o r t . 
However, with these few instances i t must also be noted that the majors 
have l o s t t h e i r tax privileges and that diplomaey has been unsuccessful 
i n stemming the tide of obsolescent bargaining i n the host States. These 
changes have come about largely as a r e s u l t of the changes i n the 
inter n a t i o n a l and national p o l i t i c a l climate that made such privileges 
appear anachronistic and unacceptable and thus insupportable to an 
elected Administration. 
I t may be that the majors are able to influence government through 
economic or p o l i t i c a l leverage. Complex tr a n s f e r - p r i c i n g techniques 
could be used to evade US taxation, investment could be slowed, and 
a r t i c i c i a l shortages could be created, causing reduced revenues, more 
unemployment, and social unrest. I t would appear doubtful, however, 
that these options would even be considered f o r -the cost of losing 
t. 
t h e i r respecive shares of the world's largest single petroleum market 
could be too high to r i s k . The p o l i t i c a l option may well appear more 
a t t r a c t i v e being more subtle and less l i k e l y to involve economic r i s k 
or public outrage. O i l companies have been involved i n American p o l i -
t i c s f o r a good many years, and a number of campaign funds have bene-
35 
f i t e d as a r e s u l t . Most notably, o i l industry pressure has been 
exerted through the ' o i l lobby', A t r a d i t i o n a l l y powerful group, i t s 
most famous member i s probably President Lyndon B. Johnson, Since the 
days of Johnson, the lobby has declined i n influence but s t i l l remains 
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strong. The lobby i t s e l f has consistently s p l i t over the sometimes 
c o n f l i c t i n g interests of the national and the international members, 
and i t has been challenged by 'New England consumerism'. Perhaps 
the most s i g n i f i c a n t influence the multinationals can bring to bear on 
the US government i s America's dependence upon imported o i l . The US 
does not as yet have a State-owned national o i l 'champion' nor has i t 
been w i l l i n g to follow the lead of some Western European States i n 
establising 'government-to-government' deals with producers, leaving the 
multinationals as the main medium by which US o i l needs are met. Such 
a s i t u a t i o n i s unlikely to be ignored by government. 
Other domestic pressures influence the d e f i n i t i o n of government attitudes 
to o i l majors. The significance of public opinion i n governmental 
processes remains the subject of academic debate. This study follows 
the f a i r l y widespread academic practice of making a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
and 'attentive' or 'interested' public opinion and a public "mood" which 
"comes to bear as an unorganised whole... which prescribes the l i m i t s 
w i t h i n which policy can be shaped."-^ The former includes academics 
such as Raymond Vernon and Robert Engler, consumer a c t i v i s t s such as 
Ralph Nader, Labour organisations such as the AFG-GIO, and environmental 
groups l i k e 'Friends of the Earth' and 'The Sierra Club.'^ Each has 
i t s own perspectives, interests, and goals. Their pressure tends to 
be of a consistent and persistent nature, although some fluctuations 
may occur according to available funds, p u b l i c i t y , organisational 
eff i c i e n c y , and access to government. Various Congressional enquiries 
i n t o the industry or the multinationals might also be included i n t h i s 
category, drawing attention to the o i l multinationals. In recent years 
i t has been the environmentalists who have captured the headlines, 
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spurred on by o i l s p i l l s such as that of Santa Barbara i n I969, or 
disasters such as Tory Canyon (196?) and Amoco Cadiz (1978-1979). 
The l i m i t a t i o n s of these groups i s , however, summed up i n the paradox 
of the Alaskan Pipeline controversy of the 'seventies'. I t was the 
environmentalists greatest vict o r y and t h e i r greatest defeat. Having 
e f f e c t i v e l y organised opposition to the pipeline sufficient to delay 
i t , change i t s format and route, o i l company pressure with presiden-
t i a l support inspired by the ' o i l c r i s i s ' f i n a l l y and s w i f t l y swept 
away opposition and b u i l t the pipeline. Independents involved have 
suggested that the environmental issues were used by the majors to 
delay the development of Alaskan o i l reserves u n t i l o i l prices rose 
and supply and demand tightened. This case would seem to suggest that 
i t i s only when government interests coincide with those of the pressure 
groups that the l a t t e r are e f f e c t i v e . 
General public 'mood', on the other hand, tends to be ephemeral i n 
nature, ebbing and flowing according to i t s perception of ' c r i s i s ' , 
of shortages, of price hikes or price wars, or of large corporative 
p r o f i t s . Despite the attempts of opinion p o l l s , t h i s l e v e l of opinion 
remains i n a r t i c u l a t e , i t s significance most probably l y i n g i n the 
atmosphere of what i s acceptable that i t appears to create. I t s impor-
tance has not been l o s t on the various pressure groups that t r y to guide 
and 'educate' i t . The multinationals f o r instance continue to place 
f u l l page advertisements i n newspapers explaining t h e i r position and 
the benefits they believe they bring to consumers. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to 
draw f i r m conclusions about the role of public opinion, but i t would 
appear to form an important context within which government at t i t u d e s 
are formulated. 
- I l l -
The decision-making process i t s e l f also influences the attitudes 
adopted by governments towards the o i l multinationals. Four fac-
tors i n p a r t i c u l a r are of importances time, 'bureaucratic p o l i t i e s ' , 
p o l i t i c a l requirements,and the individual human characteristics of 
those involved. Although s l i g h t l y d i storted, these factors tend to 
be most obvious and accentuated at moments of c r i s i s . The 1973-7'+ 
• o i l c r i s i s ' can, even i f only b r i e f l y looked at, indicate some of 
the pressures involved. Overall, t h i s period was not one i n which 
time was greatly compressed, however, October 1973 to June 197^ 
did see the highest point of pressure, in t e r n a t i o n a l confusion, and 
intense a c t i v i t y . The embargo on the US had immediate results econo-
mically and s o c i a l l y and called f o r an immediate governmental response 
of some kind. 197^ was election year f o r the Congress and i t was only 
two years to the next presidential election, a Republican Administra-
t i o n had to be seen to act decisively and e f f e c t i v e l y . Moreover, 
America, i n the eyes of the government, must not be seen to give i n 
to "blackmail", yet i t s need f o r o i l required some movement i n America'i 
policy towards I s r a e l to one of 'even-handedness'. Whilst the m i l i t a r y 
lobbied f o r armed intervention, the State Department t r i e d toorganise 
a c o l l e c t i v e consumer response, the I n t e r i o r pressed f o r the interests 
of the domestic industry and Consumer A f f a i r s f o r lower increases i n 
prices. The President himself was distracted by Watergate and his 
f i g h t to stay i n o f f i c e . 
The o i l industry was therefore l e f t to organise and plan America's 
response whilst at the same time operating the embargo on America on 
behalf of the Arab States, Prices rose dramatically and supplies were 
rationed and a diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e was organised to t r y and bring 
together the consumer States, Therefore, the factors involved i n 
the decision making process are clearly important i n influencing 
a t t i t u d e s concerning the o i l multinationals. In t h i s case, a 
favourable climate existed f o r the delegation of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
to the majors, irrespective of the in t e r e s t i n g question of whether 
the US had any choice i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r instance. 
The question that the home government must ask i t s e l f when consider-
ing the international pressures upon i t s relations with the o i l 
multinationals i s whether these firms w i l l complicate or smooth i t s 
inte r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . For America, the p o s s i b i l i t y that the 
p o l i t i c a l goals of 'bridge-building' with the developing world, pro-
j e c t i n g an image that w i l l replace the established one of a c o l o n i a l i s t 
power, and constructing an international network of mutually advan-
tageous trading relationships, may be impaired by the actions of 
multinationals or by the State being associated with these companies 
i n countries where suspicions exist about these firms. 
Governments are largely judged by what they actually do. There are 
four ways i n which a home government might provide support f o r an o i l 
multinationals m i l i t a r y invervention, covert a c t i v i t y , economic 
sanction, and diplomacy. Only a handful of instances of m i l i t a r y 
intervention by home governments on behalf of the o i l majors suggest 
themselves from the long history of the industry, B r i t i s h and American 
"gunboat diplomacy' was brought into play against Mexico i n 192^ and 
1938) following the respective threats to a refinery, and the expropri-
ation of Shell assets i n 19^ +1 troops were sent to Abadan i n Iran and 
i n 1958 forces were dispatched to Syria and the Lebanon, However, i t 
-113-
cannot be argued that these actions were successful i n preventing 
the eventual takeover of multinational assets i n these countries, 
a point not l o s t upon the home States, especially when faced with 
the modern r e a l i t i e s of well armed host States, i n t e r n a t i o n a l condem-
nation of intervention i n the a f f a i r s of another State, as well as 
the unwillingness of domestic opinion to support such action. The 
m i l i t a r y option i s not the most viable f o r contemporary statesmen 
looking to support the o i l majors. The success of the obsolescing 
bargaining since the s i x t i e s has not been met by such action,simply 
r e f l e c t i n g the r e a l i s a t i o n of t h i s f a c t by home States. 
Covert a c t i v i t i e s may appear as a less blatcyit form of influence f o r 
the home government. The case that recurs i n study a f t e r study is 
that of Iran i n l951-5^» The embargo on Iranian o i l supplies enforced 
by the majors and supported by B r i t a i n and America, brought great 
pressure to bear upon the n a t i o n a l i s t regime of Mossedegh. Domestic 
support i n Iran weakened as the economic sanctions b i t and more impor-
t a n t l y Mossedegh's d i c t a t o r i a l form of government stimulated opposition 
to his r u l e . In 1953 a right-wing coup overthrew Mossedegh aided by 
the American CIA, and the BP company was able to regain the assets ex-
propriated by Mossedegh i n 1951. although t h i s time i n conjunction with 
American majors as part of a Consortium. This action was obviously 
successful i n the short-term, but i n the long-term i t proved counter-
productive. Other hosts were warned o f f the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i s t path 
and pursued more successful policies of *participation and col l e c t i v e 
bargaining, and i n Iran the restored Shah found i t necessary to take 
an aggressive stance towards the o i l multinationals of the Consortium 
i n order to 'prove' his legitimacy to ru l e i n the l i g h t of domestic 
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c r i t i c i s m that he was merely the puppet r u l e r of the Americans. I t 
may be that the strategy followed by hosts since the Iran dispute has 
meant that situations where t h i s type of support could be given to 
the multinationals have not arisen. On the other hand, i t i s more 
l i k e l y that changes i n international and domestic considerations have 
made Iran the l a s t time such an act could feasibly be undertaken with 
impunity as l a t e r attempts i n Iraq ( I 9 6 I ) and Cuba (I962) showed. 
A t h i r d possible means of support i s that of economic leverage. As 
has already been noted, economic sanctions were operated against Iran 
i n 1951-5'+ by an eff e c t i v e embargo operated by the o i l multinationals 
themselves. By the Cuban embargo of I 9 6 I i t was clear that the m u l t i -
nationals could not operate alone as they once hadfrr the emergence of 
OPEC i n I960 and the ri s e of the independent i n t e r n a t i o n a l company 
meant that the multinationals were anything but alone i n the international 
o i l system. Government demands f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Peruvian subsid-
i a r y of Exxon, IPC, led to the cut-off of AID by America i n 1964. 
Moreover, food shipments to India were withheld u n t i l agreement favour-
able to the o i l majors over governmental claims f o r public f e r t i l i s e r 
development was reached. I n s t i t u t i o n s such as the World Bank are argued 
to reinforce such economic leverage. Up to the *seventies*, the Bank 
operated a policy wherein f i n a n c i a l a id was withheld from o i l projects 
that were to be undertaken by the developing States themselves. I t 
i s claimed that pressure was placed upon the Indian government by the 
Bank to prevent i t from exploring f o r o i l overseas during the I960's. 
However, i t cannot be said that these actions were successful i n the 
long-term: Iran persistently moved fu r t h e r i n t o the operations of the 
-115-
Consortium, even during the ' f i f t i e s ' , Cuba fended o f f the embargo 
with the help of the Soviet Union, and Peru, at great cost to i t s 
poor economy managed to hold out against intense pressure. Further-
more, the use of such t a c t i c s led the producer States to embark on the 
strategy of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and to b u i l d up State enterprises as a 
gradual process rather than use the sharp shock of nationalisation, 
This strategy has been aided by alte r n a t i v e sources of finance such 
as the Eastern 'bloc* countries and regional organisations such as 
the OAU and OAPEC. Thus the economic sanction does not 3eem to o f f e r 
i t s e l f as the most effective of options available to the home State. 
A fo u r t h option i s diplomacy. 
The representation by one State of i t s interests to another i n the 
hope that the l a t t e r w i l l change i t s policy to one more favourable to 
the former, i s one of the oldest facets of the international system. 
In times of dispute, diplomacy i s largely the option of negotiation, 
mediation, and compromise. I t i s dependent upon the retention of lines 
of communication between those involved; i t requires that the t a l k i n g 
continues. Diplomatic pressure may be b i l a t e r a l or m u l t i l a t e r a l . 
Pressure from a single State upon another may prove i n s u f f i c i e n t i f 
the l a t t e r i s determined i n i t s policy, strong enough to r e s i s t , o r acting 
i n conjunction with others. In such circumstances, the fomer State 
may then seek to mobilise a diplomatic offensive on a broad f r o n t , 
marshalling support among other like-minded States to exert c o l l e c t i v e 
pressure by i s o l a t i n g the State i n question. The success of the 
American diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e against B r i t a i n over the San Remo Treaty, 
the attempts to influence Libya i n 1971. and the intense diplomacy 
among States during the ' o i l c r i s i s ' of 1973-7^ can a l l be regarded i n 
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t h i s l i g h t . But as the l a t t e r two examples also show, diplomacy can 
only achieve so much, even i f i t can be well coordinated and a r t i c u -
lated clearly. I t i s dependent f o r success upon the willingness of 
the other State to l i s t e n and negotiate. The home government, more-
over, may well be less than whole-hearted i n i t s e f f o r t s : other 
considerations colour the diplomatic scene that may prove more impor-
tant to the home government than the multinationals. The desire to 
maintain p o l i t i c a l l y favourable governments i n key strategic areas 
may take precedence over the economic interests involved. Multina-
t i o n a l s themselves are a medium of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s j p r i o r to 
the o i l c r i s i s the majors were used by the Saudi Arabians to signal 
to the American Administration exactly what the Arab position was and 
the consequences f o r the Americans i f t h e i r policy towards I s r a e l did 
not change. In addition, the actual sharing of scarce o i l supplies among 
the consumer States whilst maintaining the interests of the o i l producers, 
highlights the essentially diplomatic r o l e of the majors i n transmitting 
and balancing national interests without d i r e c t national contact and 
possible c o n f l i c t . The diplomatic option i s therefore the most complex 
and d i f f i c u l t f o r home States to judge and to undertake, 
I f the interpretations are correct, then the obsolescent bargaining 
of recent decades should have been met with fi r m , unequivocable support 
f o r the majors by home governments! t h i s c l e a r l y has not been the case. 
In many instances the home State has paid 'lip-service' only to the 
9 
multinationals c a l l s f o r support. The decisive confrontation between 
Libya and the majors at the beginning of the 'seventies', as the follow-
ing chapter amplifies, drew home support i n the form of a single, 
inexperienced, and il l - i n f o r m e d emissary dispatched to Libya and the 
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Middle East. I f the interpretations are to be believed then t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n should have seen emphatic and decisive support by the homo 
State. Overall, since the Second World War the o i l multinationals 
have found t h e i r positions i n the producing areas being eroded, i n 
the consuming areas' p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the market place; at the same 
time the amount of support forthcoming from t h e i r home States has 
declined as int e r n a t i o n a l and domestic conditions l i m i t the viable 
options open to them. The relationship between home government and 
major appears therefore to operate on the basis of a mutual under-
standing. The majors are l e f t to get on with the business of o i l 
supply, so long as i t i s realised that the home government also has 
wider p o l i t i c a l commitments that w i l l i n some circumstances mean 
muted support f o r the multinationals. Support f o r the o i l multina-
t i o n a l s i s neither inevitable nor automatic. 
Turning to the host States, the central question concerns the extent 
to which these States are constrained by the presence of the o i l 
majors? There are three groups of States that play host to the o i l 
multinationals; the OPEC o i l producing countries, the Western developed 
consuming countries, and the under-developed consuming countries. 
The OPEC countries themselves f a l l into three groups: the 'Gulf 
States of Bahrein, Iran. Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE)j the North African States of Algeria and 
Libyaj and the other producers outside these areas, especially 
Nigeria and Venezuela. The majority of these countries share a 
common history of colonial subservience and a common goal of asserting 
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t h e i r sovereign status during the 20th century. Embodied i n the 
desire f o r inte r n a t i o n a l recognition and influence i s the pursuit of 
economic, social, and p o l i t i c a l development through the use of t h e i r 
o i l and gas resources. During the post-war period, i n particular, 
pressure has been increasingly exerted upon the o i l multinationals 
by the governments of these States i n the furtherance of these national 
goals, 
The producing hosts have been concerned with three main issues with 
regard to o i l : p r i c i n g and revenues, supply, and ownership-involvement. 
Up to I96O these countries exercised no effe c t i v e influence over produc-
t i o n or price, nor did the majority of them have any p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
the operations of the majors i n t h e i r own t e r r i t o r i e s . Even i n Iran 
where the National Iranian O i l Company (NIOC) had been established by 
the government to run concession areas outside the o r b i t of the Consor-
tium, State involvement remained very small. Some gains were made i n 
revenues; r i s i n g production, the spread of 50-50 profit-sharing agree-
ments, and the a b o l i t i o n of host contributions f o r marketing and sales, 
a l l increased the amounts accruing to the producers. I t was also 
evident a t the time that these States could only achieve so much. They 
lacked the technical expertise, the information, and the f a c i l i t i e s of 
the majors. The formation of OPEC .in I96O reflected not only a common 
int e r e s t i n the short-term objective of maintaining posted-pricea, but 
also a perception of the long-term need f o r cooperation i n order to 
achieve t h e i r common aspiration f o r greater control over the o i l 
industry. The success of OPEC i n I96O of preventing posted-prices 
f a l l i n g was the f i r s t r e a l reverse i n the foxtunes of the o i l multinat-
ionals. Although i t required another decade before the main effects of 
t h i s change i n the balance of power came to f r u i t i o n , OPEC proved an 
-119-
e f f e c t i v e source of information-sharing, technical education and, 
most importantly, f o r the harmonisation of producer policy and bar-
gaining positions. 
Some observers i n the West have expressed the b e l i e f that OPEC 
v d l l break-up as s e l f - i n t e r e s t surfaces following the watershed 
39 
successes of 1973~7^« Differences have always existed between 
the members of OPEC, but whether they w i l l produce the end of the 
organisation remains i n the realm: of speculation. Differences, 
howeverj are important i n the pattern of relationships that have 
developed among the actors. Iran, f o r instance, with i t s large 
population sought to s a t i s f y i t s economic needs through increased 
production. Countries l i k e Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, on the other 
hand, with small populations prefer to increase revenues by means of 
production cutbacks when necessary. P o l i t i c a l differences also 
e x i s t . The withdrawal of the colonial powers from d i r e c t involve-
ment i n these areas, has seen turbulent p o l i t i c a l changes also take 
place. Monarchic rule has been overthrown i n some of these host 
Statesi Iran, Iraq and Libya, whilst i n others, such as Algeria, the 
continued influence of the colonial power has been challenged. Often 
proclaiming a curious mixture of nationalism, socialism, and reli g i o u s 
fervour, new leaders such as Kassim of Iraq or Qadafi of Libya expres-
sed antipathy towards o i l multinationals and the surviving monarchies 
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, a l i k e . Whilst the revolutionary 
leaderships expropriated the assets of the majors i n t h e i r lands, the 
monarchic States followed the more moderate and gradual road of p a r t i -
cipation. 
-120-
Power p o l i t i c s has also played i t s part. The desire to lead the 
OPEC group has "been an enticement to men l i k e Hussein of Iraq, 
A 
Qadafi, Reza Shah of Iran, and King Faroud of Saudia Arabia. The 
A 
constant jockeying f o r position between Iran and Saudi Arabia i n the 
I96O's has been given an added t w i s t i n the 1980's with the Islamic 
Revolution i n Iran c a l l i n g f o r the r e j e c t i o n of the "materialist' 
values of the West, massive price rises, and f o r the o i l to stay i n 
the ground i f necessary. 
The Tehran and T r i p o l i agreements of 1971. discussed i n the next 
chapter, marked the transfer of control over posted-prices from the 
majors to the producer States, the 1973°7^ embargo represented how 
f a r the producers were able to control supplies, and by 1976 a l l the 
producers held 10C$ p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e i r domestic o i l industries. 
Majors, forced to adapt to survive i n these areas, entered j o i n t 
ventures, opened new contracts, and agreed to invest i n petrochemical 
plants, with the host State. I t i s therefore d i f f i c u l t to draw the 
conclusion that multinationals control these States or that they have 
benefited from the differences among these States, since at the c r u c i a l 
points OPEC unity has been successfully maintained. The developed hosts 
consist of three groups also: those that deal with the majors as both 
producing and consuming nations (America, B r i t a i n , the Netherlands, 
and Norway), those that are consumers ( I t a l y , France, West Germany), 
and the special case of Japan. A l l are i n d u s t r i a l i s e d , are large 
consumers of o i l products, are representative democracies, and base 
t h e i r socio-economic systems upon l i b e r a l values. 
In the f i r s t group of States, government attitudes are largely 
influenced by the desire to balance the usefulness of the majors i n 
o 
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developing t h e i r o i l resources and providing d i s t r i b u t i o n networks, 
against a concern f o r a degree.of control over the industry. This 
careful balance of interests i s more appropriate to the European States 
involved than to America where the majors are not s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
involved i n the production of o i l . The intervention i n t o society 
by government has been widespread i n the Western European States 
since World War Two, although i s much less pervasive i n the US, With 
regard to the o i l industry such interventionism i s evident i n the 
establishment of national o i l companies to work with the majors i n 
the North Sea. B r i t a i n established the B r i t i s h National O i l Company 
(BNOG), whilst Norway formed the Norwegian equivalent. Moreover, 
B r i t a i n and the Netherlands already look upon the Shell group as a 
national i n s t i t u t i o n . BP too, i s held even more i n t h i s l i g h t with 
i t s B r i t i s h government stock-holding. Taxation and royalty payments 
are high i n these States but are not pushed f a r enough to alienate the 
majors. There may be occasional t a l k of 'windfall p r o f i t taxes' but 
the nationalisation and related policies pursued i n some OPEL1 States 
are u n l i k e l y to be followed i n these European hosts. In America, where 
Federal government continues to play the role of 'holding the r i n g ' be-
tween the d i f f e r e n t groups i n society, interference with the industry 
has been minimal although questions are raised over the role played by 
the majors during the ' o i l c r i s i s ' and t h e i r high annual returns. 
These firms, having originated i n B r i t a i n , Holland and America, do not 
constitute the aliens that they do elsewhere, and do not engender the 
same l e v e l of doubts. 
The s i t u a t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t i n Prance, I t a l y and West Germany. In the 
f i r s t two the position of the majors has been steadily eroded by 
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government i n favour of State-owned companies; CFP-ERAP ( E l f ) i n 
France and ENI i n I t a l y . Such policies are not new, GFP was establ-
ished i n 192U and ENI owes i t s origins to the corporatist policy of 
the Mussolini regime i n I926. But the s i g n i f i c a n t forces involved 
are the personalities of General de Gaulle and Enrico Mattel who 
both sought to counter an Anglo-American domination by the o i l 
multinationals. Thus r e f i n i n g capacity, market shares, and import 
quotas s t r i c t l y govern the position of the majors. For some majors 
i t i s too r e s t r i c t i v e and^have withdrawn. West Germany took much 
longer to abandon her free market a t t i t u d e s and i t took the o i l c r i s i s 
to make her throw government support behind the Deminex and Gelsenberg 
companies. The majors are therefore c l e a r l y much more r e s t r i c t e d i n 
t h e i r movements i n these hosts as a re s u l t of national regulatory 
policy. 
Japan's t o t a l dependence upon imported o i l supplies has meant that 
government has long been concerned with the industry and especially 
with the majors since i n 1973 these firms imported 7% of Japans' o i l . 
In I962 the government passed l e g i s l a t i o n strengthening national control 
over p r i c i n g and r e f i n i n g , and i n 1973 the majors accounted f o r only one 
t h i r d of r e f i n i n g capacity. In I967 the Petroleum Development Public 
Corporation was established to extend Japanese involvement i n o i l and 
the Arabian O i l Company (Japan) i s currently active i n the Middle 
Eastern offshore explorations. Thus, i n Japan government i s seeking 
to lessen i t s dependence upon the o i l multinationals. 
The under-developed States, sharing low GHP's and general economic 
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weakness, the imprint of former colonialism, p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y , 
and a dependence upon outside aid, are perhaps i n the weakest of 
positions to bargain with multinationals. Moreover, t h e i r lack of 
a c o l l e c t i v e voice such as that of OPEC furt h e r diminshes the scope 
of the bargaining strength available. I t would be strange i f some 
governments i n these countries did not f e e l some suspicion of pr i c i n g 
policy and supply conditions. However, i n terms of l i m i t i n g the sover-
eignty of these States, questions largely turn upon whether the 
multinationals are symptoms or sources of weakness, fo r , even these 
States have the r i g h t to say no to those who wish access. The need 
f o r a deeper understanding of the requirements of these States, and 
consequently the role that the multinationals are hoped to play, can 
only come through work such as the Brandt Commission. The role of the 
producer States i n either the transference of wealth to the poorest 
States or by o f f e r i n g o i l discounts, may be a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n 
the emergence of a clear role f o r the o i l majors i n these areas. 
The multinationals have therefore experienced a decline i n t h e i r 
position as the host States have exerted t h e i r economic and p o l i t i c a l 
capacity to bargain e f f e c t i v e l y with the majors, and as home government 
support has weakened as a r e s u l t of changes i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l climate. 
The multinationals continue to be able to o f f e r technical expertise 
and r i s k c a p i t a l to States i n return f o r guarantees of access to o i l 
supplies. The case of India indicates the development and nature of 
hi 
t h i s symbiotic relationship between the actors. 
Subject to the attentions of the o i l majors f o r many years p r i o r to 
independence (I9A7), India saw over 80$ of her r i s i n g consumption 
during the 1950's imported by these firms. Over ha l f were supplied 
by the British-owned Burmah-Shell Company. FUced with diminishing 
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foreign exchange reserves and growing n a t i o n a l i s t pressure against such 
a prominent position held by the majors, government called f o r r e f i n -
eries to be b u i l t i n India, Standard Vaccuum and Burmah-Shell 
responded by building small r e f i n e r i e s i n 1 9 5 ^ i n 1957 Caltex b u i l t 
another small refi n e r y . Prices did not f a l l but t h i s did represent a 
breakthrough f o r the government, however small. The companies had 
opposed these demands a„s less p r o f i t a b l e . But f o r the government i t 
represented an investment of $100 m i l l i o n i n India and reduced the 
force of company threats to withdraw. The majors acceded f o r three 
reasons. F i r s t , the f a c t that the majors would s t i l l be importing 
t h e i r own crude lessened the p o s s i b i l i t y of p r o f i t s f a l l i n g too f a r . 
Second, the legally-binding agreements included guarantees that assets 
would not be expropriated. Third, India was a promising area f o r 
expansion. The majors would simply be excluded from the market i f 
they refused the government. This was a remarkable success f o r the 
host government when the s i t u a t i o n i n Iran i s taken into consideration. 
Although r e f i n i n g capacity rose to 7% i n 1955 and majors investments 
to $218 m i l l i o n , the Indian problems of demand and foreign exchange 
remained as a re s u l t of the Second Five Year Plan's stimulus. These 
problems, along with the deV\ re to promote domestic business, saw 
government pressure focus upon the issue of 'local equity', i n other 
words, the entry of the majors into j o i n t ventures with l o c a l business. 
The majors were called upon to supply c a p i t a l , technical knowledge, 
whilst l o c a l business (with a 50$ holding) would supply l o c a l c a p i t a l 
hh. 
and a knowledge of l o c a l conditions. The majors, d i s t r u s t f u l of 
l o c a l involvement and f e a r f u l of the spread of such demands elsewhere, 
adamantly refused. In the short-term the multinationals protected 
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t h e i r position, but i n the long-term t h e i r s i t u a t i o n was severely 
damaged. Nationalist and a n t i - c o l o n i a l sentiments, reinforced by a 
p o l i t i c a l concensus of the r i g h t ( l e f t , and centre, formed a powerful 
platform upon which host pressure upon the o i l multinationals was able 
to emerge. 
The "seed of c o n f l i c t " of 'local equity' came to a head i n the 1960's 
when the Indian government sought to reduce prices paid by subsidiaries 
to the rest of the multinational* and to import o i l from the Soviet 
Union on a barter basis. The majors rejected the p r i c i n g policy and 
refused to handle the Soviet o i l . The Indian O i l Company had a capa-
c i t y f o r only one-quarter of the o i l needed by India. At t h i s time 
prices were f a l l i n g , production r i s i n g , the Congress Party was divided 
and superpower tension was high. The majors acted by c u t t i n g prices, 
attacking " p o l i t i c a l o i l " , and sought support from home States and 
the World Bank. But, home governments, fearing that India would be 
sent i n t o the Soviet camp gave no support to the majors. India 
i t s e l f set up investigations i n t o the working of the industry, and i n 
I965 the Defence of India Act gave government powers to coerce the 
majors. Three new r e f i n e r i e s b u i l t by the Soviet Union increased 
India's bargaining power. In I962, a deal between P h i l l i p s Petroleum 
and the Indian government gave the l a t t e r a 5 $ holding, P h i l l i p s 
and Indian stockholders 2^%. A series of s i m i l a r deals followed, 
including the majors. What had made the c r u c i a l bargaining difference? 
"...the s i t u a t i o n now, unlike the f i f t i e s , i s that the 
government knows how the o i l industry works and that 
the o i l companies have sensed the increasing bargaining 
strength of the government over two decades and have 
begun to take a less r i g i d stance." ^6 
-126-
With regard to the central question of independence and contr o l , 
Michael Tanzer argues th a t : 
"To the extent that the basic interests of the o i l companies 
and government diverge, t h e i r views...naturally tend to 
d i f f e r . Conflicts stemming from divergent interests are not 
usually resolved by appeals to 'equity', but rather are ,^7 
set t l e d by the r e l a t i v e bargaining power of the parties." 
With a broad concensus of support, an improving economic base, the 
willingness of independents to step i n with much better offers than 
the majors, and the desire of the majors f o r access to the growing 
market as well as t h e i r large investments i n India and a lack of 
home support, together produced a substantial swing i n bargaining 
power towards the host State. In 1972, Burmah-Shell and Exxon offered 
India new conditions. They would enter j o i n t ventures, relinquish 
t h e i r r i g h t of supply from t h e i r own sources, i n return f o r an allow-
ance to expand r e f i n i n g capacity. In 197^ Esso India offered a 7^ par 
t i c i p a t i o n to government to much of i t s operations, indicating the 
extent to which the majors have had to adapt. 
A b r i e f mention must be made of the significance of the Soviet Union 
i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o i l system. Important i n the early years of the 
20th century, the 1917 revolution removed the Russian industry from 
the world scene. I t was not u n t i l 1950 that i t returned to export 
to East and West Europe. The role of the USSR has been largely one of 
a revolutionary influence. By providing an ideological and a p r a c t i c a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e to the majors, the position of the l a t t e r has been under-
mined. The development of the Soviet o i l industry showed that the 
majors could be dispensed with. Moreover, at times of tension between 
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hosts and majors the USSR has made i t s e l f available as an alte r n a t i v e 
source of o i l , expertise, or credits on terms that the majors could 
or would not compete with. Whether or not these offers are made f o r 
p o l i t i c a l gain does not change the f a c t that i t does provide an 
alter n a t i v e to the majors i n the o i l system. 
There are no concise, all-embracing answers to the problem of the o i l 
actors and t h e i r relationships. The discussion above highlights the 
complexity of appearance and r e a l i t y i n the role of the o i l m u l t i -
national. Global f l e x i b i l i t y and the power that i s associated with 
such organisation i s i n f a c t l i m i t e d by the nation-states system. 
The enterprises are cl e a r l y not autonomous of the States, the web of 
national and inter n a t i o n a l regulations r e s t r i c t s the freedom of the 
majors to roam the world at w i l l . I t i s equally false to argue that 
the States are independent actors. In the context of o i l , governments 
have clear needs that require in t e r n a t i o n a l involvementsj host States 
seek the markets f o r t h e i r o i l and the home States seek secure supplies. 
I t i s i n t h i s position ' i n between' States, as part and parcel of the 
inte r n a t i o n a l system of States' interests that the o i l multinationals 
importance l i e s . The multinationals are 'go-betweens', the foi"um i n 
which interests are a r t i c u l a t e d and communicated. This i s an essen-
t i a l l y d i p l i m a t i c r o l e , recognised by the governments and enterprises 
a l i k e . I n the v i t a l commodity of o i l involving complex competing 
interests, the States have a stake i n the continued presence of the 
multinationals i n the system as a medium i n which d i r e c t contact and 
possible confrontation can be avoided, as can be seen from the 
discussion of the ' o i l c r i s i s ' i n Chapter 5. 
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However, the p r a c t i c a l relationship between multinational and State 
i s also p o l i t i c a l ; a bargaining process whex-ei n tVie actual influence 
achieved by the actors i s the s i g n i f i c a n t factor. Power i s a d i s t -
i n c t l y r e l a t i v e concept i n t h i s bargaining context. The States can 
gain p r a c t i c a l advantages i n the form of investments, expertise, and 
f a c i l i t i e s i n return f o r t h e i r allowance of access to the State f o r 
the firms. This does not appear to rest upon, an exercise of control 
by the majors, rather the b e l i e f among governments that the majors 
can s t i l l be of use to them. Overall, the interpretations 
based upon a presupposition of multinational control are unsubstant-
iated, rendering i n v a l i d t h e i r explanations of the status and role of 
the o i l multinationals. The evidence available c l e a r l y suggests that 
the relationships between the actors i s one i n which a mutual aware-
ness of respective needs, interests and c a p a b i l i t i e s , and i n which 




THE INTERNATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY; 
BARGAINING AND CHANGE 1970-1976 
Unlike the general analysis of the previous chapter, the following 
analysis i s centred upon three p a r t i c u l a r events of the early 1970's 
that are s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the o v e r a l l study of the role of the m u l t i -
national enterprise. These events highlight i n close d e t a i l the 
trends and changes i n the relationship between these companies and 
the nation-States discussed i n the foregoing chapter. Analysis i s 
s t i l l concerned with questions of power, autonomy, and bargaining 
and with the assertion of the main interpretations that multinational 
control forms the essential base f o r the relat i o n s between the actors. 
The Tehran-Tripoli Agreements i n 1971; the OAPEC embargo of 1973-7^> 
and the establishment of the IEA i n 197^. are events that warrant 
at t e n t i o n simply because they raise serious doubts as to the v a l i d i t y 
1 
of the explanations offered by the interpretations. 
In these instances, bargaining strength lay overwhelmingly with the 
governments involved. The 1971 agreements rocked the multinationals' 
influence over prices, supply, and ownership of o i l | the embargo was 
implemented by the majors on behalf of the Arab countries simply to 
ensure continued access to crude o i l supplies i n the future; and the 
IEA was established i n response to home State awareness that a reliance 
upon the multinationals was not necessarily i n t h e i r own best interests. 
Together, these events destroyed any appearance of multinational 
autonomy that might have arisen during the post-war period, and replaced 
i t with the r e a l i t y of State sovereignty and governmental bargaining 
power that had gradually emerged during the f i f t i e s and s i x t i e s but 
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which remained unrecognised or ignored by multinational executives 
and even t h e i r c r i t i c s . 
The Tehran-Ti-ipoli Agreements of 1971 represent the most s i g n i f i c a n t 
and c r u c i a l event i n the history of State-multiivational relations 
during the whole of the decade under review. These agreements s i g n i f y 
the breakthrough f o r the Gulf and Mediterranean o i l producing host 
States i n t h e i r bargaining with the o i l multinationals i n order to 
gain s i g n i f i c a n t benefits and advantages from the negotiating process. 
The economic background of a t i g h t e r supply-demand s i t u a t i o n ; the advent 
of a new revolutionary group spurred on by anti-western values} and the 
ohanging circumstances surrounding home government foreign policy that 
made i t less l i k e l y that t h e i r support f o r the o i l majors would be of 
a decisive nature, provided the s u f f i c i e n t conditions i n which the 
obsolescing bargain could be more e f f e c t i v e . With the establishment 
of these agreements came the general awareness among host States and 
multinationals that any pretention that the enterprises embody a bar-
gaining strength s u f f i c i e n t f o r autonomous action and universal control 
over the conditions i n which they operate i n the host States, no longer 
hold any large degree of force. Pricing, supply, and p a r t i c i p a t i o n -
ownership bargaining between the actors i n the immediately following 
years that saw the nation-States (especially the hosts) gain increasing 
advantages was a d i r e c t consequence of the stimulus to obsolescent bar-
gaining provided by the success achieved by the States i n 1971. 
The roots of the changing relationship between the actors i n the seventies 
l i e i n Libya. This country provided the touchstone f o r events rather 
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than other,perhaps more obvious, States as a res u l t of p a r t i c u l a r l y 
strong and obvious tensions with i n Libya that were f u e l l e d by a 
revolutionary coup which overthrew the monarchy of King I d r i s and 
l e f t a determined and f o r c e f u l regime i n i t s place that looked to 
make immediate and s t r i d e n t inroads in t o the position of foreign o i l 
multinationals i n Libya. 
Tensions i n Libya stemmed largely from the interaction between the 
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l system and the o i l industry. The i n s t i t u t i o n s of 
Libya were encapsulated i n a powerful and immobile venality. Authority 
maintained i t s position through patronage and corrupt practice. The 
nature of t h i s system and that of the o i l industry were conditioned 
by t h i s venality. The requirements of the venal system stimulated the 
unique pattern of o i l concession areas i n Libya. Small blocs and a 
large number of applicants f o r them encouraged fur t h e r patronage, 
bribery, and corruption. The two main concession rounds (1955 and. 
I965) saw the involvement of a l l the o i l majors, but, i n addition, a 
3 
large number of independents. The s i t u a t i o n was quite unlike that of 
the other o i l producing States of the Arabian Gulf or Mediterranean 
where governments dealt with only one or two concessionaires. Fragmen-
t a t i o n and corruption fed upon each other i n Libya; soon the demands of 
the monarchy upon the o i l companies became more pressing. Baed upon 
terms offered by P h i l l i p s Petroleum and Standard Indiana i n I96I, Libya 
pressed f o r n o t i f i c a t i o n of contracts over 200,000 (LP); depositing of 
l o c a l funds i n l o c a l banks; p r i o r i t y to be given to Libyan tankers; 
t o t a l disclosure of technical information; a higher percentage of 
company p r o f i t s i n government revenue; and the establishment of r e f i n -
eries and petro-chemical plants by these enterprises. However, the 
- I 3 2 -
government, weakened by corruption, faced by general opposition from 
the companies, and lacking both the p o l i t i c a l w i l l and the p r a c t i c a l 
tools to exert s u f f i c i e n t pressure upon the multinationals, achieved 
l i t t l e . Bargaining advantage remained with the companies} some con-
cessions were ruthlessly exploited whilst others remained untouched 
f o r fear of flooding the petroleum market. The host government did 
manage to secure a relinquishment of the depletion allowance by the 
majors i n I96I, but ov e r a l l t h e i r bargaining was ine f f e c t u a l . Exxon, 
i n p a r t i c u l a r proved a source of great f r u s t r a t i o n and tension during 
the f i f t i e s and s i x t i e s . Some of Exxon's concessions lay undeveloped 
and plans were delayed time a f t e r t i m e j ^ posted prices were well below 
the Middle East levels; problems over the Zelta pipeline and the 
refusal to finance government losses from the I967 close-down over 
the Arab-Israeli war, together created bitterness, resentment, and 
f r u s t r a t i o n i n the country, feelings that were tapped by the Gaddafi 
revolution i n September I969 and l a t e r turned successfully against the 
o i l majors. 
The new government continued t h e i r predecessors' policy of pressurising 
the o i l companies by raising the tax-reference price of o i l i n January 
1970 by 10-20%. The companies united to face t h i s challenge, r e j e c t i n g 
the government demand. Deadlock ensued, the government gained the 
support of States such as Albania to buy t h e i r o i l i f the government 
was forced to nationalise, and the companies cut back on t h e i r d r i l l i n g . 
The "wild men of Libya" changed t h e i r strategy by exerting pressure 
upon the independents rather than the multinationals, s p e c i f i c a l l y 
Occidental. These companies did not have the resources of o i l of the 
majors and were largely dependent upon Libyan o i l supplies. 
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Throughout 1970 the government ordered Occidental, Amoseas, Oasis, and 
Mobil, to substantially cut t h e i r production. Eventually, lacking the 
support of Exxon, Occidental was forced to succumb to Libyan demands. 
With the support of other radical States, Algeria and Iraq, Libya had 
managed to exert s u f f i c i e n t power to break down the common fr o n t of 
the companies. By again c u t t i n g Occidentals production i n August 1970; 
by harassing a l l the companies executives through the refu s a l of visas; 
the banning of new technology imports; and by police searches of 
company and employee belongings the government sought to inci-ease i t s 
pressure. Occidental agreed to government demands f o r a r i s e i n the 
posted-price of 3° cents immediately and a fu r t h e r r i s e of 10 cents 
over f i v e years, and a tax-rate r i s e from 50% to .57$. The Libyans then 
raised t h i s to $Sfo. In return, Occidental was able to gain government 
acceptance of a production l e v e l of 700,000 ban*els per day. After t h i s 
September *Rh agreement, Oasis agreed on September 18th, and the rest 
soon followed - including the majors. Lump-sum payments were to be 
made to Libya by the companies f o r the price differences since 1965; 
posted prices were to ri s e by 30 cents per barrel and by 2 cents annually 
t o 40 cents by 1975* Production cuts were not restored. 
The Libyan government achieved these terms through determined bargaining 
and e f f e c t i v e l y directed pressure. The companies were divided i n t h e i r 
needs and attit u d e s ; the majors were a f r a i d of si m i l a r terms being 
sought elsewhere, the independents and some majors needed Libyan o i l 
badly i n order to meet r i s i n g demand. The United States was divided i n 
i t s a t t i t u d e , whether to intervene or not. In the event, the 
State Department pressured the majors to agree to Libyan demands i n 
order to maintain America's position as the supply medium to Europe and 
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to ensure that prices i n America did not r i s e dramatically as a 
re s u l t of a Libyan embargo. The majors were therefore weakened by 
t h e i r multinationalism and t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to act successfully i n a 
cohesive, c o l l e c t i v e way to r e j e c t host government demands. Home 
government support was lacking and alternatives such as ENI or the 
Soviet Union were available. Therefore, i n t h i s case i t was the 
government that was able to exert a c o n t r o l l i n g influence rather 
than the multinationals. Occurring r i g h t at the beginning of the 1970's 
the host producer States had witnessed a substantial increase i n t h e i r 
bargaining position as a r e s u l t of the Libyan action. This awareness 
resulted i n a wave of obsolescent bargaining throughout these States, 
j u s t as the multinationals had feared. 
Before analysing the relations between governments and corporations 
through 1971- mention should f i r s t be made of the immediate events 
leading to the Tehran and T r i p o l i Agreements, Following the Libyan 
agreements, the Shah of Iran s t i l l nurturing vague grievances against 
"foreign countries", raised Iran's tax rate to 55%. Over the next few 
months host producers began to establish t h e i r bargaining positions on 
the basis of 55% tax rates and 30% increases i n posted prices. The 
21st OPEC Conference meeting i n Caracas (December 9-12th, 1970) 
codified these r i s i n g demands i n a Resolution that also called f o r a 
% increase i n government shares of company p r o f i t s and the elimination 
of a l l remaining company discounts from posted prices. Supported by a 
threat of an OPEC-wide cut-off i n the o i l flow to the corporations i n 
f i f t e e n days i f the l a t t e r refused, the corporations were i n v i t e d to 
enter in t o negotiations on the basis of three regional groupings^, the 
Gulf producers; the Mediterranean exporters, and Venezuela-Indonesia. 
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The Gulf producers meeting was to be the f i r s t , being held i n Tehran 
i n January 1971. Worried about American supplies, Under-Secretary of 
State John Irwin was sent to Iran; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, where he 
gained an awareness that, i n the event of an embargo upon the corpora-
tions, consumers would not face shortages. The majors decided upon a 
fi r m stand against the producers. Through the hasti,ly established 
'London Policy Group' (LPG) the majors sent a j o i n t message to OPEG 
on January 13th proposing "an all-embracing negotiation" between a l l 
the o i l companies and OPEC members, dealing with o i l prices and 
agreement l a s t i n g f i v e years. One week l a t e r , America convened the 
OECD i n Paris to gain support among consumer States f o r a moderate 
increase i n prices. Almost simultaneously the majors 'gave-in' to 
Iranian and Libyan pressure f o r separate negotiations i n a l e t t e r to 
Libya» 
"We should prefer, and should have thought that i t would be 
benefi c i a l , i n the interests of time, that the negotiations 
should be with a group representing a l l the OPEC members. 
Nevertheless, we should not exclude that separate (but not 
necessarily connected discussions could be held with groups 
comprising fewer than a l l OPEC members." 7 
On the 1^-th February agreement was reached i n Tehran between twenty -
two corporations and the Arabian Gulf producers. From t h i s ag.reement, 
Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar gained an increase of 35 cents 
per b a r r e l , the price to increase on June 1st 1971 and thereafter on 
each New Years Day u n t i l 1975. % on each date. Additionally, i n f l a t i o n 
and d o l l a r f l u c t u a t i o n adjustments were included, discounts abolished 
and State revenues raised to The producers agreed to r e f r a i n 
from f u r t h e r increases i n prices. In Libya, negotiations had begun on 
January 2nd, 1971. Unwilling to wait f o r the Gulf t a l k s to even begin, 
and with the ink hardly dry on the 1970 agreement, the government set 
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o f f on the bargaining t r a i l once again. Libyan Vice-Premier Jalloud 
demanded price rises, special premiums to cover the Suez Ganal closure, 
and cost-price development of indigenous o i l and gas resources and 
l o c a l sales through the investment of more corporative p r o f i t s back 
into Libya. The corporations reacted much as the same as they had 
before; the LPG agreed an 'Libyan Producer's Safety Net Agreement', 
providing f o r oil-sharing between companies i n the event of embargoes. 
Esso Libya was selected to negotiate on behalf of the LPG members. 
Deadlock soon emerged once again. I t was not u n t i l President Gaddafi 
threatened nationalisation of nineteen companies that movement took 
place. The threat came on the 28th of March and agreement was reached 
on the 2nd of A p r i l . Posted prices were to r i s e by 95 cents p/b, i n -
cluding 25 cents premium; annual rises were agreed at 7 cents p/b with 
an additional i n f l a t i o n allowance. Government revenue was set at 55$ 
and part of corporation investment was specified as being f o r exploration. 
The agreement was to l a s t f i v e years. Immediately t h i s was announced, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran sought the same terms from Aramco and IPG 
(Algeria had nationalised i t s o i l industry) and reached agreement. 
The Libyan, Saudi Arabian and I r a q i agreements became known as the 
" T r i p o l i Accord'. 
A number of questions spring immediately to mind when these negotiations 
are considered as a whole. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the 
events of 1971 i s that negotiations continued at a l l despite the a c c r i -
mony and threats that the process engendered! The question of why bar-
gaining d i d not degenerate into u n i l a t e r a l imposition of terms by one 
or other of the actors i s closely related to the question of what the 
aims, means, and c a p a b i l i t i e s of the actors were as ref l e c t e d i n t h e i r 
respective bargaining stances. A study of these factors should o f f e r 
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some suggestions as to the nature of the o i l multinationals r e l a t i o n -
ships with governments, and to the cogency of the arguments discussed 
in e a r l i e r chapters. 
Together the hosts had s i m i l a r aims to be achieved through the negoti-
ations. The immediate goal of these governments waB to gain control 
over o i l prices and thereby over the revenues that they drew from o i l 
s a l e s . Obviously, t h i s was part of the much wider aim, long expressed 
by the producer hosts, of achieving the decisive role over a l l aspects 
of o i l . The ambition of the Shah of Iran, expressed in I96.I, could 
have been spoken by any of the producer government leaders and was even 
more strongly f e l t ten years l a t e r : 
"One of our most important endeavours i s to enter the i n t e r -
national o i l market. This country, with i t s immense o i l 
reserves and i t s s k i l l e d oilmen could i n the future be more 
important than any o i l company, because the o i l which we market 
a c t u a l l y belongs to us. We could, in due course, produce i t , 
market i t , transport i t with our tankers, and a c t u a l l y r e t a i l 
i t ourselves." 8 
L i t t l e had been achieved during the s i x t i e s to aeVvcvie. t h i s aim, but 
with the beginning of the new decade dawned new hope among the leader-
ship of the producer governments. Working from a basic l e g a l foundation 
upon which the whole obsolescing bargain i s i n i t i a t e d , namely, 'rebus 
s i c stantibus' described by Frank Hendryx (Arabia's l e g a l council) i n 
1959 as involving a central democratic theme that was not encompassed 
by the e x i s t i n g State-orientated international lawi 
"The purpose for which governments e x i s t - service of t h e i r 
peoples - requires that on proper occasions those governments 
be released from, or be able to overrule, t h e i r contracts 
and obligations." 9 
At Caracas the host governments decided that a "proper occasion" had 
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emerged. They had the means t o achieve t h e i r goals. Learning from 
past experience i n I r a n and I r a q as w e l l as the more recent Libyan 
deals, these States undertook new t a c t i c s . The OPEC meeting i n 
December 1970 e s t a b l i s h e d a c o l l e c t i v e p o s i t i o n f o r n e g o t i a t i o n . 
Moreover, t h i s stance was t o be propounded through s p l i t b a r g a i n i n g 
among three n e g o t i a t i n g groups, opening the way f o r l e a p f r o g g i n g 
through the Libyan, Gulf, Libyan and Mediterranean agreementss suc-
c e s s i v e l y r e v i s i n g terms w i t h c o r p o r a t i o n s . The hosts were also aware 
of the d i p l o m a t i c channels open t o them. T h e i r d i p l o m a t i c l e t t e r s 
t o the consumer c o u n t r i e s were designed not merely t o reassure these 
c o u n t r i e s but t o lessen the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the home States would 
a c t i v e l y intervene on behalf o f the majors. However, the hosts were 
determined t o s u f f e r the consequences o f t h e i r a c t i o n s , hence the 
t h r e a t s t o cut o f f supplies t o the companies i f they proved too 
i n t r a n s i g e n t . 
The c a p a c i t y o f the hosts t o press f o r t h e i r terms was enhanced by 
the Libyans'success i n 1970 t h a t s t i m u l a t e d confidence among the r e s t 
o f these States. The Libyan deals were evidence not only of the a c t u a l 
s t r e n g t h o f the host States but also of the r e l a t i v e d i s u n i t y and 
weakness o f the o i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i f b a r g a i n i n g was undertaken i n the 
same way. Revenues t h a t had grown d u r i n g the s i x t i e s as production 
rose, provided g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y f o r those c o u n t r i e s and lessened t h e i r 
immediate concern over f i n a n c i a l dependency on m u l t i n a t i o n a l companies. 
O i l supply-demand had become t i g h t i n 1970 as a r e s u l t o f f o u r main 
f a c t o r s ; the closure o f the Suez Canal i n 196? and the shortage of 
tankers; the r a p i d l y - r i s i n g demand i n the consuming States; the sabotage 
o f TAPline i n 1970 ( A p r i l ) ; and Libyan cutbacks d u r i n g 1970. This 
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t i g h t e n i n g o f the supply s i t u a t i o n could only b e n e f i t the hosts by 
adding t o the pressure upon the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . The new r a d i c a l 
leaders such as Gaddafi were w i l l i n g t o a c t upon these changed c i r -
cumstances and OPEC provided a forum f o r a c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g 
p o s i t i o n t o be e s t a b l i s h e d , and provided f o r a c o l l e c t i v e t h r e a t t o 
cut o f f supplies t o the majors. With the p o s s i b i l i t y o f n a t i o n a l i s a -
t i o n given added c r e d i b i l i t y by A l g e r i a ' s n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n o f French o i l 
assets i n February 1971, the host governments were not the weak, i n e f f e c -
t u a l , subordinates t o the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t h a t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s argue 
i s the case. 
The b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n o f the hosts d i d have weak as w e l l as s t r o n g 
aspects. The hosts needed the markets, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , e x p e r t i s e , and 
investment t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s could provide. Moreover, the m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s maintained t h e i r ownership o f the s u b s i d i a r i e s o p e r a t i n g i n 
these States, and t h e i r i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n over supply and p r o d u c t i o n 
as the host's development o f State-owned companies and f a c i l i t i e s remained 
incomplete. Doubts remained over the c r e d i b i l i t y o f the embargo t h r e a t , 
the attempts i n 1936 and 1967 had been poor and i n e f f e c t u a l . With the 
contemporary knowledge o f the 1973-7^ embargo i t i s possible t o argue 
t h a t o i l would s t i l l have reached the consumers and could not be maintained 
f o r a s u f f i c i e n t l y long period, although i n 1971 there was no way t h a t 
the companies could be c e r t a i n . F i n a l l y , the hosts too had t h e i r d i f f e r -
ences and d i v i s i o n . The r a d i c a l States such as I r a n , A l g e r i a and Libya 
were l a r g e l y a n t i p a t h e t i c t o the moderate Sheikdoms of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and UAE, coming together mainly as a r e s u l t of mutual i n t e r e s t s 
i n o i l . I r a n , Venezuela and N i g e r i a were non-Arab States thus represen-
t i n g a f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n , and i n a l l these host States, the p o l i t i c a l 
a u t h o r i t y and s t a b i l i t y o f the governing e l i t e s was suspect from domestic 
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p o l i t i c a l challenges o r from communist insurgents such as i n I r a n . 
O v e r a l l , however, the host governments were i n a much stronger bargain-
i n g p o s i t i o n than a t any time i n the post-war peri o d and i n the 1971 
Agreements were able t o make s i g n i f i c a n t advances i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n s 
as a r e s u l t . As has been noted i n previous chapters, b a r g a i n i n g 
s t r e n g t h i s r e l a t i v e not absolute and t h i s host s t r e n g t h was d i r e c t l y 
r e l a t e d t o the power o f the o i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l s and the home States. 
Following the argument t h a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s dominate States t o i t s 
obvious conclusion i n the context o f the 1971 n e g o t i a t i o n s , then the 
c l e a r aim o f the majors was t o maintain c o n t r o l over the OPEC States. 
But as we have seen eaz-lier, the o i l majors l o s t much of t h e i r i n f l u e n c e 
over p r i c e s as a r e s u l t of the agreements and l e f t themselves open t o 
obsolescent b a r g a i n i n g i n the areas o f host p a r t i c i p a t i o n and supply. 
What then was the r e a l nature of the o i l majors ba r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n ? 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s looked t o maintain t h e i r access t o 
crude o i l , s e c u r i t y o f supply, and most i m p o r t a n t l y , a s t a b i l i t y i n 
p r i c i n g and supply. To support t h e i r aims the corpor a t i o n s could c a l l 
upon a v a r i e t y o f means t o achieve them. Through the f o r m a t i o n of the 
LPG and the consequential j o i n t message t o the hosts, and the 'Safety 
Net Agreement*, a basis was provided f o r a j o i n t n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n 
i n order t o e x e r t g r e a t e r pressure upon the States. Backed by the 
a b i l i t y o f these m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t o draw o i l s u p p l i e s from a l t e r n a t i v e 
sources d u r i n g any d i s p u t e w i t h the OPEC States, they could reduce 
t h e i r d r i l l i n g and investment as re q u i r e d i n order t o press f o r t h e i r 
goals. The American m u l t i n a t i o n a l s i n p a r t i c u l a r sought home government 
support and gained some d i p l o m a t i c involvement through the I r w i n mission 
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and the State Department's w i l l i n g n e s s t o a l l o w the LPG t o meet. 
Furthermore, the s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e played by the majors i n the produc-
t i o n , r e f i n i n g , and e x p l o r a t i o n of these States o f f e r e d an important 
p o i n t o f leverage d u r i n g t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the governments. 
T h e i r continued presence i n these c o u n t r i e s a f t e r the 1971 rounds 
suggests t h a t t h i s f a c t o r played an important p a r t i n government 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s . 
However, the f a c t t h a t the governments achieved the advances t h a t they 
d i d suggest t h a t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are wrong t o conclude t h a t m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l s i n e v i t a b l y and i r r e v o c a b l y c o n t r o l governments, or t h a t the 
majors gave way t o States because they s t i l l c o n t r o l l e d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
i n d u s t r y . The majors f l a t t e r e d t o deceive w i t h regard t o t h e i r bargain-
i n g power. Some measure of i n f l u e n c e accrued t o these c o r p o r a t i o n s as 
a r e s u l t o f t h e i r m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s m , but t h i s a l s o worked aga i n s t the 
majors when faced by a c o l l e c t i v e approach from a number o f host States. 
The majors f a i l e d t o maintain t h e i r c o n t r o l over p r i c e s or supply, and 
f a i l e d t o secure a p e r i o d of s t a b i l i t y . The r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the majors 
were weaker than they had appeared t o be l e d the consumer States t o 
e s t a b l i s h the IEA t o oversee t h e i r mutual i n t e r e s t s . 
M u l t i n a t i o n a l b a r g a i n i n g power was less i n f l u e n t i a l than might have 
been expected by observers and executives a l i k e , as a r e s u l t of a com-
b i n a t i o n o f long and short-term f a c t o r s t h a t undermined the majors'* 
p o s i t i o n i n 1971. M u l t i n a t i o n a l f l e x i b i l i t y i s over-emphasisad as has 
been noted i n chapters two and t h r e e , the corporations are t i e d t o the 
r e g u l a t o r y s t r u c t u r e s o f the States i n which they operate and w i t h the 
emergence o f OPEC the majors l o s t most of t h e i r capacity t o p l a y - o f f one 
government against another. Furthermore, the l a r g e r r o l e being played 
by independent companies such as ENI or the Arabian O i l Company 
(ja p a n ) , as w e l l as Eastern European countries, meant t h a t r e a l and 
c r e d i t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s e x i s t e d f o r host governments from whom more 
favourable terms could be gained than from the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s . " ^ The 
t i g h t e r supply-demand s i t u a t i o n r e s t r i c t e d the freedom o f the majors t o 
implement company embargoes upon r e c a l c i t r a n t States as had been done i n 
195^ against I r a n , and when BP t r i e d i n December 1971 t o impose such a 
ban on Libya f o l l o w i n g n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of i t s assets i n t h a t State i t 
f a i l e d t o achieve i t s o b j e c t i v e . The majors were now more dependent 
upon the producers f o r supplies than a t any previous p e r i o d and could not 
ignore the demands f o r new terms w i t h o u t r e c o g n i s i n g the danger t o t h e i r 
s u b s t a n t i a l investments i n these c o u n t r i e s . 
I n the short-term, the 1970-71 Libyan deals were important i n t h a t they 
s e t the p a t t e r n f o r f u t u r e demands i n the other producing States and 
represented f o r the majors t h e i r new l i n e o f defence beyond which they 
were resolved not t o a l l o w the host States t o go. I n Libya they companies 
had been d i v i d e d and p a r t l y conquered, and they were resolved too not t o 
lapse again. However, the d i v i s i o n s and d i f f e r i n g perceptions o f cor-
porate s e l f - i n t e r e s t s c a r r i e d over i n t o the r e s t o f the 1971 n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
The LPG was s p l i t , between majors and independents and between the majors 
themselves. For the most p a r t , the majors were less dependent upon any 
s i n g l e producer than were the independents, and because o f t h i s the 
l a t t e r were always more l i k e l y t o be w i l l i n g t o accede t o host government 
demands. Personal animosity was a l s o a f e a t u r e o f inter-company r e l a t i o n s 
a t t h i s time. Dr. Armand Hammer's attempt t o reach agreement w i t h Exxon 
chairman James Jamieson i n 1970 t o e s t a b l i s h an o i l - s h a r i n g mechanism 
t o r e s i s t the Libyan governments pressure on Occidental and thereby 
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maintain a u n i t e d corporate f r o n t f a i l e d mainly as a r e s u l t o f the 
lat t e r ' s strong d i s l i k e o f Hammer"'"'". Moreover, the 'Safety Net Agreement' 
was claimed by the independents t o be m a j o r - o r i e n t a t e d since they 
12 
were t o be p a i d i n cash r a t h e r than o i l from t h e LPG . The majors 
were d i v i d e d i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e s towards t h e hosts. Unlike the other 
majors, SoCal and Texaco were f i n d i n g d i f f i c u l t y i n m a i n t a i n i n g 
t h e i r supply s i t u a t i o n as a r e s u l t o f t h e Sues Canal c l o s u r e , BP-Shell 
emJL. 
were also experiencing problems o f production i n N i g e r i a ^ these 
companies vre.ro t h e r e f o r e r e l u c t a n t t o press the hosts too hard and 
endanger t h e i r o i l supplies. The other majors, not experiencing 
these d i f f i c u l t i e s , were less r e s t r a i n e d i n t h e i r . a t t i t u d e s or 
a c t i o n s , thereby producing tensions w i t h i n IPG- i t s e l f . I n a d d i t i o n 
the LPG- was weakened by i t s i n a b i l i t y t o draw i n c o r p o r a t i o n s , such as 
MI, AOG or C'ffP t h a t would not accept t h e j o i n t p o s i t i o n o f the majors 
nor the terms t h a t they o f f e r e d t o the host governments, thus s t r e n g t h -
ening t h e i r r o l e as a l t e r n a t i v e s . As a r e s u l t o f these d i v i s i o n s o f 
weakness t h e LPG accepted host terms based upon separnte n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
F i n a l l y the majors d i d not r e c e i v e the f u l l support of t h e i r home govern-
ments. The United States sent out an unprepared eiaissiary t o t h e 
moderate Gulf States and attempted t o g a i n consumer States' support f o r 
a small r i s e i n p r i c e s as a concession t o the host States. This 
d i p l o m a t i c a c t i v i t y was m i l d and f e l l f a r short o f what the majors hoped 
f o r * But the home governments had i n t e r e s t s and p r i o r i t i e s t o take i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n as w e l l as t h e i r o i l i n t e r e s t s , important as they might 
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be, as w i l l be discussed l a t e r . The LPG was given passive support 
through "business l e t t e r s ' of the State Department i n Washington, but 
t h i s support was muted and not f r e e from i n t e r n a l c r i t i c i s m , , The o i l 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t h e r e f o r e could not be c e r t a i n t h a t t h e i r attempt 
to coordinate t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y would not come under home 
government s c r u t i n y from A n t i - t r u s t a u t h o r i t i e s (as was the case 
l a t e r i n 1974) Returning t o the question o f autonomy, i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t t h e m u l t i n a t i o n a l s were anything b ut the absolute masters 
suggested by the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Kather, th e b a r g a i n i n g process 
r e f l e c t e d an outcome t h a t was a r e s u l t o f the r e s p e c t i v e strengths 
and weaknesses o f these actors andin t h i s instance l e d t o g r e a t e r 
advantages accruing t o the governments than t o the c o r p o r a t i o n s . 
I n t h i s balance o f barga i n i n g f a c t o r s , as was noted e a r l i e r , t h e 
home government also played an important r o l e . These governments 
aimed t o secure o i l supplies, through the e s t a b l i s h e d corporations 
i f p o s s i b l e , b u t by a l t e r n a t i v e means i f n e c e s s a r y . ^ The United States 
was also i n t e r e s t e d i n ma i n t a i n i n g the p o s i t i o n o f the ' f r i e n d l y ' 
States o f Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE and i n preventing t h e Soviet 
Union from extending i t s i n f l u e n c e i n the r e g i o n at America's expense. 
I n t e r e s t e d opnion was d i v i d e d between those who advocated making 
concessions t o the host s , such as JomeB Akins, D i r e c t o r o f the O f f i c e 
of Fuels and Energy i n t h e Department o f S t a t e , and those who advocated 
government i n t e r v e n t i o n on b e h a l f o f the majors to r e i n f o r c e t h e i r 
u n i f i e d s t a n d against t h e producers, such as t h e Armed Forces who 
worried about t h e i r supply s i t u a t i o n , , Following Vietnam, and the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l condemnation o f the breaking o f the e t h i c o f n a t i o n a l 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , the United States could not a f f o r d t o be seen 
to be a c t i v e l y i n t e r v e n i n g i n the a f f a i r s o f the producer States t o 
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t h e i r d etriment. Thus the I r w i n mission, t h e OECD meeting and t h e 
'business l e t t e r s ' remained the extent o f home government involvement 
i n 1971, l e a v i n g t h e corporations t o work out t h e i r best p o s s i b l e 
agreement w i t h i n the context o f these n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . 
The o i l m u l t i n a t i o n a l s ' p o s i t i o n as the most important i n f l u e n c e upon 
t h e o i l i n d u s t r y and upon the States i n v o l v e d w i t h them had begun t o 
change during t h e 1960's, but i t was the agreements o f 1971 t h a t 
saw the beginning o f the swing i n b a r g a i n i n g power towards the govern-
ments i n an obvious way. The terms agreed represented a s i g n i f i c a n t 
advance f o r t h e hosts and conversely an unwanted development f o r the 
majors. The governments d i d not n a t i o n a l i s e , r a t h e r they maintained 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . This was a r e s u l t o f t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t they could 
achieve t h e i r goals without r e s o r t i n g t o such a c t i o n , the t h r e a t alone 
p r o v i n g s u f f i c i e n t . The majors managed t o r e t a i n t h e i r ownership o f 
t h e i r s u b s i d i a r i e s , and i m p o r t a n t l y t h e i r access t o crude o i l s u p p l i e s . 
Even the r a d i c a l States allowed the majors t o continue t o operate i n 
t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . The host governments s t i l l d i d not have s u f f i c i e n t l y 
developed State f a c i l i t i e s t o a l l o w them t o n a t i o n a l i s e t h e assets o f 
t h e majors w i t h any r e a l chance o f running a successful o p e r a t i o n . The 
home governments avoided a l o s s i n supplies, accusations o f i n t e r v e n t i o n 
or endangering r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . Bargaining produced 
agreements t h a t r e f l e c t e d r e l a t i v e advantage not c o n t r o l . The p o s i t i o n 
o f t h e majors was seen t o have changed, governments found themselves 
w i t h more room f o r manoeuvre w h i l s t the majors found themselves w i t h l e s s . 
Ultimately,however, t h e 1971 agreements were a f a i l u r e f o r t h e majors 
f a i l e d t o g a i n f i v e years o f s t a b i l i t y , w i t h i n a year px'ices were 
r a i s e d by the h o s t s , BP's assets were n a t i o n a l i s e d i n Libya and p a r t i . -
c i p a t i o n agreements were widely c a l l e d f o r . Obsolescent b a r g a i n i n g was 
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increasing i n pace* 
The Tehran and T r i p o l i Agreements proved to be mere 'ropes of sand'"^*-
15 
that l e d to the collapse of the 'House of Cards' that was the 
in t e r n a t i o n a l o i l industry and centered upon the fulcrum of the o i l 
multinationals, and which culminated i n the ' o i l c r i s i s ' ^ of 1973-
1974» The o i l c r i s i s can be seen as a 'single traumatic prooess*^ 
however, i t was not a single event. Instead a number of different 
strands combined to produce a c r i s i s . The quadrupling of 
posted-priees and the imposition of production cutbacks and embargoes 
are linked together i n the minds of many observers, and by the 
consumer governments of the period, as a single act by the Host 
States, However, these features of the c r i s i s can be regarded as 
aeparate events that together advanced the obsolescent bargaining 
process. Although the p r i c e increases, production outs and embargoes 
stemmed from the catalyst of the 'Yon Nippur' war of October 6 t h 1973 
and involved both economic and p o l i t i c a l considerations, i t i s l i k e l y 
that the p r i c e 'hikes' arose more from the immediate economic concerns of 
OPEC whilst the embargo emerged from the p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l 
i n t e r e s t s of OAPEC. As a r e s u l t of the o i l c r i s i s the position 
of the majorB was further undermined i n the producer States and 
made more suspect i n home and consumer States. The following discussion 
i s l e s s concerned with the price issue (although i t s p o l i t i c a l implica-
ti o n s w i l l be noted where they influence the r e l a t i o n s between majors and 
governments) than with the re l a t i o n s h i p s between the actors from the 
perspective of the Arab embargo and the home State-consumer reaction 
that led to the formation of the 1EA. 
when Egypt and S y r i a attacked I s r a e l they achieved a s i g n i f i c a n t 
advance through surprise and aggressiveness. Yet, within two weeks 
I s r a e l had counter-attacked and was i n a position to threaten both 
Damascus and the Egyptian lands of the Sues Canal zone. Faced with 
t h i s m i l i t a r y r e v e r s a l the o i l ministers of the Arab states met i n Kuwait 
to coordinate the i r use of an " o i l weapon' against the West i n general 
and the p r o - I s r a e l i States of America, Denmark, the Netherlands, as well 
as Rhodesia, South A f r i c a and Spain i n p a r t i c u l a r . These ten Arab 
States decided upon a 10% cut i n o i l exports and a complete embargo 
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upon these 'hostile' countries. Saudi Arabia postponed her cut to 
provide America with an opportunity to change i t s foreign polioy 
but almost simultaneously America increased i t s aid to I s r a e l and 
Saudi Arabia then introduced i t s embargo. By November the embargo 
had succeeded i n extracting a r e i t e r a t i o n by the EEC of i t B support 
for UN Resolution 242 and a generally more favourable climate towards 
the Arab position i n the c a p i t a l s of Western Europe. OAPEC meetings 
i n Kuwait and Algiers decided upon EEC embargo exemption from some 
of the proposed cutbacks and for an o v e r a l l t o t a l out of 25$ of 
September 1973 l e v e l s . The war was progressing steadily towards 
a hard-fought, b i t t e r and co s t l y m i l i t a r y stalemate. Arab proposals 
for ending the embargo were watered down from the demand for a f u l l 
I s r a e l i withdrawal from 'occupied lands' to a 'timetable' for such 
withdrawals. American foreign policy, whilst remaining substantially 
p r o - I s r a e l i , had moved perceptively towardpa more 'evenhanded' approach 
to the warring States and was seriously pursuing a oease-fire and 
peace settlement. I n January 1974, a c e a s e - f i r e was signed* Already 
i n December 1973 some Arab States had argued for an end to the 
embargo, and by the Algiers Conference i n February 1974 the embargo 
was concluded, whilst i n Washington the consumers were meeting to t r y 
and coordinate t h e i r o i l st r a t e g i e s . The embargo was formally ended 
and eventually i n November 1974 the LEA emerged from consumers' 
deliberations. 
iff 
This then i s the b r i e f history of events during the 1973-1974 c r i s i s . 
But what were the p a r t i c u l a r aims and bargaining positions of the various 
actors and what was the nature of the role played by the o i l multinationals? 
The f i r s t aspect to be noted i s that i t was not the OPEC organisation 
that imposed the embargo and cutbacks, but the OAPEC countries. These 
l a t t e r States include v i r t u a l l y a l l the major producers i n the world and 
therefore as a c o l l e c t i v e group i s in a position to enact an effective 
19 
and coordinated, seaes of exportcuts and embargoes, , There are two 
main, views regarding why the Arabs should have taken such an action 
i n 1973» The f i r s t i s economic. Writers Buch as Benjamin Schwadran 
argue from the hypothesis that 'the Middle East o i l c r i s i s which 
stemmed from purely economic factors suddenly assumed aspects of 
20 
p o l i t i c a l determinant^' . This argument would seem to f i t i n very well 
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with the proclaimed aims and raison d'etre of OAPEC as embodied i n 
i t s constitution: 
'The p r i n c i p a l objective of the organisation i s the 
ceoperation of t h e members i n various forms of 
economic a c t i v i t y i n the petroleum industry, the 
r e a l i s a t i o n of the closest t i e s among them i n t h i s 
f i e l d , the determination of ways and means for 
safeguarding the legitimate i n t e r e s t s of i t s members 
individually and c o l l e c t i v e l y , the u n i f i c a t i o n of 
efforts t o ensure the flow of petroleum t o i t s 
consumer markets on equitable and reasonable terms 
and the creation of a suitable .climate for c a p i t a l 
and expertise > i n v e s t ^ i n the petroleum industry i n 
the member countries' 
Presumably then the embargo was i n i t i a t e d by the OAPEC hosts i n 
order to 'safeguard' the legitimate i n t e r e s t s of i t s members through 
the reduction i n available o i l , leaving 'market forces' to r a i s e p r i c e s , 
only stopping - i n Schwadran's view- when the economic consequenoes 
of international f i n a n c i a l i n s t a b i l i t y threatened the Arab States 
22 
themselves. : However, whilst accepting that economic i n t e r e s t s were 
involved i n the decision to undertake an embargo, more important to 
OAPEC may w e l l have been the p o l i t i c a l aim of changing American 
foreign policy i n t h e i r favour, i n other words, using the majors 
as 'transmission b e l t s ' for the exercise of influence over the 
home {States and consumers. OAPEC, having been established i n 196U 
as a, moderate grouping of Arab States to be a counter balance 
against r i s i n g radicalism, gradually grew i n number and could not 
withstand the pressure from r a d i c a l States for membership,, OAPEC1 s 
radicalism, i n consequence,grew during the early 1970's„ The o i l 
weapon had been used before and was not a new ideas Advocated i n 1947 
by the Arab League as a means of opposing the creation of the I s r a e l i 
State, the following year Jordan and S y r i a closed the pipeline to 
I s r a e l and TAPline was delayed. The Suez War i n 1956 and the June 
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War of 1967 both saw Arab producer attempts to implement an embargo 
against p r o - I s r a e l i States, What was new about the 1973 situation 
was- the unity of OAPEC and the length of the embargo,, Most of the 
Arab States were involved and the action lasted f i v e months (nine i n 
the case of the Netherlands) much longer than ever before* The warning 
given to o i l executives of the Aramco group by King F a i s a l of Saudi 
Arabia, the declared terms for the ending of the embargo, and the 
actual terms that ended i t , a l l point to the p o l i t i c a l motive behind 
We not*. 
the embargo^fce b i t t e r n e s s that remained aft e r the 196 7 c o n f l i c t , the 
pressure extended by the pan-Arab organisations such as the Arab League 
and the PLC- upon ret i c e n t Arab States, and the strong p o s s i b i l i t y that 
the moderate royai&st States such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia undertook 
t h i s action as a defensive measure i n order to grasp the i n i t i t i v e 
away from more headstrong r a d i c a l States, 
OAPEC was able to exert i t s influence over the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s through 
i t s members. Together these States held 65$ of OPEC's °(1 resources 
and 55$ o f world resources. At a time when the market c l e a r l y benefited 
the s e l l e r s , these States were i n a strong bargaining position i n r e -
l a t i o n to the majors. American production was i n decline, Veneeuela 
was f a l t e r i n g and Alaskan and North Sea reserves had not yet been brought 
on-stream i n commercial quantities. Since the beginning of 1972 OPEC 
had been s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e v i s i n g o i l prices upwards and, following the 
outbreak of war, had taken the opportunity to boost prices uni-
l a t e r a l l y to h i g h l e v e l s as figure 2 indicates,, These p r i c e - r i B e s 
were providing ever greater revenues f o r host s t a t e s , thus 
strengthening t h e i r f i n a n c i a l independence from the majors. The host 
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governments were now confident of t h e i r bargaining power. The emergence 
of State-owned corporations as e f f i c i e n t and knowledgeable organisations 
and the speed and spread of p a r t i c i p a t i o n agreements throughout the Gulf 
increasing the host influence over domestic industries from 20tp60'/S 
by 1973* strengthened the bargaining position of the host governments. 
As i n 1971 there were divisions and differences among the Arab States 
that weakened t h e i r position i n some respects. The most obvious 
WftS that between the moderate r o y a l i s t States and the r a d i c a l , 
revolutionary States. The embargo produced curious differences among 
these countries. Whilst a l l agreed to the embargo and the moderate 
States implemented t h e i r cuts, the r a d i c a l states actually increased 
production] The c r u c i a l differences arose from the 'hawkish' desire 
of the r a d i c a l States to get the moderate States to nationalize t h e i r 
o i l industries and take f u l l control of the assets of the majors. 
The moderates, however, preferred to take a gradualist l i n e , arguing 
would 
that t h i s ^ e x e r t more pressure upon the majors and bring greater 
rewards. Moreover, there was, and remains, a difference i n the t a c t i c s 
open to the various governments. Those with large revenues and small 
populations such as Saudi Arabia are able to use production l e v e l s 
to d i r e c t p r i c e s , whereas those with high€C' populations, such as 
I r a n , seek to r a i s e production and prices to increase revenues. F i n a l l y 
the increased production of non-Arab States such as Nigeria to o f f s e t 
the decline i n available o i l reduced the impact of the embargo. 
However, the Arab States undertook t h e i r embargo for p o l i t i c a l 
reasons and were led by Saudi Arabia. The moderates took t h i s 
l i n e for a v a r i e t y of reasons. The enmity between King F a i s a l of 
Saudi Arabia and Nasser of Egypt was l a t e r replaced by a friendship 
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between F a i s a l and Sadat. Arab prestige and pride had been hurt by 
the 1967 war and F a i s a l i n p a r t i c u l a r looked to regain i t 0 These 
States also sought to regain the leadership of the Arab world and 
maintain t h e i r own position against the r a d i c a l s t a t e s a F i n a l l y , majors 
were being made aware that the demand for 100% p a r t i c i p a t i o n would 
have to be conceded. The Arab States needed the majors to operate the 
embargo and commanded s u f f i c i e n t leverage over them to gain t h e i r 
acquiescence as a r e s u l t of the bargaining of the previous three 
years,. 
An important question r a i s e d by the c r i s i s i s the amount of choice 
available to the majors} could they have avoided being used by 
the States? C r i t i c s such as C.T. Rand argue that the majors agreed 
by choice to cooperate because the rewards of 'buy-back' agreements and 
home government support for higher prices as a cover for a change i n 
pi 
foreign policy. For John B l a i r the a b i l i t y of the producers 
to control up-stream f a c i l i t i e s and the continued strength of the 
* • 
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majors down-stream formed a ' b i l a t e r a l monopoly.) , Rand argues that 
the majors r e a l i s e d that compliance would guarantee t h e i r continued 
position and t h i s i s evidenced by high investment l e v e l s prior to the 
c r i s i s * Whilst there Is l i t t l e dispute over whether the majors were 
instrumental i n the embargo, i t i s unclear whether they faced a 
r e a l choice,. The majors had l i t t l e incentive to hold out againt 
Arab government demands, but even i f they had decided to refuse 
l i k e l y that p r e f e r e n t i a l agreements and t h e i r large assets and 
investments would be endangered and even these corporations could not 
afford such a l o s s . 
The majors can be said to have had three goals in October 1973s f i r s t 
26 
to re ta in access to crude o i l supplies at least cost j to change 
American foreign policy towards the Arab States, thereby strengthening 
27 
the place of the majors i n these countries and t h i r d , to survive 
the turmoil as best they could. In e f fec t , the majors achieved a l l 
three of these aimse However, i n the long-run suspicion and uncertainty 
among home States and consumers had led them to become involved i n 
the o i l supply process rather than leave i t solely to the majors* 
The majors are therefore not autonomous actors, but are closely t i ed 
to the heavily State-influenced international system* an^respond to the 
dis tr ibut ion of power within that system and-to the pressures exerted 
thereiiu To assess the role of the majors i t i s equally important to 
analyse the home States* and consumer reactions and bargaining positions. 
In 1975 Christopher Tugendhat wrote that: 
'•••one of the most important of a l l developments tc 
come from the climactic events of the early 1970's 
could well be the emergence of the consuming countriesg 
as p o l i t i c a l actors i n the drama of the next decade' 
However, i n 1973 both the home States and the consumers were complacent 
i n their attitudes towards o i l ancjfehe o i l majors* Following the 1967 
embargo these States had undertaken stockpiling of o i l i n case of 
another such action and provided fo r an OECD Petroleum ISoergenoy 
Group for oi l-sharing 0 Western States were slow to recognise the extent 
of their dependency on the Arab StateSo America imported one-third from 
these states and a 10-15$ cut could produce shortages,, Western Europe 
imported 68% and Japan 90$ of their o i l needs0 These countries did 
not expect the c r i s i s , but the feeling was strong that i f one aros® 
the majors would cope, as they did i n 1956 and 1967* The events of 
the early 1970's i n the o i l industry were simply ignored., Some observers 
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did o f fe r warnings: 
•»o» that the o i l importer governments should consult 
to set guidelines for the companies actually engaged 
i n bargaining i s the most practical proposition o 0 0 
require more responsibility and shore f i n a l responsibil i-
t y fo r negotiated agreements' 
Such warnings were unheeded or came too la te . The 1973 embargo 
stunned these States. The majors' allocation of o i l appeared free from 
home State inf luence^ and a new approach to o i l was called for by 
c r i t i c s . Consumers met the cr is is with confusion: 
a setting of uncertainty and disarray, of 
of t ransi t ion from too successful a past to 
too uncertain a future 
America, as both a home State and the leading importer of o i l , was i n 
a d i f f i c u l t position* America re l ied upon 'her' f i ve majors and 
surrounded o i l i n an aura of 'national security ' . Western Europe was 
used to such dependency, but i t came as a shock to America. I n i t i a l 
reactions were of anger, f rustra t ion and misunderstanding with terms 
such as 'blackm^L' f ree ly used. America f i n a l l y decided upon a diplo-
matic i n i t i a t i v e to draw consumers together, whilst i n i t i a t i n g 'Project 
Independence' i n America i t s e l f . The American government had been 
lYtere. wa& 
reluctant to intervene early on. 6. strong I s rae l i lobby; a CIA report 
AN 
suggesting that Faisal was b l u f f i n g ; the concern of the Secretary of 
State with cease-fire negotiations; and a President distracted by 
re-election and 'Watergate'. Yet, America f e l t i t had to act and act 
as leader of the consumer states. 
Western Europe, however, perceived the cr i s i s d i f fe ren t ly from America 
32 
and relations were permeated with suspicion and resentment i n France 
To Anne-Margret Walton^, the cr is is i s an example of 'issue linkage' 
wherein America linked security interests to economic interdependence. 
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The most important linkage however, i s that of strategic-military 
interests to p o l i t i c a l changes i n the international system of which 
the ' o i l weapon' was a symbol; 
' . e e t h e system of advanced industr ial nations appears 
to stand in the greatest danger of f a l l i n g apart 
as a result of f a i l u re of i t s leaders and peoples to 
recognize that i t i s under attaok from a powerful ex-
ternal force, which, in part at least, sees the 
destruction of the Western system as a desirable 
e n d . • n 
Concern was with possible expansionism by the Soviet. Union i n the 
Middle East and Western Europe. Yet i t i s argued that the Soviet Union 
as an increasing net importer of o i l and i n need of the industr ial 
West to help her own development, had l i t t l e de3ire to see a crumbling 
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Western economy and a r ise in tensions through i t s own actions • Soviet 
production of o i l rose as did supplies to the West at this time, rousing 
cr i t ic ism of the Kremlin among those who foresaw the f i n a l collapse of 
the capital ist system. 
The majors continued with their allocatory scheme. Bri tain with 
i t B status of a ' f r i end ly ' State affirmed by OAPEC and reprieved from 
the embargo s t i l l found i t s e l f with shortages - i t s close l inks 
with BP bft*ta^t no particular advantage. America invited the Western 
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States to meet i n Washington i n February 1974, and^represented the 
beginning of an attempt to establish a unif ied counter-group to OAPEC 
and OPEC. The Washington Conference formed a coordinating committee to 
help form a jo int agency© This decision raised problems for Western Europe 
f o r j under French pressure, the EEC had issued a pro-Arab Declaration i n 
November and i n December a 'secret* meeting of EEC Foreign Ministers 
in Copenhagen agreed an exchange programme of 'mutual assist($nce' with 
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Arab States, and i n January announced an intention to hold a 'dialogue' 
with Arab States. 
For Prance the cr is is signalled an opportunity to extend i t s res t r ic t ion 
of 'Anglo-Saxon' multinationals and also to challenge America's position 
of leadership in the WeBt through the rejection of the IEA i n i t i a t i v e 
and pursuing 'rapprochraent' with the Arabs. Premier Jacques Chirao claimed 
in October 1974 that 'France refuses to be part of a confrontation between 
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users and sellers ' . 
Prance grasped an Arab proposal fo r broad discussions including 'Third 
World' States and the 'International Conference fo r Economic Cooperation' 
opened'in 1975. The IEA had been established i n November 1974i but 
by 1975 s t i l l did not resemble the envisaged organisation for countor-
b.argaining. The majors were l e f t much as they were before the c r i s i s . The 
reaction of the West was ineffectual and la te : 
• In the struggle between the producers and consumers 
the weakness and helplessness of the la t ter was 
amply demonstrated. A l l the daring e f for t s of the 
United States and the very modest e f fo r t s of the French 
were doomed to f a i l fo r they lacked the proper motivation 
fo r a united, determined stand of the consumers and 
a readiness to take the proper measures for the realisation 
of the objectives. They a l l worked at cross purposes, 
each trying to advance i t s own interest at the expense 
of the others. At the end the United States gave i n and 
did not l i v e up to her threats. '-^ 
The majors general^ implemented the wishes of the hosts and gained 
short-term benefits from higher prices and access to preference o i l . The pre-
dominant influence upon the majors was the host States at the same time as 
home State pressure was weak. The weakness of the consumers stemmed from 
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the dilenma over the role they should play i n the international o i l 
industry: 
'•••whether they should throw i n their l o t with each 
other and pursue policies and negotiations as an 
internationally coordinated body of major consuming 
areas, or whether they should seek to manage as best 
they can on & national basis, seeking b i l a t e ra l 
arrangements with individual producers, or whether 
they can, as they have done i n the past, play i t by ear 
and attempt to have a measure of both individual 
and international cooperative act ion. ' 
The majors have t r i ed to Valance the confl ic t ing pressures through their 
t radit ional , role as 'middlemen'. In the 1973 or is is th i s was an untenable 
posi t ion. To t r y to operate the embargo whilst olaiming to be impartial 
actors brought only cr i t ic i sm. The majors l e f t themselves open to such 
attacks by acting fo r the Arab States yet also t ry ing to 'demonstrate 
the va l id i ty of their claim that they can act as neutral intermediaries 
i n moving o i l between hostile governments.'^ Consumers were b i t t e r 
over the arbitrary decisions of the majors emergency committee. The 
hosts were concerned that the majors would reap the f inancial rewards 
resulting from shortages or that the majors might reduce the force of 
the embargo by directing o i l to embargoed States through t h i r d countries* 
The embargo was probably significant not i n i t s physical respects (alfaough 
the long queues of vehicles at the petrol pumps were real enough) but 
i n i t s psychological impact. Governments and majors were made aware of 
the i r interdependency. Specif ical ly, host governments realised the i r 
bargaining influence; consumers recognized that they must take a more 
active role i n the international o i l industry; andthe majors were made 
aware of the State-dominated environment i n which they oper ate and the 
pressure behind the demands of host governments. 
-158-
The relationships between the governments and the multinationals, not 
only i n the o i l cr is is but i a the 1971 agreements as wel l , reflect 
d i f f e r e n t i a l bargaining rather than any absolute control* I n these 
oases the host States have gained greater revenues, participation and 
pricing control through obsolescent bargaining, the majors have 
maintained their role as international merchants of o i l j the consumer 
and home States maintained their o i l flows whilst increasing corporate 
taxation and establishing state-based f a c i l i t i e s to take on larger 
responsibili t ies from these enterprises. The overwhelming force for 
change has been the underlying improvement i n the p o l i t i c a l capacity 
of the host governments to press for their national objectives 
leaving the multinationals performing their role as 'in-between' 
within a more restricted international framework. As one writer describ 
the importance of these events and trends: 
the industry had changed for good. The system which 
onoe dominated i n the Gulf (and elsewhere) had been 
shattered, and the architects of th is demolition were 
G-adaffi, Occidental and the hubris of the unyielding 
Exxon, the redoubtable SoCal and the other f i v e majorso 
The heyday of the independents i n Libya-like an 
accident on a freeway-has l e f t i t s trace on,the industry, 




This study began by asking a number of questions about the 
multinational corporations and thei r relationships with nation-
states. In what sense do they operate beyond the sovereign authority 
of nation-states? % e » does power l i e within these relationships 
and of what i s i t constituted? What confl icts of interests are 
there? Do the multinationals represent a challenge to positions 
of authority assumed by the nation-states i n international affairs? 
This concluding chapter provides the opportunity to bring together 
the principal arguments and the evidence discussed i n the main 
body of th is study and to draw conclusions as to what may be 
said to form the answers to these questions*, 
Prom the interpretations disoussed i n chapter two i t i s clear* that 
there i s a bel ief that the multinationals are very much beyond the 
control of governments, conducting thei r operations on the basis 
of an asymmetrical power relationship with the States, involving 
themselves i n bargaining processes, the outcomes of which are 
inevitably 'zero-sum' i n the l igh t of inevitable and irreconcilable 
conf l ic t s of interest between the actors, and constituting substantial 
challenges to the sovereignty of nation-states. However, i t i s also 
clear from chapter two and from subsequent cnapters that th is 
be l i e f i s mistaken and that these interpretations are unconvincing 
and are b u i l t upon weak, insubstantial theoretical foundations. 
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The case study, by focusing attention upon the actual relations 
between o i l multinationals and governments, reinforces tne view 
suggested by the theoretical discussion that precedes i t , that 
the multinationals are not autonomous units , but are t i g h t l y bound 
into an international system organised by, and fo r the interests of 
nation-states. Power, i n the sense discussed earlier i n the study 
I s largely distributed symmetrically although i n many instances 
the balance t ips i n favour of the States. Bargaining i s undertaken 
on the basis of reciprocal benefits with the parties involved seeking 
agreements that go some way to f u l f i l l i n g their competing interests. 
Finally i t i s evident from the review of the characteristics of both 
the multinationals and the States i n chapter three that the corporations 
do not constitute a serious challenge to government authority and 
appear to reinforce the established nation-state dominated system. 
Such conclusions are obviously inimical to arguments that posit 
a v i r t u a l l y complete independence for these corporations. The 
neo-imperialists base thei r analysis upon an economic rationale 
or rather rat ionalisat ion, the bel ief that i t i s economic processes 
and their l o c i and not p o l i t i c a l frameworks (nation-states) 
that are the important f o c i fo r analytical attention. Multinationals 
are ident i f ied as the largest and most significant concentrations of 
economic strength i n the international economy and as such exploit 
countries as 'captured* economic t e r r i t o ry . These global monopolies, 
i n this view, owe their growth to an inherent and inevitable capital ist 
t r a i t for expansion, and their power to their economic capacity to control 
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countries, be they home or host. Apart from doubts concerning 
capital is t expansionism, national or international, class exploita-
t ion and the eystemio polarisation of wealth and poverty, which were 
raised i n chapter two, i t i s clear that this theory breaks down in a 
number of other respects,, First,the multinationals cannot be said 
to be the monopolies that they are claimed to be by the neo-imperialiot 
The l imi ta t ion ' of competition between capital ist enterprises 
that ia the basis of the concept of monopoly simply does not 
exist among multinationals^ however much these corporations desire 
or pursue i t . For example, there i s i n the car industry intense 
competition between the giants and, as the case study highlights 
i n the o i l industry successive attempts such as that of the 
Achnacarry agreement have either been short-lived or outright fai lures. 
The related argument that these corporations are so large that they 
cannot help but dominate industries, leaving governments with no 
choice but to deal with them and accept their terms, i s more worthy 
of consideration. But th is i s also oversimplified and rendered 
inval id by what is chooses to ignore. In the o i l industry i n 
part icular , but i n others too, the multinationals' position i s being 
eroded by smaller specialised firms and government-owned companies. 
These l a t t e r firms are not constrained by fears that terms agreed 
i n one country w i l l result i n 'leapfrogging' i n others—a j u s t i f i e d 
concern ©f the multinationals as ehapter f i ve has shown* Second, the 
multinationals do not control nation-states as this interpretation 
argues must inevitably b® the casa0 Taking the home countries 
f i r s t , the question <f why these countries should allow the Eu l t i -
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nationals to lose the i r control over their subsidiaries overseas, 
despite the calls fo r aid from these firms to government, i f there i s 
a' harmony ef economic or even c lass interest, i s not sat isfactor i ly 
answered. The l i n k between economio strength and influence over 
government, that i s , power, i s simply assumed, not proved, as i t 
must be i f this interpretation i s to mean anything at a l l . Class i s 
used as an all-embracing 'ca tch-al l ' to cover the deficiencies of 
the abstracted equation: economio capacity equals power (influence). 
I n thiB context, class consists of speculation b u i l t upon dynamics 
ef implication, rather than conclusive proof. I t i s argued that 
because both corporate and governmental executives are from the same 
background, their perspectives are similar and therefore i t i s implied 
that the i r actions w i l l coalesce. Similarly, i t i s argued that a 
' shut t le ' of executives between corporation and government indicates 
that the behaviour of those involved w i l l remain the same despite 
ins t i tu t iona l differences. There is no evidence to support a generalised 
system!cally-ordered iynamic of class of the nature propounded by the 
neo-imperialist interpretation. More important B t i l l i s the evidence 
indicating strong obsolescent bargaining, by host states especially 
that completely contradicts the claim of th is interpretation that the 
multinationals inevitably and irrevocably control nation-states. The 
very presence of such a process, so evident i n the reduction of o i l 
majors to contractors i n countries where previously their position 
of authority over o i l was unchallenged (chapter 5)> refutes the distorted 
determinist explanation of the neo=imperialistSo 
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Equally unconvincing i s the neo-mercantilist argument. In th i s 
interpretation the nmitinational corporation has established i t s 
position during the post-war period as a consequence of a 'natural 
harmony of interests' with i t s home government. American p o l i t i c a l 
and mi l i t a ry expansion i s argued to have provided favourable conditions 
fo r multinationals and i n turn corporate expansion has reinforceot 
the position of America overseas. However, an inevitable decline i n 
the hegemonial position of the home country as a result of the 
d i f fus ion of technology forces the home country to depend upon the 
multinationals to an ever greater extent, thereby allowing the 
multinationals to develop as increasingly more autonomous organisations. 
This interpretation does not attempt to portaay i t s e l f as a general 
theory as does the neo-imperialist, rather i t draws i t s conclusions 
from particular h i s to r ica l instances such as the Cold War. The 
problem with this interpretation l i e s with the inability of these 
h i s to r ica l examples to stand up under investigation. The Cold War 
period must be regarded as the exception rather than the ru l e . The 
threat of Soviet expansion into Western Europe perceived by the 
American government af ter the war, stimulated a similar response 
from government and business. This was only a temporary coal i t ion that 
f a r 
ought not to be generalised too widely^ clearly the history of 
the o i l industry indicates that home country interests do not always 
coincide with those of the multinationals. The o i l c r i s i s highlighted 
the difference i n policy towards the Arab countries in the context 
of Israel with the corporations backing the p o l i t i c a l demands of the 
Arab o i l producers and the African government continuing i n i t s 
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support for I s rae l . I t i s also d i f f i c u l t to accept the view that 
tne multinationals are moving beyond, the control of American regulation 
because America i s i n decline. America's world influence may be i n 
a slight decline, but i t s a b i l i t y to enforce i t s sovereign authority 
upon private corporations cannot be seriously questioned, especially 
as new regulations such as those covering information disclosure 
and environmental protection have been introduced. Moreover, the claim 
that multinationals were manipulated^during the immediate decades 
af ter the war by the home government to secure i t s position overseas, 
such as Cuba following the takeover by Fidel Castro, i s l imited i n i t s 
v a l i d i t y , f o r , i n th is case as i n others, the companies have been 
guided not. by national interests but by their own, as the avoidance 
of Rhodesian (Zimbabwe) sanctions indicates. Home country aggrandisement 
does not constitute the rationale of the multinational corporations* 
operations overseas, although neither can they ent irely ignore the 
requirements of behaviour established by .such countries, both of yhich 
points indicate the weakness of the neb-mercantilist explanation, Further-
more, as the Iranian hostage cr i s i s so graphically i l lus t ra ted , 
wealth (or economic capacity) does not direct ly correlate with power. 
Even the strongest of organisations can be ineffec tual . This core 
be l i e f of this interpretation can be seen to be invalidated by the 
successes of countries i n harnessing suff icient ' countervailing 
power' to r e s t r i c t the position of the multinationals as well as 
the American home country0 
Although the interpretations as a whole argue that the multinationals 
exercise autonomy as a result of economic strength, the sovereignty-
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at-bay and global reach arguments ident i fy the crucial element of 
autonomy as being that of multinationalism i t s e l f , that i s , global 
f l e x i b i l i t y . As new economic organisations, structured on world-wide 
bases, these enterprises are i n a unique position to overcome) national 
res t r ic t ions simply by 'going elsewhere'. Immobile national units 
cannot compete with these corporations on equal terms and are therefore 
threatened with extinction. Although the two interpretations d i f f e r 
as to whether this independent role i s a good or bad development, they 
agree that such an independence i s emerging. Yet, i t i s clear from the 
earlier chapters that the amount of f l e x i b i l i t y aocrvdjig to the 
multinationals as a result of their global structures i s l imi ted . 
The multinationals are represented i n these interpretations as 
homogeneous entities operating with l i t t l e reference to national 
frameworks. However, the study of the multinationals i n chapter 
three indicates that whilst f inancial and managerial l inks are 
centralised, the corporations are based upon parents and subsidiaries 
that are nationally-orientated and responsive to national conditions. 
The global reach interpretation chooses to underlay the importance 
of the obsolescing bargain, and argues that the multinationals possess 
a monopoly of knowledge. But the nation-states are clearly pressing 
the multinationals hard to alter their operating conditions i n favour 
of the countries, and i n so doing are being helped by their greater under-
standing, technical expertise, and research f a c i l i t i e s I OPEC for example 
provides a forum for the exchange of information between o i l producers. 
I t i s a fallacious argument to reason that corporations ©an establish 
an independent role on such an uncertain basis. 
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I t i s evident from this study that the interpretations considered 
and referred to throughout o f f e r unconvincing explanations of the 
multinationals' relationship with nation-states,, Multinational 
autonomy is as fa r from rea l i ty as absolute national independence. 
Just as the State, no matter how powerful, must look to and depend 
upon outside enti t ies for resources to satisfy the needs of i t s people, 
the multinational corporation requires the continued access to countries 
for materials or markets, the control over which resides f i r m l y in the 
hands of national governments. The multinationals are t i e d into the 
nation-states system, the i r actions are regulated by a large and 
growing network of national controls and internat i lnal supervisory 
bodies. Investment and trade laws, taxation requirements, public auditing, 
information disclosure requirements, competition policies suoh as 
the American Anti-trust legis la t ion , codes of conduct such as that 
declared by the ACM, ownership and part icipation agreements providing 
for government involvements such as those achieved by the Arab 
countries i n the early 'seventies' with the o i l majors, export and 
import quotas, environmental protection res t r ic t ions , labour provisions, 
safety practices, production and marketing quotas, together are some 
of the regulations that form of body of 'rules' of behaviour for the 
multinationals against which their conduct can be Judged by governments 
and within which the i r relationships with governments are undertaken,, 
These rules form the context in which bargaining and negotiating 
takes plaoe0 Mul t i la tera l cooperation between governments reinforces 
the impact of these rules 0 This cooperation may be based upon 
regional interests as i n the case of the ACM, or as chapter f ive shows. 
i t may be based upon producer concerns (OPEC; or consumer interests 
(lEA). OAPEC for example involved a complex interaction of economic, 
m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , and religious factors in it3 formation and 
development. Moreover, the establishment by the United Nations of 
a Centre for the Study of Transnational Coi*poratiOns, i n association 
with i t s investigation and publication of a code of conduct fur ther 
res t r ic ts the possibli ty that the multinational corporation constitutes 
an autonomous organisation i n the international system. 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s witn tne interpretations largely stem from the 
underlying misunderstanding of the dis t r ibut ion of pawer present 
i n the relations between corporation and government. Power i s 
symmetrical rather than asymmetrical i n nature, involving not the 
imposition of a set of conditions upon one actor by the other, but 
a negotiated outcome based upon d i f f e r e n t i a l bargaining that i n 
the majority of instances appears to o f f e r reciprocal benefits 
to those involved, rather than the 'zero-sum' bargains claimed 
by the interpretations in which one gains only i f the other loses. 
As can be seen from chapter four, size alone is a misleading guide to 
the dis t r ibut ion of power. As far back as 1937 Jersey Standard's 
subsidiary was expropriated by Bolivia. The following year the 
subsidiaries of both Jersey and Shell were expropriated by Mexico 
and i n the ' s ix t ies ' Peru successfully expropriated the Exxon 
subsidiary IPC. However, these examples do largely represent 
breakdowns i n , or the avoidance of , the processes of negotiation,. In 
these cases the governments were indeed able to gain their objectives 
at the expense of the multinationals despite the intense pressure placed 
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upon them by these f i rms. Of course there are also examples In 
which the multinationals have been able to exert suff ic ient pressure 
to achieve their goals at the expense of government: the Chilean 
case in the 'seventies' or the Iranian cr i s i s i n the ' f i f t i e s ' 
are, as we have noted i n earlier chapter, instances where the 
countervailling bargaining power of a government was too weak to wi th-
stand that of the corporation. Yet, i t i s also quite evident from the 
preceding chapters that these are exceptions, bargaining does 
usually take place, often of a b i t t e r nature, and benefits are 
largely distributed on a pragmatic basis of what i s possible. As 
the caBe of India has shown, despite the country's need fo r o i l 
supplies from outside sources, technical expertise and r i sk 
capital that l e f t i t dependent upon the o i l majors, i t was s t i l l 
able to establish i t s control over the domestic industry during the 
' s ix t i e s ' and 'seventies'. Out of the bargaining involved, the 
government secured i t s objectives of participation iittfie o i l 
industry, higher revenues, agreement on graduated ownership, and a 
continued dialogue with corporation that were able to provide 
capital and expertise as well as o i l . On the other hand, the 
oi l majors managed to maintain a role i n India, i n other words 
they were granted continued access to the Indian market with 
reasonably secure returns for their investments. I t has alao been 
seen from the analysis of the Arab o i l producers' relations witk the 
majors that whilst the producer countries gained effective control 
over prices, supplies and ownership of Middle Eastern O i l , the majors 
in return were able to secure (at least temporarily) preferential 
terms fo r the supply and purchase of this o i l . Moreover, the 
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requirements of these governments in the related area of petrochemical 
plant development, namely that the majors supply the r i s k cap i ta l ? 
f u l f i l s national goals but also offers the majors a continued involve-
ment inside these countries. In each case those involved recognized 
the fact that each had something that the other needed. Influence 
was reciprocal , and of a re lat ive rather than absolute nature. 
These corporations and governments could not afford to alienate 
each other as result of an exercising of asymmetrical power; 
the p o l i t i c a l process clearly involved the resolution of competing 
interests thiough bargaining and compromise, and not the imposition 
of conditions upon one actor by the other. Conflicting, or, as i s 
more often the case, competing interests cannot therefore be 
r e a l i s t i c a l l y drawn as being either inevitable or irreconcilable, 
the power balance precluding the possibi l i ty of corporation or govern-
ment being able to effectively pursue i t s interests in isolation 
from those of the other actor, as in the case of Kennecott in 
Chile mentioned earlier in the study i l lus tra ted . The copper 
multinational could not ignore the mounting pressure from the 
Chilean government and the rea l danger of expropriation. Once the 
government had acted, i t found that i t could not ignore a network 
of f inancial commitments that required compensation i n the light 
of expropriation to which the government had to address i t s e l f . 
One of the most obvious conclusions to be drawn from thiB study 
i s that the relationship between the multinationals and the nation-
states i s a great deal more sophisticated than the interpretations 
argue. Mention was made in the introduction of the differences to be 
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found among the types of multinational and the nature of their 
operations. I t must also be evident from the intervening chapters 
that there i s an even greater number of differences among the 
countries. Some countries are obviously larger than others; some are 
wealthy and some poor; there are thoBe that are weak and those 
that are strongj some are less dependent upon multinationals than are 
others and there are some that are more hostile to these corporations 
than others. 
Strength and weakness can originate from p o l i t i c a l , economic or 
natural factors, America exercises a worldwide role , i t i s 
economically mature and diversi f ied, there i s a high degree of 
p o l i t i c a l stabi l i ty and i t i s r ich in natural and human resources,, 
On the other hand, countries such as Ethiopia or Chad are po l i t i ca l ly 
s tr i fe - torn , economically underdeveloped and lack resources. The Arab 
o i l producers do not exercise a role comparable to America's but possesses 
great strength through their possession of o i l resources in demand by 
the corporations. A strong po l i t i ca l w i l l offers a counti'y a better 
position from which to deal with multinationals. The powerful 
leadership pf Qaddafi in Libya, the religious fervour of the Iranian 
leadership, or the ideological radicalism of Algeria or Iraq a l l 
contribute to a position of strength with regard to the multinationals 
lacked by others. 
S imi lar ly , dependency i s not limited to those countries that are 
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identif ied as underdeveloped, although in some instances national 
econuiniea can become t ied to the fortunes of the multinationals that 
operate within them, such as Chile in the 'sixties* and early 
•seventies'. Developed countries too fear that tneir technological 
lag behind the United States forms a type of dependency from whicn 
i t i s d i f f i cu l t to escapei as th is study has already seen the EEC 
was partly encouraged in i t s formation by those that saw an opportunity 
for European corporate mergers to challenge the technological lead 
of American multinational*. In some cases dependency i s more obvious 
such as the Japanese reliance upon o i l supplieaprovided by the 
o i l majors. Yet, even in the case of America the position can. be 
ambiguous. As one of the leading economies of the world i t might be ex-
pected that concern over dependency oni multinationals would be 
minimal. But as chapter three indicated there ass worries that 
the American economy i s developing into a service-orientated post-
industrial economy generating less income, thereby increasing the 
dependence upon the revenues derived from multinationals oprating 
overseas. Since it.is a reasonable conclusion to draw in the light 
of previous discussions of autonomy and power, no government 
i s entirely independent from those multinationals operating within 
the confines of i t s authority, but some -such as America- are more 
independent than others. 
The differences in attitude of governments towards the multinationals 
cannot be regarded in isolation from the factors discussed .immediately 
above, but are, however, also influenced by other distinct factors* 
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A comparison between Libya and South Africa suitably i l lus trates some 
of these factors,, Both these countries are r ich in natural resources* 
Libya in o i l and South Africa in precious metals and minerals. Both are 
importantly placed geographically; Libya for the Mediterranean and 
northern and central Africa; South Africa for southern Africa and 
the Indian Ocean. Both are also the focus for international disapproval: 
Libya "because of i t s expansionism in north Africa and elsewhere; 
South Africa because of i t s domestic policy of apartheid* However, 
their respective attitudes towards multinationals are very different. 
The revolutionary leadership of Libya has been reinforced over the 
years by soc ia l i s t ideological trappings; together this p o l i t i c a l 
oomplexlon has proved unfavourable to large capi ta l i s t multinationals. 
Religious fervour directed at the representatives of Western materialism 
has provided an additional rationale for government pressure upon 
the o i l majors. Sucoessive obsolescent bargaining has been interspersed 
with nationalisation of multinational operations in Libya and. trie 
establishment of national control. In South Afr ica , on the other 
hand, a more favourable climate exists for multinationals. Ideologically 
sympathetic to capita l i s t free enterprise ana bolstered oy a 
national consensus of values centered upon the protestant work 
ethic, economic nationalism find6 i t s expression in tne desire to 
attract enterprises that w i l l enhance the position of South Africa 
i n southern * Africa and the world. This desire i s given added urgency 
by the country's unpopularity abroad. By locating in South Afr ica , these 
corporations can be used a symbols of South Afr ica ' s determination 
to order i t s own a f f a i r s without outside advice or pressure* Apart 
froa the factors of ideology, p o l i t i c a l leadership, re l ig ion, or 
eoonomics, suggested by this comparative example, there are 6thers. 
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Francej for example, assumes a hostile posture with regard to multi-
nationals from abroad9 especially those from America, almost as a 
matter of national pride and irrespective of the question whether 
these corporations w i l l be granted access to the French economy» 
The f i erce French protectiveness towards i t s oultural, social 
and politico-economio identity i s an important.'feature of i t s 
attitude towards these corporations* 
Such differences between countries cannot be ignored, and i t i s clear 
that generalisation i s not easyc The simple postulates of multinational 
autonomy or asymmetrical power distort the real i ty of differing actors 
and national and corporative perspectives or actions. There i s a need 
for detailed analysis of the multinationals* relations with governments 
to provide a larger body of empirical information for interpretations 
to escape the problems of working in an area of limited information. 
However, even with the information that i s available i t i s possible 
to conclude that the multinational corporation does not constitute 
a challenge to the authoritative position of the nation-state in 
contemporary international a f f a i r 3 0 These corporations have emerged as 
a response to the prevailing international environment in which they 
have Bought to operate. These private organisations have developed 
structures designed to reduce the costs involved in transactions across 
national frontiers such as t a r i f f f luctuations 0 Howevert this 
establishment of international structures represents a development 
within the existing framework of a nation-state. The parent-subsidiary 
relationship operates within national jurisdictions and the network of 
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regulations that form the context for international bargaining 
between corporations and governments. To identify the multinationals 
as being subordinate parts of a nation-state dominated system, i s not 
to undervalue their significance in that system. The multinationals 
are able to provide sources of revenue, employment, expertise, 
capital and distribution and marketing networks. Moreover,as the o i l 
c r i s i s discussed in chapter f ive highlights, the multinationals can 
play a diplomatic role by providing a forum in which competing 
national interests can 'te:pursuecl|free from the danger of f r i c t ion 
arising from direct national confrontation: the multinationals assuming 
the role of 'lightning rods' in the international system. The multi-
nationals are therefore important organisations within contemporary 
international relat ions. 
Although on the one hand there are obvious examples of multinationals 
being able to imposeiheir conditions upon governments and being able to 
accrue a higher level of advantages from their bargaining relations 
with some governments, on the other hand, there are also examples 
of governments imposing their own conditions upon multinationals 
through nationalisation and of increasing their advantages through 
obsolescent bargaining. On balance, however, these examples 
represent the extremes of the relationships between multinationals 
and governments. In general the corporations and governments conduct 
their relations on the basis of a mutual recognition that each 
has something to gain from a balanced relationship and continuing 
dialogue with the other. Power i s exercised through the medium of 
d i f ferent ia l bargaining that ref lects i t s relative and symmetrical 
nature. Bargaining outcomes mirror the distribution of power in 
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the reciprocal benefits to corporations and nation-states. These outcomes 
also re f lec t a desire to achieve objectives within the framework 
of mutually-acceptable agreements, a fa i lure to achieve such an 
agreement opening the way to attempts to gain these objectives 
through recourse to extreme tac t i c s . The crucial point to emphasise 
however, with regard to the central question that has been posed 
concerning multinational autonomy, i s that this bargaining relat ion-
ship takes place within the context of a network of regulations 
established by the nation-states that define the boundaries 
of multinational operations and the l imits to bargaining. In effect 
the 'rules' of the game are established by the nation-states and in 
consequence the multinationals are required to play out their role 
accordingly. The multinational clearly does not l i e beyond the 
sovereignty of nation-states, but rather forms an important 
and integral part of an established international system that i s 
heavily influenced by the interests of nation-states. 
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